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The Myth of Semantic P1•esuµi,,,,;i tiou 
Steven E. Boer 
William G. Lycan 
The notion of "presupposition" has caJ..>1.ured th" fancy of many 
linguists, and appeals to "presuppositions" are widely regarded as 
carrying explanatory force in linguistic theory. Our aim in this study 
is to criticize, from a standpoint congenial (tuough by no means 
specific) to Generative Semantics and the Pe,.rormative Analysis, the 
popula.r thesis that there are "semantic" presuppositions , i.e . that 
certain sorts of s entences have peculiar quasi- logical impl i cations 
which are distinct from ordinary entailm1:nts aud yet closely akin to 
them, in that the falsity of the alleged implicata results in appre-
ciable semantic consequences anent the seuten.:e:~ in question. A 
methodological. corollary of this thesis iu thut linguists who regard 
grammar for a natural language as operating or, a kind of' "natural logic" 
must complicate their semantic theories by -u,., :1dditio11 of more or less 
complex formal apparatus to account for th" dl~tinctively sernAntic 
oddities which are alleged to result wlteu "vn,!:upposi,ions" fail.I We 
shall argue (i) that the thesis is fals1: , (H) thut cvnsequently the 
methodological corollary is without sui•, •Jrt., ' a!td (iii) that alJ.eged 
cases of semantic presupposition do not <'Vt'u l\>rm a natural kind, in 
that where discernible "implications" do obt;,,..u1 , they turn out to be 
relations of distinct and largely unrelated :;ort.s (thus , we shall urge 
that such cases not be subsumed under a siugh· tlteor..tical term) . We 
shall accordingly offer piecemeal alternativ.., explanations of the 
intuitions in question, and go on to provitl.., what we believe to be an 
illuminating diagnosis of the fallacies ou which th<: notion of semantic 
presupposition rests. 
l. Introduction : "Presupposition" 
Most linguistic semanticists (and mau, philosophers of language) 
seem to agree that the notion of "presuvpv~lt lun" is both rich in 
intuitive content (and thus available as ,..u imµort.aut; source of data 
for syntax and semantics) and crucial for 0,U' understanding and theori -
zing about the meanings of utterances (auu ll.Jus th-,oreticalJ.y important 
in syntax and semantics). A reader of tile ] it;f;>rat<U"e comes away with 
the impression that we have a vast stocll.p.il- of r.:latively hard data 
concerning the presuppoilitions of sente1w..,:,;, !Jut that we have yet to 
get quite as clear about what 11presuppo:s.u,c" is u:; vurist metatheoreti-
cians would like; nevertheless, the intuitiv,• IJvtlon that we have will 
do well enough to go on with , and we may <:out.im«:: to appeal to data 
concerning presupposition in framing syntactic uuu semantic arguments 
on diverse topics. 
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Here are some examples of pairs of sentences the like of which 
have been here and there adduced under the rubric of "presupposition" 











































Sam rea.lizes that Irv is a Martian. 
Irv is a Martian . 
Fred regretted leaving home. 
Fred left home. 
Bring me the avocado in the brown paper bag, 
There is an avocado in a brown paper bag. 
Few girls are coming. 
Some girls are coming. 
If Irv were a Martian, I'd be running away from here. 
Irv is not a Martian. 
Have you stopped beating your wife? 
You have beaten your wife . 
I hope I can disprove Godel's Theorem. 
It is possible to disprove Godel's Theorem. 
I promise to bring back your toilet- seat. 
I intend to bring back your toilet-seat. 
Fred, who -was fat, could not run. 
Fred was fat. 
Camille is pretending to be sick. 
Camille is not sick. 
John managed to get out of the phone booth. 
John tried to get out of the phone booth. 
She was poor but she was honest . 
Being poor tends to preclude being honest. 
If you touch me again, I'll scream. 
I f you don ' t touch me again, I wn' t scream. 
Melvin is a bachelor. 
Melvin is an adult. 
It ~y perhaps be clear that the i'irst membe1· of each of these pair s 
somehow "suggests" or "implies" its fe).low. What is not at all clear 
(and would be naive to asswne) is that there is a single distinctive 
and important relation which is instantiated by a.ll these pairs. In 
fact, as we shal l see, the differences betveen the pairs are more 
interesting tban the similarities. 
To co111plicate the matter further, the literature contains a richly 
varied panoply of nonequivalent definitions or introductions of the term 
presuppose and its cognates, e.nd it is clear that not one but many 
distinct theor etical notions are in play as well . There are many more 
such notions than have been pointed out to date, though they may be 
grouped fairly easily into a few larger categories. And it is clear 
(though we shall not be able to docwnent the first and third of these 
points here) that (i) the differences between tbese various notions 
have tacitly been traded on, sometimes with substantive (but spurious ) 
results; that (ii) when the proper distinctions have been made, most of 
the resulting notions will be seen to be relatively clear and manageable, 
though some (including the core concept of "semantic" presupposition) 
will be found to be vacuous and/or theoretically useless; lllld that 
4 
(iii) when the differences have been attended to~ out not before~ 
signif'icant progress ~y- be made on the relevant theoretical isaues ., 
such a.s the q_uestion of' transitivity and the much-touted '\rrojection 
problemu.3 
Some recent theorists have at la.st begun dissecting the monolith in 
crude but helpful ~ays . It is b7 now more or less standard to distinguish 
semantic from pragmatic :presuppositions (Sta.l:naker 1972; Keenan 1971; 
KarltWlen J.913; Thomason 1973; Atlas 1975; a.nd others}. That is, it is 
pointed out that there are a.t least two such notions that a.re J.)erha.ps 
not quite the s-a.me. But even this rough d.ifi'ere.nce is rarely taken 
seriously in the literature--thus Karttunen (1973), having pointed out 
the distinct ion., vrit es~ 
For the time being~ let. U$ simply a.:sslll:il.e that. -we understand 
what is meRD.t by a presupposition n the ~ase of simple 
senten~es .. . a.nd turn our attention to Ill.Ore complex cases . 
• . • we may- ev-en forget about the distinction between 
semantic and pra~tic presuppositions. What is seid a.bout 
one kind o-f presupposition will apply to the other as veil 
(I hope). (p. l7l) 
These t\lo remarks will startle a. reader vho ha.s taken a careful 1ook 
at our list o:f sentence pa.ii:s or he.s taken note of the ~ssorted dlif"ini-
tions or presuppositioo that have been ofrered in the literature. 
Let us list a fer.. of' these defi.nitions: 
(15) a. s1 Eresu:pposesi s2 ~ df s1 entails s2 and s1 1 s 
denTal entai s 82. Horn 1969; Morgan 1969} 
b. s1 p.resu~oses2 S2 = di' If S1 "makes literal 
sense~ th~n S2 is true. (Keen&.n 1971) 
Si presupposes3 s2 = dr If Si is true1 then 82 
is true; and i.f S1 is false~ then S,2 is true 
{i.e . i~ S2 is not t~ue, then Si is neither true 
nor f'a.lse) , (Alterne..tively: Si aeces sitates 
S2 and. S1 1E denial necessitates S2 . ) (Strawson 
1950; Keenan l971; Lakoff' l972; Kart unen 19711:J)). 
d. s1 presu;egis~s4 s2 ~ d~ A speaker utte~s s1Sz is t:rue. 
felicitously only if that speaker believes S2. 
someone 	present believes 82-
it is at least pretended that 
S2 is true . 
etc. 
(Heringer l972), 
And a close conpe.nion~ 
(J.6) 	 s1 1 invite:s the in::ference ofu S2 = df" Given certain 
he.ckg~o-und beliefs that ve have, we ~ould have some 
,ra.rrant f'or as.slJI!ling that if someone J utters Sl> 
he wi11 a.c a.s if he is •,dlli.ng o be regarded. as 
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having connnitted himself by uttering s1 to the 
truth of s2 . (Geis and Zwicky 1971)5 
The semantic/pragmatic distinction cuts a.cross this representative 
set of definitions in a rough but noticeable way. Let us say, albeit 
clumsily, that a notion of "presupposition" is semantic iff the impli-
cations in question are a function of semantic status, semantic proper-
ties, propositional content or logical form, while a notion of "presup-
position" is pragmatic iff the implications in question arise only in 
virtue of contextual consi derat i ons, the roles of the relevant sentences 
in standard speech acts, Gricean conversational matters, simple matters 
of background knowledge on the part of particular speakers, etc. By 
this crude criterion, definitions (15a-c) delineate semantic notions, 
while (15d), (16) and others of their ilk yiel d pragmatic notions; 
entailment, significance, truth- value, and necessitation are semantic 
attributes which sentences have or can be treated e.s having in isolation, 
while felicitiousness and background beliefs are the sorts of things that 
pertain to particuJ.ar speakers in particular circumstances. 
We have argued elsewhere (Boer and Lycan 1974) against the linguistic 
relevl!,nce of "invited inference" a la (16). And, as we shall try to 
lll8,ke clear, the Austinian notion specified by (15d) is somewhat beyond 
the scope of this paper. Thus, we shall concentrate on "semantic" pre-
supposition, and debunk it in the ways sketched above, providing for a 
number of typical cases alternative accounts of the relevant phenomena. 
2. Our Program 
The first thing to notice is the dubiousness of (15a) and (15b), as 
compared to (15c). Let us begin with (15b). Its main defect is that i t 
is impossibly vague . (Is literal meant as opposed to metaphorical??). 
In addition, (15b) does not seem to square at all veil with examples 
01' the sort listed as (l)- (14). To begin, each first member of those 
pairs "makes literal sense," period (in whatever sense we can intuitively 
attach to that terlll) , whether or not its associated second member is 
true. Second, in the sense of (15b), 
(17) Tommy fell off his tricycle. 
presupposes2 
(18) There is at least one language. 
since (17) could not very well be true unless there were some language 
for it to be true in; and this is not an "implication" of imy relevant 
sort. (15b) presumably is a misstatement 01' (15c), on the assumption 
that "making literal sense" is in some way intimately connected with 
having a truth-value. Let us move on to (l.5a). 
2 .1 . Two Fallacies 
(15a) has an extraordinary :('eature. 6 If S1 entails S2 and S1's 
denial entails S2, then their disjunction entails S2. But their dis-
junction is a tautol.ogy, viz . an instance of the Lav of Noncontradiction. 
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Since a tautology cannot entail a nontautologous sentence, s2 must 
be a t aut ol ogy as well. Thus, no sentence pr esupposes1 anything but 
tautologies . Moreover, since every tautology is entailed by every 
sentence (including any S1 in its denial), every sentence presupposes1 
all tautologies . Again , these results do not square with the data 
sentences in (1)-(14) . 
It is easy enough to see what has gone wrong. Entailment is essen-
tially a concept of standard bivalent logic , though it can easily be 
defined in more exotic formai systems. Presumably what exponents of 
(15a) have been ge.tting at is a.gain the idea that, when S1 "presupposes" 
S2 and S2 fails , S1 is neither true nor false; but (15a) fails to 
capture this idea, since entailment supports contraposition (if s1 
presupposes1 S2 and S2 i s false, then S1 is false and S1's denial is 
false, which--assuming the validity of double negation- is a contra-
diction; thus , presuppositions1 cannot fail . ) 
A notion of "presupposition" that turns on the idea of truth-
valuelessness requires a nonclassical semantics; so what the "presup-
position" enthusiast really needs is a model -theoretic notion of strict 
implication that does not support contraposition, and this is the notion 
of necessitation (cf. , e . g . van Fraassen 1968) . 
A sentence S1 necessitates a sentence S2, roughly, just in case 
there is no model relative to which S1 is true and S2 is untrue. In a 
bivalent system, obviously, the notion of necessitation coincides with 
that of entailment, since in such a system to be untrue is to be false; 
if S1 necessitates S2 11Pq in some model Sz is f~lse 1 then in that model 
s1 is untrue and hence false as well . In a nonbivalent system, however, 
this last inference fails. A. model can falsify S2 without falsifying Si, 
since in that model s1111ay be neuter (here, truth-vaJ.ueless) rather than 
false. What the proponent of semantic presupposition presUlllSbly has in 
!rind, then, is that for S1 to "presuppose" S2 is for both S1 and its 
denial to necessitate S2, it being unde-rstood that the underlying logic 
does not respect bivalence; thus, the falsity of S2 requires the truth. 
valuelessness of S1. And this is just the Strawsonian notion of "pre-
supposition" captured by (15c) above . Since both (15a) and (15b) seem 
when pressed to melt away into (15c), and since (15c) has in fa.ct itself 
beet, widely promulgated in some of the loci classici of presupposl.tion, 
we shall take (15c) as codifying the core concept of "semantic pre-
supposition", and reserve the latter term as designating this notion, 
viz . that of presupposition3. 
For the record, notice t-wo formal points: First, (15c) still entails 
that every tautology is semantically presupposed by every sentence 
(since every tautology is necessitated by eve1-y sentence), though happily 
it lacks the more embarrassing feature of (15a). We propose to pass 
over this i'act e.s being e. "don't- care"; it is no more interesting that 
tautologies are semantically presupposed by every sentence than it is 
that they are entailed by every sentence. Second, semantic presupposi-
tion (presupposition3) is transitive-the proof is trivial.7 Informally: 
Suppose S1 presupposes$;? and S2 presupposes S3. Nov if 63 is false 
and hence not true, then S2 is truth-valueless and hence not true; and 
if s2 is not true , then S1 is truth-valueless . Thus, S1 presupposes S3 . 
With the distinction between entailment and necessitation in mind, 
we may now display the flaw in a widely accepted argument of Li.nsky's 
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(1967) against Strawson' s celebrated criticism of Russell's Theory of 
Descriptions. As is well known, Russell (1905) contended that 
(19) The King of France is wise. 
entails 
(20) There is one and only one King of France. 
Strawson (correctly) draws from this claim the consequence that if (20) 
is false then (19) is false , and argues against this consequence, 
concluding that the falsity of (20) results in the truth-valuelessness 
of (19} , i.e. that (19) semantic~y presupposes (and therefore does not 
entail) ( 20) . 
Linsky maintains that this alleged contrast is spurious-- far from 
refuting Russell's claim t hat (19) entails (20), he says, Strawson has 
succeeded in proving that (19) does entail (20)!; 
Let us assume that C(l9)J presupposes C(20)J. What 
this means is that from the premise that C(l9)J has a truth-
value, it follows that C(20)J is true. But if C(l9}J is true, 
it follows that C(l9)J bas a truth value. Therefore, if C(19)J 
is true, it follows that C(20)J is true. But C(19)J is 
true, if, and only if, the King of 'France is wise, and C (20) J 
is true if, and only if', one, and only one, person is King of 
France. Therefore the statement that the King of France 
is wise entails the stateJUent that one, and only one, person 
is King of France. (p . 94). 
This argument is multiply defective. First, it should be noted that 
Linsky cannot happily be interpreted as meaning 11f'ollows deductively" 
by follows (though earlier passages suggest that this is what he does 
intend); for the metalinguistic claim that (20) is. ~rue does not, 
strictly speaking, follow deductively- from the metalinguistic claim 
that (19) is true--if only for the trivial reason that (20) (or (19)) 
might have meant something entirely different from what it in fact 
does mean. When we say that the truth of' (20) "follows from" the truth 
of (19), we mean rather that th~ metalinguistic conclusion that (20) 
is true is deducible fro.m the metalinguistic claim that (19) is true 
conjoined with some contingent premises borrowed from our theory of our 
own language (specii'ically, the premise that (19) and (20) have the 
meanings that they do). Let us say that the claim that (20) is true 
follows theoreticalll from the claim that (19) is true, understanding 
the relevant theory call it L) to be whatever theory gives the correc't 
account of the t wo sentences ' - meaning- and entai-bnent-relations . 
With this usage in mind, we may concede that Linsky has succeeded 
in. showing that the truth of (20) follows theoretically from that of 
(19). And, since the two instances of Convention T cited by Linsky are 
themselves deducible from the theory &, we may further admit that 
(2l) If the King of' France is wise, then there is one 
and only one King of France. 
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is a. theorem ot' I,, a.nd thus that (20) itself' f'ollovs theoreticw..ly 
:from (19) itself-:- But these results do not suffice to shO"W' that (19) 
entails (20). For the theory L i vi..rtue of which (20) follows 
theoretically from (19) is a brutely contingent theory; and to say 
that (20) :follows f'rom the conjunction oi' (19) with a.n additional 
contingent premise Ls (obviously) not to sa.y that (19) itself eotails 
(20). 
Possibly Linsky might back up~ and argue that for (i9} to entail 
(20) just is for L, the correct theory of our language, to yield the 
conclusion tha.t if (19) is true then (20) is true. If t.his is right~ 
then, since Linsky has shown that L does yield this cQnclusion~ (19) does 
entail (20) a.rter all. But to take this line vouJ.d be to overlook the 
indispensable ~act that Strawson is working vi.thin a three-valued logic. 
The ract that the truth of {19} requi~es the truth or (20) iTI Yirtue of 
L does not guarantee th.at the a.ls ity ot' (20) so requires the f'alsity of 
f19); what Linsky has succeeded in showing is only that (19) necessitates 
(20). One could. obtain the stronger claim that (l-9) entails (20) only 
by adding tbe 1'urther premise that (19) is either true o:r :fa.l.se; but 
th.at prends,e is just what is at issue. Thus Linsky has failed to 
demonstrate the incoherence o~ the distinction between entailment a.nd 
semantic presupposition. 
It is easy enough to state the facts of the Bitu.a.tion in a. vay that 
is both perfectly coherent and free from any of the foregoing confusions. 
Russell and Stra;wson agreed tne.t (19) neeessitates (20), i.e. tha.t the 
tr~th of (20) follows theoreticall.y from the truth of (i9). Hovever, 
Russell believed that the falsity of {19) follows theoretically- from 
the falsity of (20)~ while Stravson contends that what the falsity of 
(20) theoretically requires is rather the trut.h- valuelessnesa or (19) •. 
Invoking en obvious notation: 
RUSSELL 	 STRAWSON 
T(l9J 	 ~ T(20) --agree-- T(19) => T(20) 
L L 
F(20) 	 =io... T(l9} -a.gree- - F(20) ;:,..... T(19) 
L L 
F(20) 	 ;;:,, F(19) - disagree-- F(20) ~- T(l9) &- F(l9) 
L L 
Now ve may def'ine necessitation, enta.illnent and presupp0sition in corre-
lative terms . 
61 necessitates S2 i T(61) T(S2).:i:,. 
L 
Si en ails S2 if':f Si necessitates S2 and F ( 62) :::,. F(S1) · 
L 
s1 ~emantica.lly presupposes S2 iff 81 necessitates S2 and 
F(S2 ) 	 ~ - T(81) & .., F(S1.).  
L  
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Thus, entailment and pres·.ipposition are mutually exclusive species of 
necessitation. And this terminology, in addition to its coherence and 
its safety from Linsky's objection, makes good sense of the dispute 
between Russell and Strawson, since it is perfectly coherent on this 
usage to say that S1 presupposes but does not entail S2; and as Strawson 
suggests, entailment and presupposition are mutua.lly incompatible. 
2.2. Analytical Tools 
These formal preliminaries have succeeded in making ou.r notion of 
semantic presupposition clear, and in demonstrating its coherence. But 
it remains to be seen whether that notion is in addition both nonempty 
and useful in linguistic semantics or any other branch of linguistic 
theory. And indeed the central thesis of this essay is that the notion 
is in fact empty, and hence uninteresting. In Sections 3 and 5 we shall 
embark on a series of central case studies. In each study we shall first 
show directly that the case in question does not fit the definition of 
semantic presupposition or anything usefully like it, and then go on to 
offer a reasonably plausible account of what is instead going on, though 
we have not the space here to go into each case in as much detail as 
we would like. 
In section 4 we shall offer some explanations of why it has seemed 
so plausible to construe these cases as instances of semantic presup-
position; ou.r explanations, we believe, afford considerable insight into 
the relation between semantics and pragmatics. 
For the most part we shall concede that such pairs as (l)- (14) above 
exemplify some very loose and informal generic relation of "suggestion" 
or "implication", but we intend our case studies to show ( as our second 
most important thesis) that the cases surveyed are cases of a number of 
entirely different kinds of "suggestion" or 11implication", and that , 
although each of these kinds of "suggestion" is linguistically interesting 
and important in it.sown right, they have nothing interesting or important 
in conunon, If we are right, then, (i) there are no semantic presuppositions, 
though there are other, looser sorts of implicative relations; and (ii) 
there is no general class of phenomena worthy of being subsumed under 
any common theoretical term such as presupposition at all, though there 
are far narrower relations of "sugge!i>tion" or whatever that are indivi-
dually well worth investigation and explication. We shall, however, 
retain the term suggest to designate whatever it is (however bori.ng) about 
all or most of the pairs (1)-(14) that has made theorists suppose there 
to be an interesting general notion which they all exemplify. 
In Section 3 each alleged case of "presupposition" will be e:iq,lained 
away in terms of homelier and more manageable linguistic relations, and 
we shall succeed in preserving bivalence throughout. In aid of that 
program, we must spend a little time getting out a few of these humbler 
relations. 
2,2,l. Entailment 
We shall argue in a fe1< of our cases that the alleged "presupposi-
tions" are simply classical (semantic) entailments which, for one reason 
or another, have eluded recognition as such. In the primary sense, 
classical entailment is a model-theoretic relation which holds between a 
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set of logical forms (formulas of our bivalent canonical idiom) on 
the one hand and a particular logical form on the other. We may define 
this relation more precisely than we have done above, as follows: 
If CL is our bivalent canonical language, VcL is the set of 
admissible valuations of CL, and FcL is the set of formulas 
of CL, then: for any r ~ FcL and A & FcL• 
r entails A iff, for every v & VcL• v simultaneously 
satisfies r only if v satisfies A. 
Entailment between actual sentences of a natural language is defined in 
terms of the logical forms of those sentences . 
If S1 and 52 are sentences of a natural language L, {A,B} & FcL• 
A is the logical form of 51 , and Bis the logical form of 52 , then: 
51 entails 52 iff [A} entails B. 
People sometimes distinguish between what an utterer of the sentence 
51 "asserted" and what he "implied". In making this distinction, they 
may have either of two goals in mind. On the one band, they may be 
contrasting what s1 or its utterer implies with what 51 entails . To 
account for this case, we define below three common species of "implica-
tion" which may usefulJ.y be contrasted with direct entailment. On the 
other hand, proponents of the assertion/implication contrast may be drawing 
a distinction within the class of entailments of 81 . This latter distinc-
tion is somewhat harder to explain. It appears to be a pragmatic matter 
of relative emphasis. That is, the utterer of 51 is held to have ilnplied 
rather than asserted 82 on the ground that 82, although entailed by 51, 
does not express what seems to have been uppermost in the speaker ' s 
mind when he uttered 51. Consider the following: 
(22) a . Peering through the keyhole, 
bed with re best friend! I saw my wife in = 
b. I saw my wi~ in bed vitb my best friend. 
c. ! peered through the keyhole. 
There is some inclination to say that the utterer <;:,f (22a) "asserts" 
(22b) but only 11ilnplies" (22c). His remark about the keyhole is only 
incidental; his primary concern (witness the intonation contour) is 
with what he saw. This marginal sort of "implication" has no semantic 
content over and above that supplied by classical entailment: it merely 
superadds to entailment a variety of purely pragmatic considerations 
about the speaker's probable system of vs.1.ues, i.e. about the relative 
importance to the speaker of one entailment versus another. Even so, 
this pragmatic ingredient has been known to occasion some bothersome 
confusions about presupposition, which we shall briefly discuss in 
succeeding sections. Since 11ilnplication1' 0£ this variety plays only a 
superficial role in our overall account of alleged presuppositions, we 
shall not embark on the thankless task of trying to characterize it 
precisely. 
ll 
2. 2 . 2. Theoretical Implication 
Returning for a moment to entailment, we note the folloving trivial 
corollary of our definitions: given any two sentences S1 and S2 which 
are capable of entering into entailment relations, we can always find a 
third sentence S3 such that rs1 & Sfl entails S2. For the most part, 
83 will be uninteresting. But sometimes S3 is a sentence which speakers 
of the language tacitly or explicitly regard as true, for S3 may formulate 
some ingredient in a theory which they hold . When this happens, people 
will tend to infer S2 directly from S1 and to treat S1 as if it entailed 
S2, whereas in fact no such entailment exists (cf. our discussion of 
Linsky and the theory L, above). The obvious explanation of this tendency 
is that the background-theory which supports their inference is so well-
entrenched in their consciousness that they make use of it without 
explicitly recognizing that they are drawing on extralogical premises; 
probably the best example of this is the theory!!_ itself, which codifies 
our knowledge of our own language. To describe this widespread phenomenon, 
we introduce the notion of theoretical implication, defined as follows. 
If S1 and s2 are sentences of a natural language Land Pis 
a nonempty set of speakers of L, then:  
S1 theoretically implies 62 for Pat time tiff there  
is a sentence S3 of L such that s3 expresses all or  
part of some theory held by the members of P at t,  
and I S1 & Sfl entails 62 ·  
In practice, we shall often omit the qualification "for P at t" when 
i;he values of "P" ~d "t" a'te contextually obvious. Theoretical implica-
tion lllB.Y be illustrated by the following example . 
(23) a. John jumped of1' the r-oof, 
b. John fell. 
Many contemporary speakers of English vould immediately infer (23b) from 
(23a), and would say that (23a) "implied" -0r even "entailed" (23b). But 
this implicative relation cannot be entailment, since, so far as logic 
is concerned, it is entirely possible that John remained suspended in 
space after his Jump. The reason that people tend to leap from (23a) 
to (23b) is just that they concurrently hold background theories a.bout 
the behavior of unsupported objects near the ear-th's surface-theories 
which, when sententially fonnulated and conjoined with (23a), yield a 
conjunction which does entail (23b) . (23a) does not itself entail (23b); 
rather (23a) theoretically implies (23b) for a large class of speal<ers 
of English at the present time (and many past times a.swell) . 
2 . 2,3. "Act-implication" 
A third sort of "implication" concerns the relation bet•.,een a.. 
sentence and the statement of one or more of the conditions under which 
that sentence can be felicitously uttered. Felicity conditions are 
pragmatic constraints on the successful and nondefective performance 
of speech acts (promising, ordering, questioning, etc.) . Whether or 
not a given sentence can be f elicitously uttered in a given context 
depends, -0f course, on vhat speech act the speaker is trying to perform 
with that sentence on that occasion. Accordingly, we define the 
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following notion of act-implication: 
If S1 	and S2 are sentences of a natural language L and @ is 
any speech act, then: 
S1 act-implies S2 relative to@ iff s1 can, under normal 
circumstances, be used to perform a, and s2 formulates a 
pragmatic constraint on successful and nondefective 
performances of O(i.e. s1 coul.d not be felicitously 
uttered in the attempted performance of@ unless s2 
vere true}. 
In the case of sentences vhich--like explicit performe.tives--are 
normally restricted to the performance of a single sort of speech act, 
and in contexts vhere it is obvious what speech a.ct is at issue, we 
may omit the qualification "relative to@" and speak merely of s1 
act- implying 52. Consider, for example, the following sentences: 
(24) a. I 	 (hereby) promise to leave. 
b. The utterer of (24a} intends to leave. 
(24a) act-implies (24b), since (24a) is a. conventional device for 
promising and (24b) formulates a nondefectiveness condition on promises 
(viz. sincerity). Our tendency to infer (24b) from (24a) oves chiefly 
to our inductive assumption that speakers are generally avare of the 
pra~tic constraints on speech acts and normally try to meet them. 
When ve hear (24a) in speech, we simply take it for granted that the 
conventionally associated speech act has been successfully and non-
defectively performed unless something in the context clearly demands 
otherwise. 
It bas sometimes casually been assUllled that the notions of "act-
implication" and "semantic presupposition" simply coincide. We shall 
shov in case study 3. 6 of Section 3, and in Section 4, that they do not. 
2.2.4. Conversational Implicature 
A fourth, and somevhat more complicated, species of "implication" 
is vhat H.P. Grice {1961 and 1974) has called conversational 
impJ.icature. Grice offers some general pragmatic rules or "conversa-
tional maxims" which greatly facilitate coI!llllunication and vhich ve 
all tend to obey. Some Of these maxims are: 
(25 ) 	 a. Make your contribution [to a conversati-0nl as 
informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange}. [The Maxim of 
StrengthJ 
b. 	 Do not make your contribution more informative 
than is required. 
c. Do not say vhat you believe to be false. 
d. 	 Do not say that for wbich you lack adequate 
evidence, [The Maxim of Evidence] 
e. Be relevant. [The Maxim of RelevanceJ 
f. Avoid ambiguity. 
g. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
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These rules are regarded by Grice as corollaries of a more general 
instruction which he called the "Cooperative Principle", viz. 
(26) 	 Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at that stage at which it occurs, by 
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-
exchange in which you are engaged. 
(26) and its subordinate maxims are taken, plausibly , to be conventions 
which serve as valuable auxiliaries to the prior conventions which 
govern syntax and meaning. Their main function is to expedite the 
giving and/or receiving of information, in more or less obvious ways. 
Using the maxims, we can construct detailed explanations of a 
person's inferring the truth of a sentence S2 from someone ' s assertive 
utterance of a sentence s1 even though S1 does not entail S2, Grice 
in fact outlines the general form for such explanations: 
He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that be 
is not observing the maxims, or at least •.. Cthe Cooperative 
PrincipleJ; be could not be doing this unless he thought 
that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) 
that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q 
is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking 
that q; therefore he intends me to think, or is at least 
willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has 
implicated that q, 
An explanation of this form, although it assumes that the explainer 
knows the normal (literal) sentence-meaning of the sentence which replaces 
"p", does not ai,cribe the explainer's inference of the sentence replacing
"q" to any connection between the latter sentence and the meaning or 
$emantic propertiei. of the former . The explainer merely engages in 
some straightforwal'd, informal commonsensical reasoning based on his 
knowledge of (26) and its corollaries (25a-g), Derivatively, we may 
define t he following relation between sentences, which we call 
conversational implication: 
Let 81 and S2 be sentences of a natural language L; then:  
S1 conversationalJf implies S2 iff any normal speaker of  
L who utters S1 a normal tone in a normal context  
conversationally implicates that S2 is true (i.e . iff 81  
and S2 could replace "p" and "q" respectively in a  
correct application of the Gricean explanation- schema to  
the context o~ S1's utterance).  
Using the notions explained in this Section, we sheJ.l proceed to 
our series of case studies. There is, however, one more important prior 
point to be made. 
2 .3. Responsibility 
Semantic presupposition is primarily a relation bet~een sentences 
(better, betveen their logical forms}; in fact, the distinction be.tween 
"semantic" presupposition and ''pragmatic" presupposition is sometimes 
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(cf. Stalnaker 1972, 1973) taken to rest on the claim that the latter 
relation relates speakers, rather than sentenees or their logical 
forll!S, to sentences. On the other hand, it is generally held that 
a speaker (pragmatically) presupposes at least the semantic presup-
positions of the sentence be or she utters; so the question of what 
it is for a speaker to presuppose something can be raised in either 
case. 
It is said, for example, that a person vho utters (12a) above 
presupposes that being poor tends to preclude being honest, this belief 
being indicated by the presence in (12a) of the word but. What is this 
relation of "speaker's presupposition"? The natural suggestion that 
comes to mind is that a speaker presupposes a sentence S just in case 
his or her utterance on that occasion is somehov defective, inappro-
priate or flaved unless he or she believes S, But this will not do. 
For a speaker may token (12a) in a perfectly appropriate and nondefec-
tive manner without himself or herself accepting (1.2b)-e . g . if be or 
she knows that the hearer accepts (12b). Perhaps ve should sa;y instead 
that a speaker presupposes S just in case the utterance on that occasion 
is inappropriate, etc., unless the hearer accepts S; but this suggestion 
faces obvious counterexamples as veil. Nor is it required that Sin 
fact be true. It will not do even to require that at least one party 
to the conversation accept S, nor that the speaker is at least pretending 
to accept S, for speaker and hearer may have some reason for talking 
"as if" S vere true even though neither actual.ly believes this. 
About all we can i,ay at this p<;>int is that a speaker presupposes 
(or 11presumes 11 ) S iff the utterance on that occasion is inappropriate, 
etc., unless the speaker is speaking as if S is true, or unless the 
speaker is "representing himself/herself as" "be-lieving S, or the like. 
But we cannot stop bere, for these scare-quoted phrases are no clearer 
than presupposes and presumes themselves. They are invoked as technical 
terms; so to say that the felicitous utterer of (12a) "represents 
himself/herself as" believing (12b) is just to ,:elabel the problem, not 
to explain anything. 'l'he problem remains: Paradoxically, it seems that 
the entirely unflaved utterance of (12a) requires, presumes, etc., the 
belief that (12b) is true, but this "belief" is not necessarily the 
belief of anyone! 
This is a quandary that we shall not here attempt to resolve. 
When it becomes necessary to remind ourselves that ve cannot tal.k 
simply of requiring that the speaker believe an alleged presuppositum, 
ve shall ring in the slogan "or vhoever" to recall the puzzling non-
specificness of the actual requirement in question. 
3. Case Studies 
3.1. Nonrestrictive Relative Clauses 
Let us begin vith a.n alleged "presupposition" that turns out 
rather obviously to be just an entailment. It has been claimed (by 
Keenan 1971 and others) that nonrestrictive relative clauses give rise 
to semantic presuppositions; it would be said, e . g. that (27a) 
semantically presupposes (27b): 
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(27) 	 a. Dick, who is an expert on Austin, loves the 
Bonzo Dog Band. 
b. Dick is 	an expert on Austin. 
It is hard for us to think of (27a) as truth-valueless when (27b) 
is false. For, in light of the considerable evidence that sentences 
like (27a) are derived from underlying conjunctions (Thompson 1971), 
it seems clear that the truth-conditions of such sentences are those of 
conjunctions. Thus (27a) has the same truth-conditions as 
(28) 	 Dick is an expert on Austin and Dick loves the Bonzo 
Dog .Band. 
as does 
(29) 	 Dick, who loves the Bonzo Dog Band, is an expert on 
Austin, 
Necessarily, therefore, (27a) is false 11' (27b) is t'alse; (27a) entails 
(27b) . 
There is an interesting consideration which may have blinded 
theorists to this fact and which, as we shall see, causes significant 
confusion among "presupposition" enthusiasts. The important point to 
notice (cf. Section 2 . 2.21 above) is that a sentence Si's merely 
entailing a sentence S2 in no wray guarantees that Si asserts S2, or that 
one vho uttered Si would thereby assert S2, or that S2 gives any part 
of the content of "what 51 says" in an intuitive sense. (27a) clearly 
does not "assert" (27b). Relativi:i;ation evidently is, perhaps among 
other things, a way of de-emphasizing certain parts of the total semantic 
content of a sentence, to such a degree that ve ;rant to deny that those 
parts are asserted by the sentence or by the speaker who utters it; 
those parts are, if you like, merely taken for granted (it is tempting 
to say "presupposed" here, in a. quite nontechnical sense). But all this 
is perfectly consistent with their being simply entailed by the original 
sentences. What is not asserted may still be entailed in virtue of 
logical form. For example, Pea.no's axioms do not assert the theorems 
of elementary arithmetic, but they certainly entail them. And 
(30) Snow is white. 
does not assert 
(31) Either snow is -white or pigs have wings. 
or 
(32) If Lincoln is dead, then Lincoln is dead, 
but it entails both. 
There is a tendency to confuse the linguistic act of denying what 
someone else has asserted with the quite different act of uttering the 
denial of the sentence which that person used in making his assertion. 
Thus, upon hearing someone utter (27a), one who wished to deny vhat 
t he utterer bad asserted might sa:y 
16 
(33) Dick doesn't love tbe Bonzo Dog Band. 
or even, much less efficiently, 
(34) 	 Dick, who is an expert on Austin, does not love the 
Bonzo Dog Band. 
This fact might lead someone (see again Keenan 1971) to suggest that 
(34) is the denial of (27a) and to add that, since (34) plainly necessi-
tates (27b) Just as (27a) does, we have a clear case of semantic presup-
position. But this would be fallactous . (34) is not the denial of (27a). 
The denial of (27a)-- if it can be formed in surface-structure at all-
is formed by negating the entire sentence, not by negating just that 
part which one would intuitively judge to have been "a-sserted" by an 
utterer of (27a). And that external negation is true if (27b) is false . 
There is, however, a troublesome datum wbicb needs explaining. 
When we attempt to deny (27a) by forming the sentence 
(35) It's false that Dick, who is an expert on Austin, 
loves the Bonzo Dog Band. 
or 
(36) It is not the case that Dick, who is an expert on 
Austin loves the Bonzo Dog Band. 
we encounter an apparent dialect difference . Spea.Jters of Dialect A, 
as ve may call it, bear no differene:e between (34) and (35) or (36). 
In Dialect A, (34), (35), and (36) are all treated as being straight-
forwardly equivalent to (37): 
(37) Dick is an expert on Austin, and Dick doesn't love 
the Bonzo Dog Banet. 
-and hence as necessitating (27b). Speakers of Dialect B, on the other 
band, treat (36) as syntactically 8lllbiguous: they allow that (36) cannot 
only be read along the lines of (37) but can also be read as equivalent 
to the noncommittal (38): 
(38) 	 It is not the case that Dick both is an expert on 
Austin and loves the Bonzo Dog lland. 
Speakers of Dialect B, however, freely grant that (37) is far and away 
the more natural reading oi' (36) : they al.most alvays read ( 34 ) as (37) , 
and they are strongly inclined in most instances to read (35) and (36) 
similarly, i.e. to accord these sentences readings on which they 
necessitate (27b). 
The difi'erence between our. two dialects, as well as their po:l.nts 
of agreement, can be explained ~'i.thout recourse to semantic presup-
positions. The crucial difference seems to lie in their respective 
treatments of rele.tivization. Specifically, Dialect A places a 
restriction on the formation of nonrestrictive relative clauses which 
is absent in Dialect B. 
There is considerable evidence that, in English generally, rela-
tivization is blocked vithin the scope 01' certain sentence-forming 
operators, i.e. that a sentence of the superficial form 
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{39) O{x. who is F, is G) 
cannot, 	for certain choices of Q, be derived from the underlying structure 
{40) Q.(x is G & xis F) 
but only from an underlying structure like 
(41) Q.(x is G) & (xis F) 
in which the conjunct to be relativized is not already within the scope 
of the operator Q. The role of the commas in the surface-form {39) 
is to signal that the relative clause, though superficially occurring 
within Q's complement, is not within the scope of Q.at the level of 
underlying semantic structure. For example, let Q. be an epistemic 
operator, as in 
(42) 	 John is convinced that Mary, who died last year, is 
alive and well in Argentina. 
It is implausible to think that (42) derives from 
(43) 	 John i, convinced that (Mary i~ alive and well in 
Argentina & Mary died last year) 
but highly plausible to think of (42) as stemming from 
{41,) (John is convinced that Mary is alive and well in 
Argentine) & (Mary died last year). 
It might be thought that our hearing (42) as derived from {44) 
rather than from (43) is just habitual disambiguation on the basis of 
our charitable reluctance to ascrlbe explicitly contradictory beliefs 
to John. But even if we provide (42) with an environment that not 
only tolerates but encourages a contradictory reading of the comple-
ment of John is convinced that, such as 
(45) 	 That stupid John has lots of contradictory beliefs; 
for example, he is convinced that Mary, "ho died 
last year, is alive and well in Argentina. 
we STILL cannot hear the relative clause as expressing part of what 
John believes-it remains in our mouths, an extraneous side comment. 
Similarly, let Q. be an a.lethic modal operator, as in 
(46) 	 It might have been the case that John, "ho is 
honest, was a politician. 
We hear 	no reading of (46) on which it entails (47): 
(47) It might have been the case that John vas both 
honest and a politician. 
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In (46) as well, the modal operator fails to penetrate the commas. 
Dialect A includes negation among the sentence-forming operators 
which block relativization in this way. Dialect B does not. Conse-
quently, Dialect A treats (36) as unambiguously derived from (37), an 
internal negation. In Dialect A, (27a) has no external negation in 
surface-structure, although of course the semantic content of (27a)--
which is recorded in the underlying conjunction (28)--can easily be 
externally negated in surface structure. The results are not encouraging 
for the advocate of semantic presupposition. Although (27a) necessitates 
(27b) in virtue of entailing it, it is simply false that the denial of 
(27a) necessitates (27b). The fact that (36) necessitates (27b) in 
Dialect A is quite irrelevant, since, as we have seen, (36) is not 
(logically) the external negation of (27a) in that dialect. The 
presupposition claim cannot even be formulated in terms of surface 
structure. And it is untenable when formulated in terms of logical 
structure, for the external negation of (28), which shares (27)'s logical 
form, plainly does not necessitate (27b). The peculiarities of Dialect 
A concern only a bit of syntax. 
Dialect B, in contrast, allows that (36) may be derived from either 
(37) or (38). Why, then, do speakers of B tend to assume that any 
actual utterance of (36) is most likely derived from (37)? The answer, 
we believe, lies in Gricean considerations of conversational implica-
ture, not in the semantic realm at all. The crucial point is this: to 
utter the denial (i.e. the external negation) of a conjunction, or 
something logically equivalent to this denial, is to implicate that, 
although one has reason to believe that the conjuncts are not (or 
cannot be) true together, one's evidence is insufficient to indicate 
which conjunct in particular is false (cf. Grice 1961:130-2). The 
existence of this implicature is a simple corollary of the assumption 
of obedience to the Conversational Maxims. To begin with, one must 
have adequate evidence for one's denial of the conjunction. There are 
only two forms this evidence could take: specific evidence for the 
falsity of one conjunct in particular, or nonspecific evidence which 
tends to rule out joint satisfaction of both conjuncts without specifying 
where the fault lies. The latter sort of evidence may be fairly rare 
in practice, but possession of the former sort is inconsistent with 
obedience to the Maxims. For if the speaker knew or had reason to 
suspect which conjunct is false, he would have data which entail, but 
are not entailed by, the denial which he uttered. His utterance 
would therefore violate Grice's Maxim of Strength, to the effect that 
one ought not to say significantly less than one's evidence warrants. 
Thus, for better or worse, the hearer concludes that the speaker 
possesses only nonspecific evidence vis-a-vis the conjunction in 
question. 
In the face of this conversational implicature, it is easy to 
see why a speaker of Dialect B would prefer (37) to (38) as a reading 
of an actual utterance of (36). Read as (38), an utterance of (36) 
would be appropriate only in relatively rare evidential situations; but 
read as (37), an utterance of (36) would fit what seems to be the 
statistical majority of speech-situations, in which specific evidence 
is available. More importantly, the reading corresponding to (37) 
is secured by the pragmatic effect of relativization in (36), viz. 
de-emphasis: if (36) is read as (38), it is difficult to explain why 
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the utterer would de-emphasize part of what he is concerned to deny. 
In Dialect B, special stage-setting is required to make (38) a 
"live option" as a reading o:f (36). If the speaker goes on to tell 
an appropriate story about bis reasons, then (37) and (38) will be :felt 
to be equally plausible readings of (36), as in 
(48) 	 It is not the case that Dick, who is an expert on 
Austin, loves the Bonzo Dog Band; :for recent 
psychological studies have shown that only high-
brows understand Austin, and only lowbrows like 
the Bonzo Dog Band. 
So strong is the pragmatic preswnption in favor of the reading (37) 
that it is extraordinarily dif:ficult to elevate (38) beyond mere 
parity to the status of "more likely" reading o:f ( 36). The only fairly 
natural 	way of "compelling" a speaker of Dialect B to hear (36) as (38) 
is to invoke tacitly metalinguistic internal quotation . Thus, only 
an utterance of something like 
(49) 	 It is simply false that "Dick, who is an expert on 
Austin, loves the Bonzo Dog Band." 
--where the quoted material is uttered in a derisive tone of voice--
will create a presumption in favor of the reading (38). 
Nothing in our account of Dialect B requires an appeal to semantic 
presupposition. To think that presupposition is present at all is to 
overlook the fact that, in Dialect B, (36} necessitates (27b) only on 
one of its two syntactic readings, but that reading, vi.z. (37), is not 
the reading on which (36) is the denial of (27a). The mistake is a 
natural one, however , owing to the powerful pragmatic presumption in 
favor of (37), 
Notice that nothing in our total account of nonrestrictive relative 
clauses requires BDY particular disambiguation of any surface sentence. 
In any test for semantic presupposition, we simply distinguish external 
from internal negation, regardless of "hich construction is in fact 
expres,;;ed by any of the negative sentences in question. In each case, 
it is seen that the external negation fails to necessitate the alJ.eged 
presupposition, while the internal negation entails it--either ;ray, 
semantic presupposition is ruled out. 
The data of both Dialects A and B suggest the following hypothesis: 
Principle H: \/hen a sentence containing an emphatic (i .e. 
emphasizing or de-emphasizing) construction in surface 
structure is externally negated, no change of emphasis results. 
That is, whatever semantic ingredient has been syntactically emphasized/ 
de-emphasized in the original sentence Vill remain emphasized/de-
emphasized in that sentence's denial. It is easy to provide an 
independent rationale for Principle Has '\iell: Emphatic constructions, 
which are surface constructions that-indicate disparities 0£ focus 
within logical forms, do not reflect semantic differences, i.e. 
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differences of logical form or semantic structure; they are produced 
by optional transformations which operate in the presence of certain 
sorts of conative factors--whichever passing desires, purposes or 
motives comprise the speaker's reason for producing his or her utterance 
and impose on it a direction of interest. If the sole function of some 
emphatic construction is to call attention to or direct attention away 
from a semantic item of a particular kind (underlying subject, object, 
predicate, relation, entire clause, or what have you), then one would 
not expect that item's broader semantic environment to matter to the 
operation of the emphatic construction, unless that environment is one 
so distortive as to yield a surface structure the relevant part of 
which is no longer "in the speaker's own mouth." Thus, take 
(50) Raffles stole the cheese. 
where the stress is functioning purely as an emphatic device. 8 





(51) Bunny shouted, "Raffles stole the cheese." 
in which (50) appears only as a mentioned, reported utterance-token, 
it plainly is preserved in 
(52) Raffles didn't steal the cheese. 
Likewise, the emphasis of (53) is preserved in (54) 
(53) Raffles stole the cheese. 
(54) It's false that Raffles stole the cheese. 
and that of ( ) is preserved in (56) and in (57). 
(55) Raffles--mind you, Raffles--stole the cheese. 
(56) Raffles--mind you, Raffles--didn't steal the cheese. 
( 	 ) It's not true that Raffles--mind you, Raffles--
stole the cheese. 
There is also a conversational rationale for Principle!!_: If a 
sentence Sis pragmatically most appropriate to utter in circumstances 
C, then one who utters exactly the same sentence, only prefixed by a 
negator, is presumed willing to let the pragmatic emphasis of S stand, 
i.e. he is thought of as saying, in effect, that S, thought of as 
uttered in C, is false. For if the utterer wished to take issue with 
the pragmatic emphasis carried by Sin C, it seems etiquette (and 
possibly the Maxim of Relevance) dictate that he should do so explicitly, 
by appropriately rewording his remark rather than by parroting an 
external denial of the original sentence; in conversation it is assumed 
that the parties share focus of interest unless an intention to 
shift focus is overtly acknowledged. 
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3.2. Cleft Constructions 
Cleft sentences behave in a way parallel to those containing non-
restrictive relative clauses, and si.miJ.ar presupposition claims have 
been made in connection with them. Thus Keenan (1971) tells us that 
(58a) presupposes (58b): 
(58) a. It vas John who caught the thief. 
b. Someone caught the thief. 
But surely (58a) straightforwardly entails (58b); if no one at all 
caught the thief, then it is certainly false that it was John who did. 
The temptation to call this a case of semantic presupposition again 
stems in pa.rt :from an undue regard for the fact that an utterer of (58a) 
would not normally be said to have "asserted" (58b). And Keenan's text 
makes it clear that he takes the denial of (58a) to be 
(59) It wasn't John who caught the thief. 
In our speech, at any rate, (59) is an internal negation, paraphraseable by 
(60) (3x}(Caugbt(x,the thief) &-(John= x)J . 
on which paraphrase it entails (58a.) just as (58a) does . (Thus, we 
construe it in (58a) and (59) as reflecting a bound variable, which 
seems to us to be the most natural way of taking it.) As before, (59) 
is what one might utter if one wanted to deny what an utterer of (58a) 
had a~serted ; but (59) is not the denilll of (58a). The denial of 
(58a) is 
{61) It ls not the case that it was John who caught the 
thief. 
which is parapbTaseable by 
(62) -(3x}[Caught(x,the thief) & (John= x)J . 
Thu,i (61) is entailed by the falsity of (58b) .9 
Admittedly, however, even (61) seems to suggest (58b) to some 
speakers, i.e. they would tend to in.fer (58b) upon hearing (61) uttered 
in an ordinary context, This fact is explicable in terms of purely 
contextual considerations . The tendency to infer (58b) upon hearing 
(61) is not very strong an;yway: it is felt most acutely vhen (61) is 
tokened in a context where there is already a presumption that the thief 
has been captured; and it is felt scarcely or not at all when (61) is 
tokened in contexts vhere this presumption is absent or replaced by 
the presumption that the thief is still at lrage. For example, if it 
is generally believed that the thief has been captured, and someone 
has uttered (58a), someone else might express disagreement (however 
ponderously) by uttering (61) . In so benign a context, (61) seems to 
expres$ 11greement with the statement that the thief has been captured. 
On the other hand, if it is generally believed that the thief is still 
at large, and yet someone has uttered (58a), someone else might express 
disagreement by saying 
22  
(63) f You're wrong. 1 
l_It's false that it was John vho caught the thief. 
No one has as yet. 
There is, however, something conversationally wrong with uttering 
(61) without qualification or explanation, in the latter context . For 
if the speaker (or whoever) believes that the thief is still at large, 
then the utterance of (61) violates the Maxim of strength, since (61) 
is much weaker than 
(64) The thief has not been caught. 
And, as in the case of nonrestrictive relative clauses , if the speaker 
believes (64), his or her emphasis in (61) of the role of the putative 
agent (guaranteed by Principle H) is inexplicable, since (64) entails 
of anyone ~ that it is false that ~ caught the thief. 
We infer, then, that the speaker (or whoever) does not believe 
(64). But this alone does not suffice to show that (58b), whose denial 
(64) is, is presumed. So we have yet to complete our explanation of why 
(61) seems to suggest (58b). 
It does seem that (61) residually suggests (58b} only to speakers 
who tacitly imagine (61) to be uttered in favorable surroUl'ldings . After 
all, (58a) is just a transformational variant of 
{65) John caught the thief'. 
The pragmatic difference between (58a) and (65) seems to be this: In 
containing a clefted subject, (58a) emphasizes the role of the agent, 
whereas (65), ~ithout special stress, seems to put the roles of agent 
and action on a par; thus (58a) focuses on John's activity and answers 
the question, Who carht the thief?. At this point Principle H comes 
into play: Since ( 61 is the external negation of (58a), (61) likewise 
stresses the role ~f the agent. {61) could be verified by either Of 
two possible situations: that in which (64) is true, and that in which 
someone other than John caught the thief (i.e . in vhicb (60) is true). 
We )lave seen that the utterer of (61) is not presuming (64) , but we 
were troubled by the possibility that he or she may have nonspecific 
grounds and thus may not be presuming (60) either. N'ow if the speal<er 
did have nonspecific grounds, i.e. if the speal<er is agnostu concerning 
the choice of (64) or (60), there would pr:i.ma facie be no reason to 
emphasize the semantic element that characterizes (60) in particular 
and is conspicuously absent in (64). Thus, our hypothesis that the 
speaker's grounds are nonspecific leaves us with a strikingly unexplained 
fact . So, other contextual factors being equal, we opt for the 
remaining possibility, viz. that the speaker is presuming (60) as 
evidence for (61); a.nd (60) trivially entails (58b}. Of course, other 
contextual factors may not be equal, and so we should expect our 
argument against the hypothesis of agnosticism (and hence, on our 
account, the presumption of (58b)) to be easily defeasible . And so 
it is, with only the merest disclailller or contextual f.i.ctor which 
obviates the need for it: 
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(66) 	 It's false that it was John who caught the thief. 
I don't know whether or not the thief has been 
caught at all, but in any case John is too 
stupid and cowardly to have caught her. 
So far we have found no use for semantic presuppositions; nor is 
it likely that further revelations about the exact syntax of (58a), 
(59) and (61) will provide any place for this notion. If (59) and 
(61) are syntactically univocal--i.e. if (59) is syntactically an 
internal negation and (61) is syntactically an external negation--
then the presupposition claim vanishes before a battery of pure entail-
ments such as attach to (60) and (62); and (6l) ' s residual suggestion 
of (58b) is explained pragmatically. If, on the other hand, either or 
both of (59) and (61) are syntactically ambiguous as between internal 
and external negations, our pragmatic considerations vould explain why 
people tend to hear the former reading in preference to the latter. 
3 .3 . Factive Verbs 
One of the most widely discussed classes of sentences allegedly 
generating presuppositions in the class of "factive" constructions 
studied by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970). As is well known, factive 
predicates supposedly involve a presupposition of the truth of their 
sentential complements. The following are some of the Kiparsky's 
examples: 
sig.~ificant} 
(67) a . It is ~~gic that S. { 
exciting 
b. John t~=~!!;e } that s . 
comprehends 
grasps 
Factive constructions like those in (67) supposedly can be negated 
vithout affecting the presupposition of the truth of 6; if this is 
right, it conclusively supports the claim that such sentences have 
no truth-values unless S js true. 
Here -too we want to argue that the sentences in (67) entail their 
sentential complements, and that their denials fail to necessitate (and 
hence fail to presuppose) those complements. Let us begin by drawing 
attention to two bits of negative evidence. 
First, strong epistemic verbs like know and real ize--which the 
Kiparskys concede to be "se!lllllltically but not syntactically factive"--
have a long historical association ·.tith the concept of truth. Episte-
mo1ogists of the last two millenia have insisted that such concepts 
as "knovl.edge" and "realization" analytically involve the truth of 
what is known or realized. In a l!!Ore contemporary idiom, their 
observation amounts to tbe claim that 
(68} X knows that S. 
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and 
(69) X realizes that S. 
entail the embedded sentences. Confronted with an ut terance of 
(70) I know that l + l = 3. 
epistemologists (and most ordinary speakers) unhesitatingly wou.ld 
say "No you don't" or "That's false". If some ordinary speaker does 
not quite kno>I what to say about such utterances, i t i s because he 
lacks a coherent theory of knowledge, or simply because such utter-
ances are statistically unfamiliar , not because he speaks a different 
dialect of English . Notice, incidentally, that the sentence 
(71) You do not know that l + l = 3. 
simply cannot be beard as alleging someone ' s ignorance of a presupposed 
fact--at least not by anyone who can count . 
Second, if we admit--as it seems we must--that sentential operators 
involving know, realize, and similar epistemic verbs have truth-
conditions which (along with our underlying logic) require the truth of 
the sentential complement , then a variety of other factive verbs will 
also fall into line with our thesis. Consider, for example , the verb 
forget. De RiJk {1974) has convincingly argued for the follo1'ing 
semantic representation of forget: 
(72)  ~ S1 ------





NOT ./ S3 
/ I -----v !IP NP 
l I I 
J<NOW I I 
On this representation, however, a sentence of the form 
(73} John forgot that S. 
entails the embedded sentence S. For something can become so only 
if it 'i(RS not formerly so. Hence it can become the case that John 
failed to know S only if John formerly knew S. And if John knew S, 
then S must be true . Civen a sui'ficient stock of primitive epistemic 
operators wh.ich behave semantically like k,nov and realize, it should 
not be too difficult to provide semantic representations for grasp, 
co~prehend, a.nd the like which result in the sentential compl ement 
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being simply entailed rather than presupposed. Such a project may 
have promise even for nonepistemic, evaluative factives like regret, 
deplore, apnlaud, etc . 
It may be objected that the negations of the sentences in (67) 
do not behave appropriately, in that they appear to commit the utterer 
to the truth of the complement S just as much as do the originals . 
If this is so, then t he commitment cannot be explained in terms of 
truth-conditionally generated entailments, since it is logically 
illlpossible that a sentence and its negation shou.ld both entail a 
contingent sentence S . So presuppositions must be invoked to account 
for the denials of the sentences in (67) . And if we invoke presup-
positions to account for these details, we thereby commit ourselves
10 to using the concomitant formal machinery to handle the originals . 
It is contended that we cannot give a proper account of the 
negations of factive constructions without appealing to presuppositions. 
This, we shall show, is false. The behavior of these negations can be 
adequately explained without abandoning the view that the falsity of 
S makes every sentence in (67) false and their denials straightforwardly 
true. We shall first establish this conclusion for the verb know and 
then show how the same reasoning secures a similar result for other 
factives. 
Consider the following sentenc.es: 
(74 ) a. Irv knows that Sam is a Martian. 
b. Irv doesn't know that Sam is a Martian. 
c. Sam is a Martian. 
Morgan (1969), Karttunen {1973) and others have claimed that sentences 
like (74a) and (74b) both necessitate (74c). But we have already seen 
reason to believe that (74a) simply entai ls (74c). Consequently, if 
{74c) is false, then (74a) is false and its denial, (74b) is true . So 
(74b) cannot necessitate {74c). And yet (to give these authors their 
due) there is something wrong, in at least some contexts in which {74c) 
is false, with uttering (74b)--even though the truth of (74b) is 
guaranteed by the falsity of {74c) . (It should not be thought that a 
sentence's being merely true suffices for that sentence's being 
appropriate or felicitous to utter, even in "normal" circumstances . ) 
(74b), uttered with rising stress on doesn't, and particularly if 
immediately followed by because Sam isn't one, is unexceptionable; but 
without such stage-setting, C7~b} would perhaps be misleading.11 Why 
is this? 
The explanation, we believe, involves both conversational and 
theoretical factors, and is somevhat subtle; but, once spelled out, 
it seems to us intuitively quite clear and compelling, and it makes 
no use of occult semantical notions. To begin with, let us note that 
(74a) is intuitively paraphrasable by 
(75) 	 Sam is a Martian and Irv believes on the basis of 
adequate evidence that Sam is a Martian. 
At least , both of the following conditions must obtain in order for 
(74a) to be true: 
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(76) a . Sam is a Martian. 
b . Irv believes on the basis of adequate evidence 
that Sam is a Martian. 
The falsity of either (76a) or (76b) suffices for the falsity of (74a) 
and hence for the truth of (74b) . 
Now suppose that someone tokens (74b) without any accompanying 
qualification or special stage- setting . Grice ' s Maxim of Evidence 
assures us tbat if (as we assume) the speaker is cooperative, then 
he has adequate evidence for the truth of (74b), (74b) being intuitively 
the denial of a conjunction of necessary conditions. What form might 
the speaker's evidence taJce? There are only three possibilities: 
(i) The speaker may have adequate evidence for the falsity of (76a) . 
(ii} The speaker may have adequate evidence for the falsity of (76b). 
(iii) The speaker may have insufficient specific evidence concerning 
(76a) or (76b) taken alone, but yet have evidence that they are at least 
not both true. 
Let us consider possibility (i) . Notice first that there is an 
asyll!llletry in our attitude toward the twofold conditions for (74a). Let 
us say that (76a) expresses the general condi tion for the truth of 
(74a), and (76b) the specific condition for the truth of (74a) . The 
specific condition is person-relative in a way that the general. condition 
is not: it concerns the subject, Irv , and not the status of what he 
believes . (As it happens, the embedded sentence (76a) also mentions 
a person, but this feature of (74b) is expendable and irrelevant . ) 
How Grice' s Maxim of Relevance dictates that one ought not to 
talk about things which are irrelevant to the point one is trying to 
make. But (74b) mentions a particular person, viz. Irv; so there is 
a conversational presumption that the truth of {7qb) has something 
importantly to do with Irv's properties in particular. But at the same 
time, the Maxims forbid saying substantially less than one is in a 
position to say. So if the speaker were entitled to deny {76a), the 
general. condition, he should do so explicitly: the speaker should not 
utter something which, like (74b), is entailed by but does not entail 
what he is in a position to assert . Moreover (here is tbe asymmetry) 
the falsity of the general condition (76a) has much more disastrous 
conseqtiences than would the falsity of the spe.cific condition (76b). 
If Irv does not justifiably believe that Sam is a Martian, then it 
follows merely that Irv does not know that Sam is a Martian , not 
that anyone else falls to know this . But if Sam is not a Martian, 
then nobody can be s·aid to know that Sam is a Martian, i.e . 
(77) X knows that Sam is a Martian. 
will be false for all values of X. Since so much more than the mere 
falsity of (74a) hinges on the falsity of the general condition (76a), 
and since (74b) is presumed to tell us something which is nontrivial 
and specifically about Irv--not something which, on the assU111pti<:>n of 
the fal.sity of (76a), would be true of anyone in the world-a hearer 
is conversational.ly entitled to the conclusion that the speaker is not 
assuming that (76a) is false . Therefore, the speaJcer's evidence for 
(74b) cannot be the failure of (76a) . 
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Passing over possibility (ii) for a moment, let us consider 
possibility (iii), the possibility that the speaker's evidence for 
(74b) is wholly nonspecific. What we want to say here is that such a 
situation is strikingly rare, and consequently that possibility (iii) 
is quite improbable . There are, of course, many common situations in 
which we have adequate evidence for something which can be expressed 
in the form of a denial of a conjunction. For example, we might be 
fully justif'ied in accepting 
(78) 	 It's not the case that Jesse both shot the marshal 
through the heart and talked with him later about 
the problem of crime in the streets. 
without having any idea which of the relevant conjuncts was f'alse, since 
we hold a well-established biological theory which entails both (79) and 
(80) . 
(79) 	 If Jesse shot the marshal through the heart, then 
the marshal is dead. 
(80) No dead person talks with anyone about anything. 
But (79) and (80) jointly entail 
(81) 	 If Jesse shot the marshal through the heart, then 
Jesse did not talk with the marshal later about 
the problem of crime in the streets. 
And (81) trivially entails (78). Similarly, we might have adequate 
evidence for 
(82) It's not the case that both Batman and Superman are 
in the phone booth now. 
without having any idea who is or isn't in fact in the phone booth, 
since our commonsensical theory of ordinary objects entails (83) from 
which we trivially infer (84). 
(83) Only one person can fit into a phone booth at a time. 
(84) 	 If' Batman is in the phone booth now, then Superman 
isn't; and if' Superman is in the phone booth now, 
then Batman isn't. 
In short, we can come to know the denial of a conjunction, Without 
having adequate evidence against either conjunct in particular, by virtue 
of having a well-established theory which entails a conditionaJ. (or , 
derivatively, a disjunction) which in turn trivially entails the denial 
of the conjunction. 
Is something like the foregoing operative in the case of {74b)? 
Let us render (74b) in conditional form, obtaining 
(85) 	 If Sam is a Martian, then Irv does not believe on 
the basis of adequate evidence that Sam is a Martian. 
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or, equival.ently, 
(86) 	 If Irv believes on the basis of adequate evidence 
that Sam is a Martian, then Sam is not a Martian. 
Clearly, if (74b) is true then so are (85) and (86), provided that 
their conditional frames are taken to be strictly truth-functional. 
But since the purely truth-functional conditional has only rare and 
specialized uses in English, we would never express (74b) in either of 
these ways. For, in ordinary speech, both (85) and (86) are interpreted 
as implying stronger, at least minimally nomological connections between 
their respective antecedents and consequents. However, the relevant 
statements, (76a) and (76b) or its denial, are not closely related at 
all: they have utterly different foci. (76a}, we have already observed, 
is about Sam and his race or nationality, whereas (76b} is about Irv 
and his epistemic position, implying nothing whatever about Sam's 
properties. We have no theory, scientific, philosophical, or common-
sensical, which connects these two disparate matters . Consequently, 
waiving any specific evidence we may have concerning the truth-values 
of (76a) or (76b) taken individually, we have no evidence for (85) or 
(86) either; thus we cannot be said to have arrived at (74b) by inferring 
it from a background set of entrenched beliefs via (85) or (86). 
(Contrast the case of (78)-(81). Plainly, the stronger the nomological 
connection expressed by a given conditional, the greater will be the 
likelihood that the truth of the negated conjunction equivalent to that 
conditional will be known to us on the basis of nonspecific evidence 
rather than on the basis of our knowledge of the falsity of one of the 
conjuncts, and vice versa. To see this, consider the limiting case of 
a strictly nomological connection--an instance of a law of sentential 
logic: 
(87) 	 It's not the case that the Continuum Hypothesis 
is both true and false. 
We would always know (87) trivially and a priori whether or not anyone 
ever ascertained the truth- value of the Continuum Hypothesis. Since 
(85) and (86) lie at the other end of the spectrum of nomologicality, 
having for ordinary people no nomological status at all, it is entirely 
unlikely that anyone would have nonspecific evidence for (74b).) 
Similar remarks apply to the disjunctive equivalent of (74b}, viz. 
(88) 	 Either Sam is not a Martian or Irv does not believe 
on the basis of adequate evidence that Sam is a 
Martian. 
As before, there is no statement of any general background theory of 
ours the.t entails (88) in the way in which (83) entails (82); we would 
in any normal case come to know (88)--and hence (74b}-only by virtue 
of antecedently knowing the truth-values of at least one of the two 
conditions (76a) and (76b), not the other vay around. 
The foregoing reasoning rules out possibility (iii) . The only 
remaining option is (ii), the possibility that the speaker who asserts 
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(74b) has adequate evidence for the falsity of (76b) . In terms of 
the Gricean Maxims, this means that we are prone to regard (74b) as 
something of an understatement, since (76b) is logically stronger than 
(74b). But this conclusion is inevitable, since the only alternatives 
are to regard (7l,b) as disastrously trivial or else backed by an 
exceedingly rare and peculiar sort of evidence . (Notice that we are 
not contradicting our earlier claim, made in Section 3.1, that in 
ordinary situations the denial of a conjunction conversationally implies 
agnosticism on the utterer's part; the pl'inciple is correct but 
defeasible. In the present context it is simply overridden by the 
asymmetry between (76a) and (76b) on the one hand, and the probabilistic 
presumption against nonspecific evidence on the other.) 
Let us recapitulate our findings . Upon hearing an utterance of 
(74b), unaccompanied by special stage- setting, a hearer who follows the 
line of least resistance will arrive at the following twofold conclusion: 
(89) a . The utterer of (74b) believes that Irv does not 
justifiably believe Sam to be a Martian. 
b. The utterer of (74b) does not believe that Sa:m 
is not a Martian. 
(89) is certainly sufficient to explain why we tend to hear (74b) as an 
internal negation, i . e . as a denial of (76b) alone. But it is not yet 
obvious why some speak~rs also hear (7hb) as actively asserting (76a) . 
For (89b) does not entail 
(90) The utterer of (74b) believes that Sam is a Martian . 
However unlikely, it is surely possible that the utterer of (74b) is 
agnostic on the question of Sam's origins. To secure the inference of 
(90) from (89b) we need (91): 
(91) 	 The utterer of (74b) has an opinion as to whether 
Sam is a Martian. 
We submit that it is primarily in contexts where the utterer is 
presumed to have an opinion as to the truth-value of the complement 
that a negated knowledge-statement willbeheard as actively suggesting 
that complement (in addition to denying the relevant specific condition}. 
Such contexts will be numerous, for there are many matters concerning 
which the lack of any opinion is highly unlikely. Where there is 
readi l y available evidence for or against a proposition--as there is 
for, say, the proposition that aspirin cures headaches-then it seems 
very unlikely that an intelligent adult who has led a normal life 
could have failed to form an opinion on the matter, or that he would be 
unwilling, if pressed, to commit himself. In addition to considerations 
of subject matter, there are many other contextual factors which might 
lead us to the conclusion that the utterer of negative knowledge-
statement has an opinion about the truth-value of the comple,ment . For 
example, the speaker may be an acknowledged expert on matters mentioned 
or described in the complement, i . e. one who, as a matter of his 
profession, would be expected to have an opinion (the utterer of (74b) 
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might be a well-known exobiologist) . Or again, (74b) might be 
uttered vith a revelatory stress contour, e.g . in tones of surprise 
(at John's ignorance of a fact) or derision (at John's stupidity in 
overlooking the obvious). 
Moreover, if there is no contextual presumption of this kind, it 
is hard to hear the utterer of a negative knowledge-statement as 
actively implying the truth of its complement, unless it happens that 
we already believe that the complement is true . If, for example, ve 
antecedently believe that Sam is a Martian, then even though we 
impute no opinion on the matter to the utterer of (74b), we will still 
hear (74b) as tending to express agreement vith our belief. For ve 
have seen that the utterer of (74b) is most likely not disag;r-eeing with 
(76a) but is at least allowing it to stand, perhaps "granting it _for 
the sake of argument." And failure to take the opportunity to dispute 
a belief whose truth-value is crucially relevant to the truth-value of 
what one says is commonly regarded as a sign of tacit consent (althou~h 
there is no real necessity in so regarding it). On the other hand, 
if the audience regards the complement as false (but imputes r.0 
opinion to the speaker) they rill find the utterance of (74b) unin-
teresting and rill no doubt point out to the utterer that be was wrong 
in not disputing (76a) , in consequence of which he said something 
trivial. But they will not hear (74b) as suggesting the truth of (76a) 
any more than we would normally hear (71) as suggesting that l + l = 3. 
Of course it is possible that the audience not only fails to impute to 
the speaker any opinion on the complement, but also fails to have any 
opinion of its own on the matter. In such a case the audience would 
not hear any suggestion of the complement's truth. Thus , if someone 
were to say 
(92) John doesn't know that Goldbach's Conjecture is false. 
--the truth-value of Goldbach's Conjecture being a matter on which we 
(and most other people) lack any opinion--we would not hear (92) as 
alleging the falsity of the Conjecture but would instead understand it 
as pointing out the fact that John, whatever he may or may not think 
of Goldbach ' s Conjecture, certainly doesn't know that it's false . 
The most natural response to (92) under these circumstances would be 
"Neither do we", or "Right, the Conjecture is up for grabs" . 
We conclude that our ability to generate (89) solely from pragmatic 
and statistical considerations adequately accounts for some people's 
tendency to hear (74b) as claiming that Sam lacks justified belief 
in proposition which is true (or at least allowed to stand unchallenged). 
Clearly, our argument can be generalized to cover all sentences of the 
form 
(93) X doesn ' t know that S . 
yielding a pragmatic explanation of why these sentences are sometimes 
taken to "imply" or suggest the truth of S while asserting that X :Lacks 
justified belief that s . 12 
Before applying all this to the factives listed in (67), let us 
review the salient points of our strategy for ease of future reference . 
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Given a sentence 	S which is intuitively paraphrasable as a conjunction 
of statements S1 and S2 such that S;i, expresses the "general" condition 
for S's truth and S2 expresses the specific" condition for S's truth 
(in the senses exemplified above), a combination of theoretical and 
conversational considerations leads to the conclusion that one who 
utters the denial 	of S intends his audience to understand that he 
believes S2 to be 	false and does not believe S1 to be false. Further 
contextual considerations lead (in many if not most cases) to the 
further conclusion that the utterer believes S1 to be true, or is at 
least willing to 	set S1's truth be taken for granted for argumentative 
purposes. This combination of conversational, theoretical, and 
contextual factors lends support to-interpreting the utterance of the 
denial of Sas if 	it were the utterance of S1 and the negation of S2 . 
For convenience, let us coin the term factive implication for this 
complex pragmatic 	relation between an utterance of the denial of S 
and the indicated 	conclusion about S1 and s2 . Schematically, we could 
then say that, where S, S1, and S2 are as above, - S "factively 
implies" S1 & 	 - S2 
Using this purely 	pragmatic notion, we can easily account for the 
behavior of the various factive constructions in (67). Consider the 
following examples: 
(94) a. John is 	aware that Mary is pregnant. 
b. It is significant that Mary is pregnant. 
c . John is not aware that Mary is pregnant. 
d. It is not significant that Mary is not pregnant. 
Let us begin by asking ourselves about the intuitive truth-conditions 
for (94a) and (94b), in that order. 
The predicate aware appears to a<lJnit of a strong reading, on which 
it amounts to knows, and also a weaker reading, on which it is equivalent 
to something like correctly assumes. Since our discussion of know takes 
care of the former, we shall confine our attention to the latter 
understanding, on which (94a) is paraphrasabl e by 
assumes}(95) Mary is pregnant, antl John believes that 
[ takes it 
Mary is pregnant. 
Thus paraphrased, 	(94a) entails both (96a) and (96b): 
(96) 	 a. Mary is pregnant.  
assumes } 
b. John believes that Mary is pregnant.
{ takes it 
and (94a) is thus straightforwardly false if either (96a) or (96b) is 
false. 
The sentence (94b) is somewhat more complicated, owing to the 
presence of a suppressed parameter . Intuitively, to be significant 
is to be significant to or for some person or group of persons. More-
over, being significant for a person Xis a property which attaches 
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to an envisaged state-of-affairs Just in case some consequences vhich 
X finds significant would ensue or depending on whether or not the 
envisaged state-of-affairs obtained. It seems, then , that (94b) can 
be paraphrased by 
(97) 	 Mary is pregnant , and some consequence which X 
finds signi£icant would ensue or not depending 
on whether or not Mary is pregnant . 
Thus (94b) would entail both (96a) and (98): 
(98) 	 Some consequence which X finds significant would 
ensue or not depending on whether or not Mary 
is pregnant. 
The problem is that (94c} and (94d) , the respective denials of (94a) 
and (94b), ought not to entail or otherwise necessitate (96a) . Yet 
(94c) and (94d) do seem to "imply" (96a) in some weaker sense; people 
sometimes tend to hear utterances of (94c- d) as conveying the 
information recorded in (99a-b) respectively: 
(99} a. Mary is pregnant, and it ' s false that John 
r::~u:::st that Mary is pregnant . 
ltakes it) 
b. Mary is pregnant, and nothing of significance to 
X hinges on whether Mary is pregnant. 
The explanation of this fact is simple. In the sense lately 
defined, (96a) is the general condition for the truth of both (94a) 
and (94b) ; (96b) is the specific condition for the truth of (94a); and 
(98) is the specific condition for the truth of (94b). Therefore , by 
exactly the same reasoning as was employed in the case of know, we 
obtain the conclusion that (94c) factively implies (99a), and (94d) 
factively implies (99b) . The considerable amount of effort spent on 
know thus has an illl!llediate payoff for the analysis of factives in 
general . We shall soon see that the payoff extends beyond factives 
to other constructions which have been thought to involve presuppositions . 
Finally, it ought to be pointed out that there is a simple and 
straightforward way of shoving conclusively that none of the sorts of 
constructions we have considered so far in fact gives rise to semantic 
presuppositions . According to the definition of semantic presupposition, 
a sentence S1 semantically presupposes a sentence S2 only if the denial 
of S1 necessitates S2. Let us list again the denials of the principal 
sentences we have considered so far: 
(lOO) a . It's false that Dick, who is an expert on Austin , 
loves the Bonzo Dog Band . 
b . It's false that it was John who caught the thief. 
c . John is not aware that Mary is pregnant . 
d. Irv 	doesn't know that Sam is a Martian . 
e . It isn't significant that Mary is pregnant . 
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The important thing to notice is that the various "implications" that 
these denials bear are all cancellable (Grice 1961:128), as in 
(101) a. It's false that Dick, who is an expert on 
Austin, loves the Bonzo Dog Band, because 
Dick knows nothing about Austin. CDialect 
B onlyJ 
b. It's false that it was John who caught the thief, 
because no one caught her. 
c. John is not aware that Mary is pregnant, because 
she isn't. 
d. Irv doesn ' t know that Sam is a Martian, because 
Sam isn't one. 
e. It isn't significant that Mary is pregnant, 
because she isn't . 
Now necessitation, a strictly model-theoretic notion, does not 
admit of cancellation. Therefore, the "implicationsII of ( lOOa- e) , 
cancelled by (lOla- e) respectively, are not necessitated by (lOOa-e). 
By definition, then, no semantic presuppositions are involved in these 
cases. And their very cancellability in context should be enough to 
tip us off that the notions we are dealing with are context-bound, 
pragmatic . 
3.4. Implicative Verbs 
Karttunen (1971b) alleges that, in addition to factive verbs, there 
are also presupposition-carrying "implicative verbs" . Implicative verbs 
are a subclass of verbs taking infinitive complements, and their 
distinguishing feature, we are told, is that assertive sentences With 
implicative main verbs "imply" an augmentr:d version of their complement 
sentences. Karttunen claims that this "implication" cannot be identified 
vith ordinary entailment, but can only be understood via an appeal to 
presuppositions. He gives the following partial list of implicative 
verbs: 
(102) manage, remember, bother, get, dare, care, venture, 
condescend, happen, see fit, be careful, have 
the f"misfortune1., take the (time J ,  
l_sense ) opportunity 
trouble 
take it upon oneself. 
Of these verbs, manage seems to be the paradigm, for it receives the 
most attention. Consider the following sentences: 
(103} a. John managed to solve the problem. 
b. John didn't manage to solve the problem. 
c. John solved the probleJn. 
d . John didn't solve the problem. 
• We are told that (103a} implies (103c}, and that (103b) implies 
(103d}. But (103b) appears to be the negation of (103a}, and (103d) 
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that of (103c); so if these "implications" were entailJitents, (103a) 
and (103c) would be logically equivalent. Karttunen claims that in 
fact they are not logically equivalent, giving as his reason that 
manage to solve and solve differ in meaning. 
0~ course (103a) and (103c) do intuitively "differ in meaning", 
but this is not enough to show that they are not logically equivalent. 
Consider, for example, the following sentences: 
(104} a. Meno is a pederast. 
b. 	 Either Meno is a pederast, or Meno is not a 
pederast but has a dog that is both ali ve 
and not alive. 
{104a) and (104b) can be shown to be logicall y equivalent by simple 
propositional calculation, in spite of the fact that they unquestionably 
differ in meaning. And in light of our discussion of nonrestrictive 
relative clauses , the sai.,e might well be said for the following pair: 
(105) a . John, who smokes cigars, loves wine . 
b. John, who loves wine, smokes cigars . 
What we need is some more accurate account of the difference in meaning 
between (103a) and (103c) which has some clear relevance to the 
question of their truth-conditions and displays their nonequivalence. 
Karttunen goes on to fill this lacuna with an appeal to semantic 
presupposition. (103a), we are informed, presupposes something like 
(106) John tried (i . e. expended effort) to solve the problem. 
Thus (106) is necessitated by both (103a) and (103b} . But (103c) does 
not even suggest (l06)--let alone presuppose it . So (l03a) and {103c} 
cannot be logically equivalent, since on these assumptions it is 
logically possible that (103c} should be true but (103a) be truth-
valueless owing to the falsity of (106). Similarly, (103b) cannot be 
logically equivalent to (103d); for the truth of (103d) is consistent 
with the faJ.sity of (106), hence with the truth- valuelessness of (103b) . 
It appears, then, that implicative verbs behave in a more complex 
way thar. do factives. Implicative verbs, like factives, suppose.dly 
generate semantic presuppositions; but, unlike factives, they presuppose 
not the truth of the sentences underlying their verbal complements, but 
in each case the truth of some third, quite different sentence. In 
addition, they introduce a novel kind of "implication" such that an 
assertive sentence with an implicative main verb "implies"(but does 
not presuppose ! ) its complement, and such that the negation of the 
former implies (but does not presuppose) the negation 01' the latter. 
"Implication'' or this new sort, then, is a mysterious and heretofore 
unknown tertium quid, inferentially reliable, but not so strict as 
necessitation. 
Before assessing all these c1aims in connection with (103), let 
us pause to look more closely at the list (102). 
It is fax from clear that the items in (102) are happily grouped 
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together. Some of the verbs in question are, in our speech at least, 
not "implicative" at all. Consider the following exchange: 
(107) 	 Bully: "Which of you dares to fight me?" 
John: "I dare to fight you!" 
Bully (eyeing John's bulging biceps): 
"Ordinarily, I'd clobber you here and nov, 
but I hear my mother calling and have to go 
home." 
In reporting this exchange, we might appropriately say something like 
(108) 	 John dared to fight the bully, but the fight 
never took place, because the bully chickened 
out . 
But the acceptability of (108} belies the claim that (109) necessitates 
(110). 
(109) 	 John dared to fight the bully. 
(110) 	 John fought the bully. 
Similarly, the following two sentences are, in our speech, virtual 
synonyms: 
(111) 	 a. John took it upon hilllself to make the announcement. 
b. John 	unilaterally decided to make the announcement . 
In this sense it is possible that a man should take it upon himself to 
do something which he is subsequently prevented from doing. That is, 
the following sentence seems perfectly acceptable: 
(112) 	 John took it upon himself to make the announcement, 
but dropped dead of a heart attack just as he was 
opening his mouth to speak . 
Both (109) and (llla) impute states of mind which, in the normal course 
of events, are accompanied or innnediately followed by the indicated 
actions. But the presumption of fulfillment, if indeed there is one, 
seems merely inductive . As a final example, we could cite the verb 
~- In negative constructions like (113) it is difficult to hear any 
implication of (114) since it is so easy to invent counterel<A!Dples like 
(115) . 
(113) 	 John didn ' t care to discuss the matter. 
(114) 	 John didn't discuss the matter. 
(115) 	 John didn't care to discuss the matter, but 
Mary forced him to talk about it. 
Of course there may be dialects of English in which these verbs are 
uniformly "implicativ-e" in Karttunen's sense. In erecting a general 
strategy for handling genuinely implicative verbs, however, it is 
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best to concentrate on unequivocal examples . So let us look at 
Karttunen's strongest case, the verb manage. If the alleged behavior 
of manage can be explained without recourse to presupposition, then 
the same form of explanation, relativized to dialect, ought to account 
for the weaker members of (102) as well. 
A preliminary thing to note about manage is that, strictl y 
speaking, the sentence (103a) does not necessitate (106) . 
(103) a . John managed to solve the problem. 
(106) John tried to solve the problem. 
For a person can manage to do something without trying--inadvertently 
or accidentally. Thus neither (ll6) nor (ll7) necessitates or even 
allows that the person in question was attempting to perform the 
indicated action.13 
(ll6) While trying to prove Fermat ' s Last Theorem, Saul 
inadvertently managed to prove Goldbach's 
Conjecture. 
(117) 	 We had been trying for months to knock all the 
beer cans off the log, but Bottomley managed to 
do it by accident whil e trying to shoot down a 
rust-speckled grosbeak. 
In fact, it is surprisingly difficult to say what is (putatively) 
necessitated by (103a). Minimally, manage seems to involve a broad 
presumption to the effect tllat some sort of impediment e.xists, if not 
for the agent then at least for some other contextually involved person 
or persons. In other words, to say that John managed to do such-and-
such is to represent the action o-r doing such-and-such as something 
which ";;asn't entirely easy"-without actually saying, but leaving it 
to the context to determine , wherein the trouble lies. Since this 
point is crucial to what follows, we shall belabor it a moment longer . 
If someone were to utter 
(118) John managed to breathe . 
he would not , appearances to the contrary, be committed to saying that 
John found it hard to breathe. The implied impediment is not intrinsi-
cally person-specific, although obvious pragmatic factors can l ead 
us to bear it a~ such: This becomes clear when we consider other 
contexts in which (ll8) would be perfectly appropriate . Suppose that 
John, h.a.ving been raised in the Andes, has extraordinary breathing 
powers . Suppose further that (118) is uttered by someone who ie aware 
of this fact and is describing a mountain-climbing episode in which 
everyone but John was fainting, unable to breathe. There is 
still the presumption that, under the circUlllstances, breathing wasn ' t 
easy; but now we bear it as attaching not to John but to his companions. 
With a little more patience-, we could easily point the presumption in 
such a way that it cannot be heard as attaching to anyone in particular, 
but only to a mysterious "someone". Thus suppose that (118) is uttered 
in a context in which everyone knows of John's great lung capacity and 
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that the utterance occurs as the climax of the speaker's description 
of John's single-handed ascent of Everest . The presllll!Ption of 
impediment clearly does not attach to John, and the context supplies 
no other specific person or persons to whom it could apply. The most 
we can say is that "someone" would find it difficult to breathe under 
those circumstances . In short, what remains constant amid all these 
shifts of "focus" is the nonspecific presumption of contextual 
impediment; the variable factor of felt application to a specific person 
appears to be something which arises extralinguistically, f rom the 
hearer's beliefs about the context of utterance . The significance of 
this point will manifest itself shortly. 
Everything we have said so far suggests that (103a) genuinely 
necessitates something like the deliberately noncommittal sentence 
(119) Solving the problem wasn't entirely easy. 
But does (103a) semantically presuppose (119)? If it does, then 
{103b)--the denial of (103a)--must also necessitate (119) . Whatever 
implicative connection exists between (103b) and (119), however, seems 
cancellable in context, hence cannot be viewed as genuine necessita-
tion. For (120) is acceptable: 
(120) 	 John didn't manage to solve the problem--it was 
so easy that a trained monkey could solve it 
blindfolded! 
Admittedly, the felt need for stress in (120) suggests that the 
implication which it cancels is strongly felt in the first place. So 
we must explain how (103b) can strongly suggest (119) without 
necessitating it. 
Before addressing this problem, let us pause and take quick stock 
of our other intuitions about the data. Parallel to the feeling th.at 
(103a) necessitates (119), we find an equally strong feeling that 
(103a) also necessitates (103c). Moreover, it seems to us that the 
joint truth of (119) and (103c) is sufficient for the truth of (103a). 
In our speech, that is, (103a) may be closely paraphrased by a 
combination of these two sentences, as in (121) . 
(121) 	 John solved the problem, which wasn't an entirely 
easy thing to do. 
(103a) and {121) would appear to have equivalent truth-conditions.14 
(121 ) obviously entails both (119) and (103c), since it derives 
syntactically from their conjunction . So, at least where (103a) is 
concerned, there is no immediate obstacle to viewing (103c) and (119) 
as simply being two of its ordinary entailments. It is when we turn 
to (103b), the denial of (103a), that we encounter an apparent 
obstacle, viz . explaining (103b)'s felt relations to (119) and (103d). 
The problem is a familiar one: (103a) behaves like a conjunction, 
so (103b), its apparent denial, ought to behave like a negated 
conjunction, i.e. (l03b) should not entail either (119) or {103d) . 
Yet an utterance of (103b) suggests to the audience th.at both (119) and 
(103d) are taken to be true. Given our earlier treatment of factives, 
the solution to this problem is evident. (J.19) and (103c) are 
respectiveJ.y the general and specific conditions for t .he truth of 
(103a), for (103c) directly concerns John, while (ll9) was shovn to 
lack specificity regarding any particular person. If (103c) is false, 
then (103a) is false; but if (l.19) i .s false then not onJ.y (103a) but 
a;ny sentence of that form--i.e. any result of replacing J'ohn by 
another singular term-will also be false. Therefore, by exaotly the 
same reasoning as was applied to factives, it follows that (103b}, 
the denial of (103a), factively implies the conjunction of (ll9) with 
(103d}. 
We note in passing that out' solution provides for an interpreta-
tion that captures the germ of truth in Karttunen 's :remark that (103b) 
"implies" (103d) and that this mysterious implication (supposedly 
neither an entailment or a presupposition) is supported by (103b) 1 s 
allegedly presupposing (106). Since we have seen that (106) ought to 
be replaced by (119}, we could reformulate Karttunen' s claim by saying 
that (103b) implies (103d) in virtue of its connection with (119) . In 
the terminology we have adopted, this claim can be interpreted as 
simply encapsulating the process of reasoning which was used earlier 
to explain why negated factives are heard as negations of specific 
necessary conditions. The speaker's evidence for (103b) cannot, on 
pain of gross triviality, bear on the falsity of the general condition 
(119); and since possession of the requisite sort of neutral, non-
specific evidence is highly improbable, we conclude that the speaker's 
evidence bears on the falsity of (103c}, hence on the truth of (103d), 
Roughly: since (ll9) has a conversationally privileged position, the 
negation slides past it and is beard as attaching to (103c), yielding 
an assertion of (103d). It is in this sense that (103b) implies (103d) 
"in virtue of" its connection with (119), 
So far w-e have shown that all of the felt implications of (103a) 
and (103b) can be straightforwardly explained in terms 01' entailments 
and factive implications, and hence that there is no residual datum 
requiring the acceptance of nonstandard semantic apparatus . Since 
this is all that we were strictly concerned to show, we could stop 
here. But it would obviously be desirable to have at least a rough 
account of why people's intuitions regarding implicative verbs like 
manage, exemplif'ied in Karttuneo' s claims, are in such a sorry state . 
Consider the sentence 
(122) 	 John didn't manage to solve the problem, but he 
solved it. 
Given our results so far, (122) is not a contradiction. (It is at 
best only what might be called a "factive contradiction", i.e. a 
sentence which factively implies something (bere, that John didn't 
solve the problem) which is incompatible with what is asserted (here, 
that John did solve the problem). Such sentences, resulting from the 
explicit cancellation of a factive implication, a.re entirely acceptable 
when put into context.) Similar observations hold of Karttunen's 
other "implicative" verbs as well; contrary to what is implied by 
his text, e.g. (123) and (12h), hoitever contrived they may be, are 
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surely not contradictions either. 
(123) 	 John didn't remember to lock his door; having 
forgotten to, he locked it inadvertently by 
getting his eyebrow caught on the bolt . 
(124) 	 John didn't see fit to remain silent; Marsha 
sat on him and stuffed a large gag into his 
mouth. 
Just possibly Karttunen wants to insist that he simply cannot 
accept (122), (123), or (124) under any circumstances, no matter how 
contexts are filled in. Perhaps in Karttunen's speech, (103b) does 
necessitate (103d), and (122) etc. are simply contradictions, despite 
appearances. But this can be so only if (103b) is something other 
than the actual denial of (103a) for Karttunen or a speaker of his 
persuasion. Without becoming entangled in controversial syntactic 
bypotheses, we can give at least a partial account of this phenomenon 
in terms of our paraphrase (121). 
If (103a) is paraphrased by (121), then the natural paraphrase 
fo:r (103b) is 
(125) 	 It is not the case that John solved the problem, 
which wasn't an entirely easy thing to do. 
What is suggestive about (125) has already been noted in our discussion 
of nonrestrictive relative clauses, viz . in Dialect A of English, (125) 
is um.ambiguously an internal negation deriving from 
(126) 	 - (John solved the problem) & (Solving the problem 
wasn't easy). 
whereas in Dialect B (125) is syntactically ambiguous as between (126) 
and (127). 
(127) 	 - (John solved the problem & solving the problem 
wasn't easy). 
If (103a) and (121) share equival ent underlying structures, then 
presumably so do (103b) and (125). But in Dialect A (125) derives 
from a structure which entails both (103d) and (119) . Consequently, 
in Dialect A (103b) would genuinely entail {103d) and (119) rather 
than merely factive!y imp!ying them, and (122) would be a logical 
contradiction . In Dialect B, however, (103b) would share the ambiguity 
of (125), having one reading equivalent to (126) and a distinct reading 
equivalent to (127). In Dialect B, the ambiguity tends to be resolved 
in favor of the logically stronger reading on familiar grounds of 
conversational implicature; and {122) is felt to be "almost a contra-
diction" on the ground that (103b), though ambiguous, i,; of a form 
whose instances are much more commonly construed as internal negations . 
Thus, at least some of the confusion about manage can be laid to 
the fact that Dialects A and B differ in their syntactic treatment of 
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the intuitive paraphrases of (103a) and (103b). Karttunen, "e might 
say, speaks on behalf of Dialect A, "hereas we have spoken on behalf 
of Dialect B. But it is important to point out that this possible 
difference between dialects does not jeopardize our earlier results, 
which were obtained by treating (103b) as the denial (i.e. the external 
rather than internal negation) of (103a). For if (103b) is unambiguously 
an internal negation, whose underlying structure is equivalent to (126), 
then there are no puzzling data to be accounted for at all: (103b) 
would simply entail (103d) and (119), There could be no question of 
semantic presupposition in this instance, since (103b), although it 
necessitates (indeed, entails) the sentence (103d) , is not the denial 
of (103a). (103b)'s behavior would be totally irrelevant . It is 
only by allowing (103b) a reading equivalent to (127) that one can 
generate any "felt problem" for whose solution an appeal to semantic 
presuppositions and quasi-logical "implications" might even conceivably 
be relevant, viz. the "felt problem" of ho" (103b) could in some sense 
imply both (103d) and (119) without actually entailing them. And, as 
we have seen, this problem is solved completely by recognition of the 
relevant factive implications. Our final conclusion, then, can be 
accounted for in purely pragmatic terms and without the invocation 
of an unprecedented and ill-behaved implicative relation. 
3 . 5 . Counterfactives 
Factive verbs have negative twins, viz. "counterfactive" verbs 
like pretend, imagine, 1DS.ke believe, etc. Not surprisingly, it has 
been contended that sentences of the form 
(128) !. is pretending that S. 
semantically presuppose the falsity of the sentential complement S 
(Lakoff 1972, Langendoen and Savin 1971). It has also been suggested 
(by Lakoff) that stress can effect a reversal of presupposition, i.e. 
that (129) normally necessitates the falsity of S, but that (130) 
necessitates the truth of S. 
(129) Xis not pretending that S. 
(130) ! is not nretending that S. 
All of these claims seem to us to be clearly false . Consider 
the following expanded instances of (128)-(130): 
{131) a . Susie is pretending that she is an orphan-
little does she kno" that her vacationing 
parents were killed last week! 
b. Mary is not pretending that she loves John!--
Whatever gave you that idea? She ' s Just 
being coquettish, but everybody knows she 
really loves him. 
c . Mary is not pretendinf that there is a spider 
on her hand, she 's allucinating, poor thing. 
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{13la- c) show that the alleged necessitations a.re all cancellable in 
context, hence that they are not instances of necessitation at all. 
The correct accowit of the "implication" carried by sentences 
of the form {l28) is not semantic but pragmatic . In this case it 
seems to depend heavily on the particular sentences we substitute 
for Sin (128). Some instances of (128), such as the one in {131a) , 
produce easily cancellable implications; others are harder to handle . 
Let us take a particularly strong case, adduced by La.koff (1972): 
(132) Irv is pretending that he is in pain. 
It is difficult not to hear (132) as necessitating 
(133) Irv is not in pain. 
And accordingly the sentence 
(134) 	 Irv is pretending that he is in pain, and he is 
in pain. 
sounds very odd, perhaps even "contradictory" in some sense. 
On reflection, it seems that the reason speakers boggle at 
sentences like {134) lies in the fact that virtually all of us hold 
certain commonsensical theories about human psychology which are 
logically at odds with (134). One aspect of our shared theory is 
that all forms of fantasizing that something is the case psychologi-
cally preclude simultaneous belief, on the part of the subject, that 
the fantasized state-of-affairs really obtains . {Some theorists might 
claim that this principle is a "conceptual truth", or even that it 
expresses an entailment of (128), not merely something which follows 
from the conjunction of (128) with a contingent theory; it makes no 
essential difference to what follows whether we say that (128) 
theoretically implies 
(135) !. does not believe that S. 
or whether instead we say that (128) analytically implies (135). At 
any rate, it appears that one of these two alternatives must be the 
correct one . ) A second, and more clearly contingent, principle of 
our commonsense psychology is that pains are ineluctably conscious 
phenomena, that pain-states are "self-intimating" . These two principles, 
of belief- exclusion and self- intimation, serve to rule out acceptance 
of (134) in the following way. (134) entails (132), and (132) 
theoretically implies (136) by the principle of belief-exclusion . 
(136} Irv doesn't believe he's in pain. 
But (134) also entails (137), and (137), by the principle of self-
intimation, theoretically implies (138}. 
(137) Irv is in pain. 
(138) Irv believes that he is in pain. 
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(136) and (138), however, are mutually contradictory. Thus (134) is 
rejected as a theoretical contradiction, i.e . something which cannot 
be true if our homely psychological theories are correct . Notice 
that (132T theoretically implies (133) in virtue of the same 
principles . For suppose that (132) were true and (133) were false, 
i.e. that {132) and (137) were both true . We just saw, however, that 
(132) theoretically implies (136), and (137) theoretically implies 
(138). But (136) and (138) are jointly absurd: therefore (133) must- -
given the truth of our theory--be true when (132) is, i.e. (132) 
theoretically implies (133). 
What about the denial of (132)? The sentence 
(139) Irv is not pretending that he's in pain . 
theoretically implies neither (133) nor (137) . (IJ' it implied either, 
we should have the absurd result, by contraposition, that (133) 
theoretically implies (132), or that (137) theoretically implies 
(132}!) This observation is not surprising, since although (132) 
strongly suggests (133), (139)- -in our speech at least--carries no 
strong presumption in favor of either (133) or (137). Only when 
(139) is given special stress, as in 
(140) Irv is not nretending that he is in pain. 
is there a strongly felt bias in favor of (137). But the source of 
the bias is easy to locate. The heavy stress in (140) conveys the 
strong impression that the utterer thinks there is something in the 
very nature of pretending which makes (132) false, i . e. some powerful 
psychological reason why pretense is ruled out . And in terms of our 
conunonsense psychology, the obvious reason is that Irv is in pain, 
which would theoertically eliminate the possibility of pretense (or 
perhaps the reason might be that Irv believes himself to be in pain, 
which is still enough to rule out pretense and which would ordinarily 
be enough to make us say that Irv is in pain, since it is theoretically 
unlikely that he would have this belief without actually being in 
pain). other alternatives, such as that Irv is rehearsing for a play 
in which he has the role of a person suffering from great pain, tend 
to be discoW1ted because we have no very strong theoretical reasons 
for supposing that these alternatives are really "intrinsically" 
incompatible with pretense (e.g. Irv might be a "method" actor of 
some sort). 
The cancellability of the felt implications of counterfactives 
like pretend proves that these implications cannot be genuine semantic 
presuppositions. And the ease with which they can be accoW1ted for 
in terms of background beliefs suggests that the presupposition 
enthusiast has fallen prey to an occupational hazard of armchair 
semanticists, viz. conflating a matter of utterance-meaning with the 
utterer's accompanying beliefs. 
3.6. Orders and Questions 
All the alleged cases of semantic presupposition that we have 
considered so far have concerned declarative sentences, since semantic 
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presupposition is typically defined in terms of necessary conditions 
for a sentence's having a truth-value, and only declaratives admit 
of truth-valuation. Yet some theorists have felt that interrogatives 
and imperatives stand to certain declaratives in relations which 
are at least importantly analogous to semantic presupposition as 
ordinarily understood. Consider, for example , the following pairs 
of sentences : 
(141) a. Why is the Moon ma.de of green cheese? 
b. The Moon is made of green cheese. 
(142) a. Shut the door! 
b. The door is not already shut. 
It has been claimed that sentences like (141a) and (142a) in some 
sense "presuppose" sentences like (141b) and (142b) respectively 
(Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970, Fillmore 1971). 
If we are to assess these claims about (141) and (142), we must 
have at least a rough definition of the ingredient notion of "pre-
supposi.tion". The following seems to be approximately what the 
presupposition theorist has in mind. Interrogatives and imperatives, 
though not truth-valued, have semantic characteristics which are 
analogous to the possession of truth- values. Thus interrogatives 
like (14la)- i.e . Wli- questions-typically admit of correct or incorrect 
answers; and imperatives typically admit of being obeyed or disobeyed. 
So we might speak of interrogatives as being 11ansver-valued11 and 
imperatives as beins "obedience-valued". Such a procedure would make 
possible the following definition: 
(143) 	 An interrogative/imperative 81 semantically 
presupposes a declarative S2 iff S1 is answer-/ 
obedience-valued only if s2 is true . 
Consequently, the falsity of (141b} entails that (141a) cannot be 
answered either correctly or incorrectly; and any situat ion in which 
(142b) is false is a situation in which (142a) cannot be either obeyed 
or disobeyed. So construed, the presupposition claim regarding (141) 
and (142) sounds fairly plausible; let us now see whether it is true . 
Genuinely semantic presuppositions, we have repeatedly stressed, 
are nonca.ncellable. So our first move vill be to show that the 
presuppositions allegedly involved in {141) and (142) can be cancelled. 
Having thus established that the relations are not semantic in 
character, we shall offer an account of them in purely pragmatic terms. 
Consider first (141a}. Logically speaking, the crucial feature 
of (141a) is th,:,.t, like all "Why"-questions, it is a complex question 
on a par with the notorious 
(144) Have -you stopped beating -your wife? 
There is a similar temptation to say that (144} "cannot be answered" 
vhen a certain condition falls, viz. when the addressee fails ever 
to have beaten his wife. But this is simply wrong. A complex question 
like (144) can straightforwardly be answered in the negative by 
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either (145a) or (145b): 
(145) a . No, I haven't stopped--J'm still doing it . 
b. No, I haven't stonped--for I never started! 
(145a) is the answer appropriate for a wife-beater, and (145b) for 
one who does not beat his wife. The only problem with a simple "No" 
answer on the part of a non-wife-beater is that, though absolutely 
correct, it leaves open the question of the speaker's reason for 
giving it. Now (l4la) might receive either -0f two ansvers, viz. 
(146a) or (l46b) : 
(146) 	 a. The Moon is ma.de of green cheese because ... 
f It isn't.b . l_ The 	Moon i$ not made of green cheese.} 
Since (14lb) is false, no answer like (146a) will count as a "correct" 
answer. For (146a) offers an explanation, but an explanation with a 
false conclusion must be either logically defective or contain a 
false premise. Yet it would be rash to conclude from t his fact that 
(14la) does not admit of any correct answer . For (l46b), we submit, 
is the correct answer to {141a) . Of course, {l46b) does not have the 
superficial form of an explanation, exemplified by (146a); but this 
is to be expected. Just as one can reply to an accusation by repudia-
ting it, so too one can answer a complex question like {141a) by simply 
repudiating the question itself. Arguments to the contrary seem to 
rest on an equivocal use of answer. For it seems we have both a 
superficial and a semantic notion of "answer": ,,.e can think or an 
answer to a question as being a declai·ative sentence standing to the 
question in the appropriate surface- grammatical relation (as (lq6a) 
stands to (llila)), or we can think of an answer a.s being a sentence 
which (regardless of its superficial shape) is semantically appropriate 
to the question , in that what it asserts specifies one member of the 
relevant exclusive and exhaustive set of possible states of affairs, 
even though the state of affairs so specified is not itself queried 
by the speaker as part of his or her $p,;,ech act. (That possible state 
of affairs in which the moon is made of green cheese because S1 , that 
in which the moon is made of green cheese because 32 , ... , and that in 
which the moon is not made of green cheese are all tbe alternative 
possibilities that there are. We assuJne here that the normal function 
of a question is to solicit a preference for one melllber of some 
partition on logical space . ) To say Just this is only to offer a 
slogan, of course; extended discussion of semantical issues would be 
required in order to make this notion of semantic appropriateness 
precise and to give it convincing motivation, as well as careful exam-
ination of the illocutionary structure underlying h'hy- questions and its 
relation to their semantic content. But, once the two notions of 
"answer" are distinguished, it is fairly plain that something like 
the latter notion ls the only relevant one. (146b) is an answer to 
(14la} because it accomplishes the desired specification of one of 
the relevant states of affairs; it is a correct answer because it is 
true . And it should be noted that any o.rdinary speaker would accept 
(146b} as a perfectly appropriate and felicitous answer to (141a). 
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(It may be true that (141a) itself is infelicitous in some way when 
(141b) is false; certainly a speaker who uttered (141a) knowing that 
(141b) is false would be guilty of raising a pointless question . 
But these facts (we shall argue more" ful.l.y in Section 4 below) are 
irrelevant to (141a)'s semantic status in such a situation.) Since 
the falsity of (141b) does not preclude the possibility of answering 
(141a), (141a) does not semantically presuppose (141b) in the sense 
demanded by (143). 
Turning to (142a), we immediately notice that it admits of two 
nonequivalent paraphrases, viz . (147a} and (147b): 
(147) a. Cause the door to shut! 
b. Cause the door to become shut! 
(147a} has nothing to do with whether or not the door is already shut; 
if the door happens to be shut already, one could obey (147a) by 
opening the door and then shutting it. Suppose, for example, that 
John is the sound-effects man at a radio station . Among his equipment 
is a portable door for making slamming noises. He keeps this door 
shut at all times when it is not in use, for, when open, it tends to 
get in his way and might slam shut at the wrong moment owing to a 
draft in the studio. At the appropriate point in the script, the 
director holds up a card on which (142a) is written; John obeys this 
direction by quietly opening his portable door and then noisily 
slamming it shut . Clearly, it is the paraphrase (147b) which seems 
to have some essential connection with the truth of {142b) . So let 
us confine our attention to (147b) . 
Why cannot (147b) be obeyed--or , for that matter, "disobeyed"-
if the door is already shut? The reason seems clear enough: as a 
matter of logic, nothing can become the case unless, for some 
immediately prior stretch of time , it was not the case. But if the 
door is already shut, then it is too late to rectify matters.15 So 
(142a) is like 
(148) Stop World War II! 
in coming too late to be obeyed. But are matters really so trans-
parent? We think not . To see why, let us indulge in a bit of science 
fiction. Suppose that John possesses a time-machine. At time:!:,, John 
is given the order (142a). John already knew that the door was closed, 
so be time- travels back to a moment prior to:!:,, opens the door, and 
time- travels forward to the moment immediately following:!:., whereupon 
he proceeds to shut the door . What John was asked to do at twas to 
cause the door to become shut {if not right away, then at least in 
the near future) . But, as a result of his time-trip, the door has 
been open for a stretch of time up to and including t, so it is no 
longer impossible that the door should "become" shut.-
One's immediate reaction to such a story is to say that John 
"caused" the process of becoming only because he could alter the past 
but that altering the past is impossible . But what sense of impossible 
is involved here? No doubt the laws of nature, as currently under-
stood, rule out time- travel. But physical impossibility does not 
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entail logical impossibility. To our knowledge, time-travel has never 
been shown to be a (logically) self-contradictory notion . Yet if it 
is granted that it is at least logically possible to alter the past, 
thus creating a new future, then it seems one must also grant that it 
is at 	least logically possible that (142a)-paraphrased by (147b)--
could be obeyed even though (142b) is false at the time that (142a) 
is uttered. 	 And this bare possibility is enough to show that (142a) 
does not semantically presuppose (142b). On the contrary, it would be 
more accurate to say that the falsity of (142b) at the time (142a) 
is uttered makes it physically impossible to obey (142a)--a fact which , 
whatever its intrinsic interest, has no bearing on semantics. 
The point of asking a "Why"-question is to get an explanation. 
If one antecedently believes that there is no fact to be explained, 
then one can rationally expect only two kinds of responses: an unsound 
argument from a deluded hearer, or a nat repudiation of the question 
from an enlightened bearer. Under these circumstances, asking (l4la) 
when one takes (141b) to be false would be an exercise in futility. 
Similarly, the point of ordering or requesting someone to do something 
is (normally) to get that person to do the thing in question . If one 
antecedently believes that the action is in any sense impossible for 
the agent, then-unless one has some rather bizarre purpose in mind--
there is no reason to waste effort in issuing an order or request. 
Using a notion defined much earlier, we could sunnnarize all of this by 
saying that (141a) and (142a) act-imply (141b) and (142b) respectively, 
i.e. the latter are "felicity conditions on" the speech acts normally 
associated with the former. 
There is an unfortunate tendency on the part of some theorists to 
assume, ~citly or explicitl.y, that sentences llhich express felicity 
conditions on a given speech act t11USt have some intrinsic semantic 
connection with the sentences typically used to perform that act. And 
writers on speech acts (e.g. Searle 1969) have reinforced this tendency 
by using the word presupposition as a catch-all designation both for 
certain re:U,.tions between sentences and for various pragniatic relation3 
bet-ween a speaker, a sentence, and an attempted speech act. The 
underlying confusion is one between sentence-meaning and speaker-
meaning. It is _probably true that a speaker who utters a sentence S 
in the attempted performance of a speech act A "gives us to understand" 
that certain felicity conditions for A are satisfied. But it does not 
follow that the sentences which formulate those conditions thereby in 
any sense convey part of the meaning of the sentence S. Thus, for 
example, the sentence 
(149) John will be killed. 
might be used to make a promise, to give assurance , to make a prediction, 
to give a warning, and so on. Ea.ch of the following sentences expresses 
a felicity condition for one of these uses of (149): 
(150) 	 a. The speaker intends to kill John or to have 
him killed. (Promise) 
b. 	 The speaker thinks that the hearer doesn't 
want to see John killed. (Warning) 
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c . The speaker has good reason to believe that 
John will be killed. {Prediction) 
Each of (150a-c) is something which we might infer from an utterance 
of (149) in a certain context, i.e. each is something we might infer 
from the fact that that man (about whom we believe such-and-such) uttered 
(149) in those surroundings (about which we have certain other beliefs) . 
But none of (150a- c) is something we would infer from the sentence (149) 
in isolation . This becomes evident when we consider that felicity condi-
tions for different speech acts may be incompatible . For in addition 
to (150a-c) we have 
(151) 	 The speaker thinks the hearer does want to see 
John killed. (Promise) 
If any of (150) or (151) is a consequence of (149) taken in isolation, 
then there is no reason why they should not all be consequences of 
(149)--for they are surely all on a par as falicity conditions ror various 
uses of (149). But then we should have the absurd result that both 
(150b) and (151) are consequences of (149). (Surely there is nothing in 
the literal meaning of the sentence (149) which in any way supports the 
conclusion that anyone who uttered (149) would have contradictory beliefs.) 
In practice, of course, no one would draw such a silly conclusion, pre-
cisely because one would think of (149) as uttered in a context where only 
one speech act was at issue . But this is just to concede our print: (149) 
act-implies one or another of (150a-c) or (151) relative to a given 
assumption about what the actual or hypothetical utterer is trying to 
accomplish; and act- implication is a concept of pragmatics, not of semantics. 
3 . 7 . Existential Presuppositions 
Even if it is admitted that all the foregoing sorts of presup-
positions have been discredited, it might still be thought that there is 
one kind of presupposition which is beyond reproach, viz. the "existential" 
presupposition allegedly carried by sentences containing singular terms 
(names, demonstrative pronouns , and definite descriptions) . Surely it 
"ill be said, any decl arative sentence containing an "empty" (i.e. non-
denoting) singular term in an ostensibly referential position is truth-
valueless, cannot be used to make a statement, etc. Here we seem to have 
a genuine semantic presupposition: the existence of referents for the 
appropriate terms appears to be a necessary condition for a declarative 
sentence to have a truth value. (And erference failures in nondeclarative 
sentences will have corresponding consequences anent their semantic 
analogues of truth-value.) 
Let us begin our examination of this claim by turning to the most 
venerable (and hackneyed) example in the literature: 
(152) The present King of France is bald. 
A1!l is well known, (152) necessitates 
(153} There is a present King of France. 
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and it has widely been held that (152) presupposes (rather than 
entails) 	(153), on the grounds that 
(154) The present King of Fr11nce is not bald. 
also seems to necessitate (153). But the ·situation here is similar 
to those involving nonrestrictive relative clauses and cleft construc-
tions (cases 3.1 and 3.2 above), in that we need to distinguish external 
from internal negation in order to determine whether (154) both is 
the denial of (152) and does indeed necessitate (153), both of which 
conditions must be met if the "presupposition" theorist is to make 
good his claim. 
If (154) is the denial of (152), then (154) is equivalent to 
(155) 	 It's not the case that the present King of 
France is bald. 
But (155) obviously fails to necessitate (153), since (156) is consistent: 
(156) 	 It's not the case that the present King of France 
is bald, because there isn't any present King of 
France. 
And therefore (154) does not necessitate (153) either. (Very likely 
(154) is not equivalent to (155), but rather to the internal negatior 
of (152}; but in that case it d:oes not express (152) 's denial. As in 
cases 3.1 and 3.2, we need take no stand on which logical form or fox= 
(154) do~s Ul fact express.) (152) therefore does not semantically 
presuppose (153); and since (as is agreed on all sides) it does 
necessitate (153), it presUJMbl.y entails it. Of course, this 
conclusion commits us to saying that (152) is false when (153) is 
false, as Russell originally contended. 
We shall deal in Section 4 below with a well-known objection rai sed 
by Strawson (1950) against Russell's claim; we shall argue that the 
objection is revealingly defective . In the meantime, we ought to take 
account of a little-remarked fact, recently pointed out by Atlas (1975): 
that, to most speakers, even the explicitly external negation (155) 
suggests (153). 
The correct explanation, we believe, i "S of .a relatively familiar 
sort. As in some of our previous cases of negation, (155) ca.,;i be 
verified by (at least) two distinct and exhaustive sorts of situation: 
there being a present King of France who is non-bald, and there simply 
being no (unique) present King of France. The utterer of (155) might 
have either of these possible situations as his or her grounds. (It 
is of course possible for the speaker to have nonspecific evidence 
for just the ultra-cautious 
(157) 	 Either there is no present King of France or 
there is one who is non-bald . 
But, as in the case of negated knowledge-sentences, it is unusual to 
expect such a situation, i.e. one in which our set of well-supported 
background theories entails (157) or the equivalent. 
(156) 	 If there is no present King of France who is 
non- bald, there is no present King of France. 
but does not entail the truth of either of (157)'s disjuncts. So the 
possibility of the speaker's having such nonspecific evidence is 
statistically less likely than either of the other two options.) 
Thus, probably either the speaker accepts (159) or the speaker 
accepts (160). 
(159) There is a present King of France who is noo-bald. 
(160) There is no present King of France. 
A familiar asymmetry distinguishes these two alternatives. In 
either case, the speaker's utterance of (155) must be regarded as an 
understatement, since on either hypothesis the speaker vould be in a 
position to be more specific about his or her grounds. But the degree 
of understatement differs widely; for (159) and (160) are respectively 
the denials of 
(161) 	 If anything is a present King of France, then 
that thing is bald. 
and (153), which can be seen to be something very like respectively 
specific and general conditions for th~ truth of (152), 
(161) cand (153) are not literally specific and general conditions, 
as we have defined the latter terms, since neither mentions any 
particular individual. Being general statements (containing only 
logical operators and predicates), they are, if they can be said to 
be "about'' anything, about classes or pro);)erties. Let us paraphrase 
(159) and (160)--their denials-very crudely in terms of properties: 
(162) 
(163} 
The property of being a present King of France 
and the property of being non-bald share an 
instance . 
The property of being a present King of France 
is unexemplified. 
And (155): 
(164} It's not the case that the property of being a 
present King of France and the property of being 
bald sruu-e an instance. 
Now Grice's Maxim of Relevance alerts us that an utterer of (155)/ 
(164) wants to tell us something about the relation between the property 
of being a present King of France and the property of being bald--
othervise mention of both would introduce irrelevance. Suppose the 
utterer has (159)/(162) as his or her evidence for (164). The 
cOJ;ljW1ction of (162) with the background assumption that the property 
of being a present King of France has at most one instance entails 
(164). On this hypothesis the speaker is guilty of slight understatement, 
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being in a position to utter the stronger (159)/(162) itself. But 
suppose that the speaker's evidence is rather (160)/(163): As before, 
the speaker is guilty of understatement. But this understatement is 
far more dramatic: for if (160)/(163) is true, then it's not the 
case that the property of being a present King of France shares an 
instance ;;ith !!&_ other property, let alone that of being bald. Thus, 
on the hypotbesTsthat (160)/(163) is th.e speaker's evidence for 
(155)/(164), the speaker's allusion to the property of being bald in 
particular becomes inexpl.icable, and violates the Maxim of Relevance . 
As usual, we as bearers take the path of least resistance and infer 
that the speaker's evidence is (159)/(162) rather than (160)/(163). 
And (159) entails the existence of a King-hence the suggestion carried 
by (155) . 
If there is any weak spot in the foregoing account, it is in 
our parenthetical and rather qui.ck repudiation of the possibility that 
the utterer of (155) may have nonspecific evidence, i.e. that he or 
she may remain agnostic on the question of the existence of a present 
King. As ;;e have said, we believe that this circlllllstance is {as things 
stand) unlikely, for reasons parallel to those we gave in :favor of our 
similar claim in the case of negated knovledge-sentences . But the 
present case does not seem to us quite so obvious; it is perhaps less 
unlikely that someone's set of well-established background theories 
should support (157) in the relevantly agnostic fas11ion . At aQy rate, 
there are further considerations 'We can bring to bear against the 
nonspecificity hypothesis in this case. 
Notice first that (152) contains what ve have called an emphatic 
construction. For on our account, (153) is trivially entailed by, and 
(;;e would further want to say) is at least loosely "part of the meaning 
of" (152), and yet the entailment bears less than tbe standard amount 
of emphasis-hence our reluctance {see Section 4.1.1 below) to judge 
that (152) asserts (153). Thus, the (along with possessive pronouns 
and ;;hatever other definite descriptors there may be) performs a de-
emphasizing function, among others . And if so, then (by Principle J:!.) 
it performs the same de-emphasizing :function in (155) as it does in 
(152), viz. that of diverting focus from the existential implication 
of the clause in which it occurs in semantic structure. Relatively 
speaking, then, the scope of (155) 1s negator stresses the predicate , 
directing the hearer's attention to the property of baldness. No;; we 
can raise the same sort of explanatory question that we did in case 
3.2 (that of negated cle~ sentences): If the utterer of (155) is wholly 
noncommittal as to his or her evidence, i.e. i:f he or she has neither 
(159) nor (160) as specific grounds, then vhat accounts for the 
(relative) emphasis, on the predicate bald, vhl,ch rather conspicuously 
characterizes (159) but not (160)? In the absence of any offsetting 
contextual factors, ve ought to and do conclude as bearers that the 
speaker does have (159) in mind; and (159) entails (153). 
At this point an exceptionally interesting sidelight appears. 
Notice first that the force of an emphatic construction comes in 
degrees; some such constructions emphasize or de-elllphasize more than 
others . For example, a descriptor, while lt de-emphasizes its own 
existential implication, de- emphasizes its own uniqueness implicatio~ 
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even more. (We are somewhat disinclined to say of an utterer of (152) 
that be or she "asserted" that there is a present King of France; but 
we are far more strongly disinclined to say of the same person that 
he or she asserted that there aren't two or more present Kings. And, 
while we are somewhat loath to say that (160) "contradicts" (152) , we 
are much 	more loath to say that 
(165) France has three Kings at present . 
does.) To take a second example, a descriptor does not de-emphasize 
its existential implication as strongly as 
(166) It was John who robbed the diaper service . 
emphasizes the role of its agent, and the latter sentence in turn does 
not emphasize so strongly as does 
(167) 	 It was John--John , do you hear , dammit! , not 
Sheila--who'ro'b'bed the diaper service. 
Notice, second, that the likelihood or unlikelihood of a speaker's 
having nonspecific evidence for uttering the denial of a sentence whose 
truth depends on a general and a specific condition also comes in 
degrees. We have seen that nonspecific evidence is exceptionally 
unlikely in the case of negated knowledge-sentences. It seems somewhat 
less unlikel y 1n the present case of negated subject-predicate sentences . 
And it is not at all rare in the case of cleft sentences. (166) has as 
general and specific conditions (168) and (169) respectively. 
(168) The diaper service vas robbed. 
(169) If the diaper service was robbed, then John 
robbed it. 
And someone might quite easily have evidence for the conditional. 
(170} If the diaper service was robbed, then John did 
not !'Ob it . 
without having specific evidence against either the gene!'al or the 
specific condition. (The presumption of a negated cleft sentence is 
not a case of factive implication.) 
What is remarkable is that these two magnitudes, at least in 
the cases we have chosen to discuss, vary inversely . In our most 
Obvious case of factive implication, that of negated knowledge-
sentences , no emphatic construction is in play . And in the cases in 
which emphatic constructions are most obviously responsible for the 
pragmatic suggestions in question, (3.1. and 3.2.) , even though 
"general"/"specific" structure is present in or can be imposed on 
them, the possibility of the speaker ' s having nonspecific evidence 
for the denial of t he relevant conjunction is not strikingly unlikely 
or remote . Finally, our present case of sl.ightly marginal or dubious 
unlikelihood is also a case in which an emphatic const!'Uction figures, 
but in which that construction is not so strongly emphatic e.s those 
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which occur in the cases which simply fail to support a claim of 
fa.ctive implication. 
We cannot imagine why this inverse dependence obtains, if it 
does obtain in general. There is certainly no obVious connection 
between (on the one hand) the superficial ell\Pbatic _properties of 
certain sentences, and (on the other} the probability or improbability 
of certain sorts of factual situations. The only hypothesis that 
occurs to us is one which lends pleasing support to our suggestions 
so far : that when speal<ers wish to implicate something by means of a 
negated sentence which can be construed in terms of "general." and 
"specific" conditions but which (for reasons of likelihood and 
unlikelihood} does not support a factive implication, they implicitl.y 
recognize the latter weakness and opt for the more superficial and 
hence more easily controllable device of emphasis, as a surrogate for 
the more natural variety of pragmatic suggestion. 
In offering our total treatment of (J.52}, we have exploited the 
fact that the present King of France, though it lacks a denotatum, 
nonetheless contributes meaning to the sentence(s) in which it occurs. 
On our view of singular terms, this means that the present King of 
France as it occurs in (152) is a "singular" tenn only superficially--
semanticall.y, it "disappears on anlaysis" in precisely Russell's vey-. 
Thus, it is being used attributively (Donnellan 1966), or non- rigidly 
(Kripke 1972). But what of singular terms that are not semantically 
structured in this way? Pace Russell, who held that all singular 
terms of natural languages are or abbreviate superficial descriptions 
used attributively, most of us believe that some singular terms, 
primarily proper names, are semanticaJ.ly fused--tbat they have no 
hidden semantic structure, but fUnction solely in such a wey- as to 
pick out particular individuaJ.s as their respective referents. 
Virtually all proper nW!les have this 11-purely referential" use; and, 
if Donnellan (1966) is correct on some further points, sometimes 
definite descriptions do too. 
What, then, about a nondenoting name or a description which is 
not being used attributively, which does not vanish in favor of its 
hidden structure in Russell's way? That is, suppose a singular term 
(say, the superficial subject of an atomic sentence} has neither a 
semantic connotation nor a denotation? What we believe is that 
Russell was exactly right in claiming that "the meaning of a genuine 
Ci.e. purely referential) name is its bearer", or, less metaphysically, 
that a genuine name has meaning or significance only insofar as it 
serves to denote what it denotes. Consequently, a connotationless 
and denotationless "name•• is, literally, a meaningless particle--not
6aword of our language.l And a string which contains it is therefore 
simply ungrammatical, ill-formed. Thus, there is at least this case 
in which reference-failure gives rise to truth-vaJ.uelessness. For a 
string such as 
(17J.) Kanrog rides poorly. 
where Kanrog neither carries attributive connotation nor denotes 
anything, is not a sentence, but merely a surface predicate preceded 
by a meaningless mark or noise; thus, it is obviously neither true nor 
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false. This, bowever, is cold comi'ort for tbe champion of trutb-
valueless sentences. (Note that tbe alleged presupposition in tbis 
case, 
(172} Kanrog exists. 
is ill-formed as well, for tbe S8llle reason, It would be quixotic 
indeed to insist of one string of gibberish tbat it "semantically 
presupposed" another string of gibberish.) 
Our thesis concerning nonattributive out nondenoting superfiaia.l 
names may strike some readers as being obviously false. Consider 
(173) Jobn loves Mary. 
There is an inclination to say that (173) just is grammatical, whether 
or not the names John and Mary are imagined to refer to anytbing. But 
we intuitively regard (173) as grammatical only oecause we know that 
these expressions are commonly used as n8llles of persons. Compare 
(174) Flork loves gl ork . 
Is (174} grammatical or not? If (174) is considered in isolation from 
any particular context of utterance, this question cannot be answered. 
If we are told that flork and glork are names, then our puzzlement 
vanishes: (174) gets treated just l ike (173). But to be a nonattribu-
tive name, an expression must be used by someone as a name of something. 
Names are very special lexical items. Except in a loose way, they do 
not "belong" to any particular language but are the transitory 
contributions of particular groups of speakers to the business of 
speech. The grammaticality of (174) is relative to an assumption 
about the semantic status of flork and glork, i.e. an assumption to 
the effect that the real or hypothetical utterer of (174) employs 
these expressions as names of actual things or people. 
Strictly speaking, a sentence-type is true, or false, only 
relative to an assignment of denotata to its demonstratives, indexicals 
and genuine names. A particular token of (174) will be grammatical 
on its occasion of utterance only if denotata are in fact assigned on 
that occasion to the ingredient tokens of flork and glork, i.e. il 
those tokens are used oy the speaker on that occasion to name some-
thing; and our token of (174) will have a definite truth-value deter-
mined by the amatory relations 0£ the objects so named. If the 
utterer is-improbably-failing to name anything on that occasion, then 
his utterance (174) lacks a truth-value in virtue of being ill-formed. 
Further development of this point, especially its extension to 
cover demonstrative pronouns and purely referential definite descrip-
tions, would require extensive discussion of the nature of reference 
and the syntactic and semantic repercussions of the distinction between 
"referentiaJ." and "attributive" occurrences of singular terms-all of 
which is beyond the scope of this essay,17 But we think ve have 
succeeded in motivating the claim t)lat not even the admitted truth-
valuelessness of the rare construction just discussed requires the 
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semanticist to forsake tbe framework of classical. two- valued logic 
in favor 	of an encumbra.nce of novel semantic apparatus . 
3.8 . 	 Counterfactual Conditionals 
Counterfactual conditionals are frequently cited as bearers of 
semantic presupposition, although there is some disagreement about 
tbe content of these presuppositions. Sentences of the form 
(175) 	 If it were the case that S1, then it would be 
the case that S2 . 
and their cognates are sometimes said to presuppose the falsity of 
both S1 and~ (Lakoff 1972) and sometimes said merely to presuppose 
the falsity of S1 (Karttunen 1971a). We agree that, at least with 
respect to their antecedents, counterfactual conditionals do carry 
certain implications, but we deny that these implications amount to 
semantic presuppositions. 
Consider first the consequents of such conditionals . Genuine 
semantic presuppositions are noncancellable, but the insertion into 
the consequent of the adverb still has precisely the effect of cancel-
ling any apparent presupposition of its .falsity. Thus the true 
sentence 
(176) If I were a whale, I would be a good swimmer. 
suggests that the speaker is not a good swim:mer but loses this suggestive 
force when expanded into the equally true sentence 
(177) If I were a whale, I would still be a good swimmer. 
Indeed, (177) seems to entail that the speaker is a good swimmer. So 
counterfactual conditionals do not semantically presuppose the falsity 
of their consequents, though they often defeasibly suggest the latter. 
Moreover, the negations of counterfactual conditionals often fail 
to suggest--much less to necessitate-the falsity of the embedded 
consequent. Consider the following sentences: 
(178) a. If I were unconscious, I could move my arms. 
b. 	 It is false that if I were unconscious, I 
could move my arms. 
By itself, (178a) does seem to suggest that the speaker ca.nnot move 
his arms; but (178b) carries no such implication. In uttering (178b), 
a speaker is concerned to deny a certain connection between two possible 
states-of-affairs, viz. his being unconscious and his being able to 
move his arms; but he does not seem to be saying, overtly or by 
implication, that he cannot in fact move his arms. Genuine semantic 
presuppositions of a sentence must attach both to that sentence and its 
denial. So the failure of (178b) to imply what is allegedly implied 
by (178a) shows that (178a) itself does not semantically presuppose the 
falsity of its consequent. 
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However , even unnegated counterfactual conditionals do not uniformly 
suggest or imply the falsity of their consequents . Whether or not the 
suggestion is present appears to be largely a matter of extralinguistic 
stage-setting rather than a feature of the conditional itself. To 
take another example, the implication of falsity is manifestly absent 
when ve use counterfactual conditionals to speculate about possible 
explanations of some admitted fact . We all know that Ford became 
President upon the resignation of Nixon. Suppose someone asks for 
some other possible vays in which Ford might have become President . 
Then 
(l79} If Nixon had been assassinated, Ford would have 
become President. 
is a perfectly true and acceptable answer which, in context, carries 
no implication that Ford did not become President . 
Indeed , there is an important linguistic job done by counterfactua.l 
conditionals with (putatively) true consequents, viz . that of formula-
ting tentative or conjectural explanations of apparent facts . As will 
be argued below, counterfactual conditionals minimally carry a "pre-
sumption" of lack of firm commitment to the truth of the antecedent, 
which makes them ideal for offering speculations and guesses about 
the causes of phenomena. For if one is convinced that, say, the 
sinking of the ship was caused by a torpedo, one would say that it 
sank because it was torpedoed; but if one is merely casting about for 
a sufficient reason for the sinking, one might say that if it had been 
torpedoed, it would have sunk. In light of these facts, the claim 
that counterfactual conditionals "presuppose" the falsity of their 
consequents in any sense seems too insubstantial to warr ant further 
consideration, and will subsequently be ignored. 
In contrast, counterfactual conditionals with recognizably or 
putatively true antecedents virtually always sound radically odd--so 
odd that many have been will ing to say that the whole conditional is 
truth-valueless in virtue of violating an alleged semantic presup-
position of the falsity of the antecedent . Nevertheless, there do seem 
to be circumstances in vhich this "presupposition" can be cancelled. 
Consider the following sentence: 
(180) 	 If there were a God, it would be foolish to disobey 
Him. 
If anyone wer e t o utter (180}, he would certai nly suggest to his 
audience that he is an atheist . But an agnostic, who is neutral about 
Theism, might wish to utter (180). without compromising his neutrality. 
And it looks as if he could do so by inserting an appropriate 
disclaimer, as in (181}: 
(181) 	 If there were a God--and, mind you, I don't think 
we're Justified in saying that there is or isn't--
it would be foolish to disobey Him. 
Some speakers of English might prefer the indicative to the subjunctive 
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here; but in spite of any stylistic oddity, (181) appears to be a 
coherent (noncontradictory) and noncommittal remark. If so, then 
(180) does not semantically presuppose the falsity of its antecedent. 
An even clearer case in which the presumption of falsity is 
cancelled has already been invoked: that in which we are casting 
about for tentative or conjectural explanations of an apparent fact . 
Thus, 
(182) 	 If the ship had been torpedoed, it would have 
sunk; and if someone had bored a hole in it, 
it would have sunk; and if it had sailed 
directly into a tidal wave, it would have sunk•.. 
--which do you think is the true explanation? 
does not contradict the assumption that at least one of the three 
suggested explanations is true. Similarly, consider a person reading 
the news of the naval disaster for the first time, and musing. 
(183) 	 So the Nikita Khrushchev went down•.•That would 
have happened if the CIA had had it torpedoed. 
(183) is 	certainly compatible with 
(184) The CIA had the Nikita Khrushchev torpedoed. 
There is also a difficulty about negated counterfactuals with 
true antecedents. If the falsity of the antecedent were semantically 
presupposed, then A counterfActual conditional vith a tl'Ue antecedent 
and the negation of that conditional would presumably both be truth-
va.lueless. But this does not square with the fact that we o~en 
regard negated counterfactual conditionals as true even though the 
conditional has a true antecedent. Consider the following sentence: 
(185) 	 If the earth were a spheroid, the people in the 
Southern regions would fall off. 
Suppose (185) is asserted by a naive defender of the flat-earth 
hypothesis. A perfectly natural reaction is to say "That's false!" 
or to counter vith 
(186) 	 It is false that if the earth vere a spheroid, 
the people in the Southern regions vould fall 
off. 
--citing as our reason for the truth of (186) the theory of 
Gravitation. Although this response could perfectly ,rell be couched 
in the indicative mood, the choice of the subjunctive is warranted by 
our desire to deny just what the utterer of (185) asserted. 
Similarly, certain unnegated counterfactual conditionals are 
retrospectively called "true" or "correct" vhen, at a later date, 
their antecedents and consequents are found to be true and suitably 
related. Suppose, e.g. that a nineteenth- century medical skeptic 
had contemptuously uttered (187): 
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(187) 	 If infections were caused by microorganisms, 
then infections could be cured by injection 
0£ chemicals hostile to these microorganisms. 
Today we 	 regard both the antecedent and consequent of (187) as true 
and related by known laws, and we deem this a sufficient (though 
certainly not necessary) condition for saying that the nineteenth-
century skeptic was "unwittingly rigbt"--i.e , that what he said was 
true, not truth-valueless . Of course, if someone were to utter (187) 
today, we would regard his remark as bizarre; but (187), thought 0£ 
as uttered a century ago, is quite acceptable . All of the foregoing 
facts are inexplicable on the assumption that counterfactual condi-
tionals semantically presuppose the falsity of their antecedents. 
What all of this suggests is that the oddity in question attaches 
not to the counterfactual conditional itself, but to utte~ances of the 
conditional in certain circumstances. The oddity, in other words, is 
pragmatic rather than semantic. One who utters an instance of (175) 
"represents himself", at least for the sake of argument, as not 
believing S1 to be true . It would be incorrect to sa;y that he repre-
sents himself as positively disbelieving S1, since it is allowable that 
he shouJ.d have no firm opini on about the matter. The presumption is 
merely that the utterer lacks (or cooperatively feigns to lack) 
commitment to the truth of S1. (This is especially evident with future-
tensed counterfactuals, for we are less sure of the future than we are 
of the past . ) And the oddity arises when we impute to the actual or 
hypothetical utterer the belief that S1 is true. What we ne~ now is 
an account of why the oddity arises. We shall tentatively contend 
that counterfactual conditionals conversationally imply that their 
antecedents are not presumed true . To show this, however, we must 
have some prior account of the semantics of such locutions to serve 
asi our guide. 
The traditional account of the truth- conditions for sentences 
of the form (175) held that a sentence of this form is true if and 
only if the conjunction of S1 vith certain "cotenable" premises 
(typically thought of as formulations of laws of nature), entails s2 . 
But it proved impossible in practice to provide a precise formal 
definition of cotenability vhich vould result in the validation of 
just the favored counterfactuals. Subsequently, David Lewis (1973) 
has provided an elabor ate possible- worlds semantics for counter-
factuals which, as a valuable corollary, makes poss.ible a vorkable 
definition of cotenability and hence a defensible version of the 
traditional truth- conditions £or counter£actual conditionals. Since 
Lewis ' account is, for better or vorse, the only viable candidate 
presently on the scene, ve can do no better than provisionally to 
opt for it and to argue that it provides a basis £or our contention 
that counter1:actual conditionals conversationa.ll.Y illlply that their 
antecedents are not presumed true. 
For our purposes, the crucial feature of Lewis I analysis is 
that counterfactual conditionals with true antecedents turn out to 
be semantically equivalent to mere material conditionals, hence to 
have the same truth- values as their consequents. For example 
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(188) 	 If Nixon had resigned, Ford would have become 
President . 
counts as semantically equivalent to 
(189) Nixon resigned::> Ford became President. 
and is thus counted as a true sentence. This procedure has some 
intuitive plausibility with regard to sentences like (188), but may 
seem artificial or even wrong when applied to sentences like 
(190) If c-0ws were mammals, lemons would grow on trees. 
Since both the antecedent and consequent of (190) are true, Lewis 
would count (190) itself as true . This is admittedly somewhat artificial, 
since ordinary speakers of English probably would not know what to say 
about (190) . There is some inclination to say that (190) is false on 
the ground that the states-of-affairs described by antecedent and 
consequent are irrelevant to one another. But it is difficult to give 
any pretheoretical justification for this intuition . For the claim 
that cows' being roamroals is irrelevant to leroons' growing on trees 
could itself be paraphrased counterfactuaUy by (191}: 
(191) Lemons would grow on trees regardless of whether 
cows were mammals or not . 
and (191) in turn seems to amount to (192}: 
(192) 	 If cows were roamroaJs, lemons would grow on trees; 
and if cows weren't mammals , lemons would grow on 
trees. 
It is easy to imagine someone uttering (192), e.g. if he were not sure 
whether cow$ are mammals or not but were certain that the outcome 
makes no difference to how lemons grow . But (192) is a conjunction, 
hence is true if and only if both conjuncts are true. Yet one of 
these conjuncts is none other than the troublesome (190) . So what 
has become of our intuition tha.t (190) roust be false? 
Sentences like (190}, regarding which we have :Little in the way 
of clear and consistent semantic intuitions, are just the sort whose 
semantic status requires adjudication by a full- blown semantic theory 
of counterfactuals. Since, in default of an articu1ate rival, we 
have opted for Lewis' theory, and since that theory is otherwise 
elegant and powerful, it would be unreasonable to balk at its conclu-
sions regarding counterfactual conditionals with true antecedents . 
(Arter all, a theory may be alloved to override an i.ntuition it 
contradicts if it can satisfactorily explain why we have that mistaken 
intuition. The apparent motion of the sun overhead does not give 
the lie to heliocentricity. Similarly, as we shall show below, 
treating counterfactual conditionals with true antecedents as semanti-
cally equivalent to material conditions does enable us to explain 
whY such sentences evoke puzzlement.) 
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Given Lewis' theory, it is easy to see what is wrong with 
uttering a counterfactual conditional in circumstances where the 
antecedent is presumed true. Suppose, e.g. that John utters 
(193) 	 If Mary were in town, she would contact her 
parents. 
We could 	then reason as follows. If it is presumed that Mary is in 
to=, then (193) is to be regarded as semantically equivalent to 
(194) Mary is in town :, Mary contacts her parents. 
But (194), together with our presumption, entails that Mary has 
contacted her pa.rents. Since ve normally assume--a.s a matter of 
conversational etiquette-that people a.re speaking truly, it must 
also be presumed that Mary has contacted her parents. But in light 
of these 	presumptions, the utterer of (193) is fully entitled to 
assert 
(195) Mary is in town and has contacted her parents. 
(195) , however, is semantically much stronger than (194), hence-on 
our present view--much stronger than (193). So why didn't the utterer 
of (193) utter (195) instead? In other words, to utter (193) when its 
antecedent is presumed true is to violate the Maxim of Strength, which 
dictates that one should not say significantly less than one is entitled 
to say. Therefore, from the assumption that the utterer of (193) is 
obedient to the conversational Maxims we may derive, via the Gricean 
inference- schema., that the antecedent of (193) is not presumed to be 
true. This explains our assumption, as hearers, that the utterer of a 
counterfactual does not believe its antecedent to be true. 
In general, the actual truth-value of the antecedent has nothing 
directly to do with the conversational deviance of a given utterance 
of a counterfactual conditional. Rather, such deviance is a matter of 
whether the context of utterance is such as to generate a presumption 
of the antecedent's truth, i.e . an imputation to the actual or hypo-
thetical utterer of belief in the antecedent, real or merely feigned 
for the sake of argument with or about some contextually involved 
believer. When this presumption is present, we cannot make sense of 
a person 's uttering the counterfactual conditional in question, since 
the uttered sentence conversationally implies the absence of that 
presumption. 
It is much harder, even with the a.id of Lewis' theory, to explain 
the further strong inclination felt by some bearers to go on to infer 
that the speaker (or vhoever) positively believes the antecedent to be 
false, although we have argued above that the latter "suggestion" is 
easily cancelled at least for semantic purposes. Previous strategies 
are unavailable here: Counterfactuals per se contain no emphatic 
constructions; nor do they have sets of "general" and "specific" 
conditions on their truth; nor do a.ny further Gricean considerations 
seem to help. Insofar as the alleged positive suggestion of the 
falsity of a counterfactual's antecedent is considered a real and 
hard datum, it is one which ve have yet to handle. 
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Moreover, even our foregoing explanation of the unacceptability 
of uttering a counterfactual with an antecedent presumed to be true 
must be regarded as tentative, since it rests on a rather unintuitive 
consequence of a theory which, though elegant, is by no means firmly 
established. An alternative explanation, one that covers the stronger 
presumption as well, will be suggested in Section 5 below. In any 
case, it is clear enough that the claim that counterfactuals semanti-
cally presuppose the falsity of their antecedents has little or nothing 
to recoll!ll!end it, and in addition renders inexplicable many of our every-
day responses to counterfactuaJ.s and their negations . 
4. Sources of the Myth 
The notion of "semantic presupposition" is, we believe, an epi-
phenomenon of the urrfortunate coincidence of some otherwise unrelated 
confusions, equivocations, and bad inferences. We have already remarked 
on some of these in carrying out our case studies; in this section we 
shall pursue our diagnosis in more revealing detai.l. 
4.1. Old Friends 
4.1.1. Assertion and Contradiction 
In discussing cases 3.1 and 3.2, we pointed out the fallacy of 
supposing that what is not "asserted" by a sentence is therefore not 
entailed by that sentence. The relevance of this point becomes even 
clearer when we reflect that, historically, the term presupPose has 
been used in each of two different ways: one, as contrasting with assert, 
and the second, as contrasting nth entail. The former usage is more 
natural, the latter technical. 
Despite the vagueness of the notion of what a sentence "says" or 
"asserts", ve have some tolerably clear cases (cf. again nonrestrictive 
relative clauses, and clefting) in vhich information that is plainly 
part of the semantic content of a sentence may have been placed (by one 
syntactic transformation or another) in so unemphatic a position in the 
surface structure of that sentence that ve are disinclined to admit 
that that information is part of what that sentence says or asserts . 
It is natural and harmless to say of this information that it is 
"presupposed, rather than asserted", by the sentence, i . e . that it is 
taken for granted, rather than actively put forward or emphatically 
pushed by the speak.er. But this natural notion of "presupposition", 
vhich contrasts with that of "assertion", is not that which 
contrasts with that of entailment. It is the Strawsonian notion, 
that of "semantic presupposition", which contrasts vith and precludes 
that of entailment. Therefore, it is an equivocation to argue 
(explicitly or implicitly) from purely intuitive data concerning what 
some sentence asserts or does not assert to positive technical 
conclusions about semantic presupposition . And it is this fallacy 
which, we think, has misled Keenan and others in cases 3.1 and 3.2, 
as well as Karttunen in case 3 . 3 (see 197lb:350-l). 
Parallel considerations bold for denying and contradicting. 
Just as it is fallacious to argue from "failure to assert" to "failure 
to entail", it is fallacious to infer from the fact that a sentence 81 
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(or someone who tokens s1 ) cannot properly be said to have denied or 
contradicted an utterance of S2, that S1 does not entail the falsity 
of s2 . Not every utterance, or even every assertion, of an S1 that 
entails t he fal sity of S2 is properly said to contradict S2, especially 
if S2 is (logically) much stronger than the denial of S1 and if the 
latter is an unemphasized consequence of S2. For example, if a speaker 
were to utter 
(196) Hud certainly is a devious swinging bachelor. 
one who replied by uttering 
(197) Hud is not an adult . 
woul.d not proper l y be said to have contradicted the first speaker, even 
though (197)-on the assumption that being a bachelor entails being an 
adult--entails the falsity of (196) . Simila.r l y, if a speaker were to 
utter 
(198) So it was Moriarty who k i l led Holmes . 
one who replied by uttering 
(199) Holmes was onl y put in suspended animation. 
would not properly be said to have contradicted the original speaker or 
to have denied vhat was asserted . To take a degenerate but even more 
obvious example, one who uttered 
(200) The economy will soon ta.ke a turn for the better . 
could not in any nontechnical sense be said to have contradicted a 
(demented) speaker who bad tokened 
(201) Three is both prime and not prime. 
though (200)--like 8IIY other sentence--entails the falsity of (201) . 
It is this general point that is overlooked by Strawson (1950) in 
offering the second of his two arguments against Russell's treatment 
of nondenoting singular terms: 
Now suppose someone were in fact to say to you with a perfectly 
serious air: ' Tbe King of France is wise.• •.•when, in response 
to his statement , we say (as we shou1d} 'There is n.o King oi' 
France ' we shou1d certainly not say we were contradicting 
the s t atement that the King of France is wise, We are certainl y 
not saying that it is false . (pp. 183- 4 } . 
Doubtless Strawson ' s premise is correct: In general , we wou1d not say 
that one who uttered 
(202) The~e is no King oi' France. 
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in response to 
(203) The King of France is wise. 
bas contradicted the utterer of (203) , at least not -without further 
comment or qualification. But, as our foregoing exampl es have shown , 
it does not fol low that the utterer of (202) did not token a sentence 
which in fact entails the falsity of (203); the utterer has merely 
attacked (203) at a de-emphasized outpost, showing (203) nonetheless 
surely to be false . Thus, the fact that we would not ordinarily say 
of an utterer of (202) that be or she had denied (203) or contradicted 
the utterer of (203) is of no consequence. 
It is worth remarking that, 11hile we believe the notion of 
"semantic presupposition" to be empty and uninteresting, the harmless 
"natural" notion of presupposing in the sense of "taking for granted" 
deserves thorough investigation--first, because its contrasting notion 
of "asserting" is intuitively viable but terribly unclear ; second , 
because it may prove illuminating in connection with issues in pragmat ics ; 
and, third, because it :may well play a role i n epistemol ogy and in the 
theory of dia1ectic . 
4.1. 2 . External vs . Internal Negation 
A second source of confusi on whi ch we have already menti oned is 
the failure to distinguish external from internal negation . The 
distinction is forced on us by the assumption that syntactic transfor-
mations operate on logical structures, i . e. on formulas of some suitably 
enriched formal system; for in such a system all scope ambiguities 
have been purged. 
Some linguists tend (in conversation at least) to protest , when 
faced with the external/internal distinction and reminded that a 
sentence's external negation is not only true but mandated to be true 
when that sentence's alleged "sellJSntic presupposition" fails , that 
exter nal negations "aren't English" . For example : "No one talks that 
ws.y . In English, when you want to deny {204) you say (205) 
(204) It was Peter vbo got sand in the parsnips . 
(205) It wasn't Peter who got sand in the parsnips . 
and when you want to deny (206) you say (207) , etc. 
(206) The present King of France is ugly . 
(207) The present King of France isn ' t ugly. 
' External negation' is just logicians ' claptrap, not goo.d English; 
and so it isn ' t recognized by the syntax/semantics of English ." 
There are at least two grains of truth here (but only grains). First, 
we hs.ve already admitted that some external negations are difficult 
or impossible to form in surface structure (cf. the case of non-
restrict i ve relative clause&}. But this admission has no effect on 
our arguments . To see this, notice again that nothing ve have rel ied 
on in the course 0£ our case studies requires us to decide, given some 
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s uper ficially negative sentence, whether that sentence expresses an 
internal negation, expresses an external negation, or is ambiguous 
between the two readings . In many cases, such as 3 .1, 3 .2, 3.3, 3.4 , 
and 3.7, the (semantic) external/internal distinction by itself gives 
rise to a n inescapable dilemma for the champion of semantic presup-
position--no assumptions about surface structures a r e needed. 
The second grain of truth in ·the quoted complaint is that e.xternal 
negations of complex sentences, uttered without verbal qualifications, 
are rarely acceptable in everyday English conversation . Why?--Because 
they are almost always frovned on by Grice's first Maxim as being 
uncooperatively weak and cautious, not because there is anything 
semantically wrong with them. Anyone can truly and felicitously utter 
(208) or 	(209) . 
(208) 	 It wasn't Peter who got sand in the parsnips, 
because no one at all did . 
(209) 	 It's false that the present King of France is 
bald, because France doesn't have a King. 
And aoyone can truly utter (210) or (211) 
(210) 	 It ' s false that it was Peter who got sand in the 
parsnips . 
(211) 	 It's false t hat the present King of France is 
bal d . 
in the circumstances envisioned; the deficiencies of (210} and (211) 
are conversational, not semantic . 
As a final way of seeing this, notice that any external negation 
is perf ectl y acceptabl e in the precise speech of philosophical logicians- -
the salient characteristic of that patois being that, in i t, conversa-
tional maxims are ignored in the interest of rigor and precision . 
L.1 .3 . Necessitation 
A third polluted source of' intuitions about "semantic presup-
position", theoretically negligible but significant in particular 
cases, is the ignori ng of arcane and bizarre but per fectly clear counter-
exampl es to claims of necessi tation . Semantic pr esupposition requires 
necessitation, and necessitation requires the absolute inconceivability 
of counterexampl es. A reader with sufficient imagination will easily 
find counterexamples to an enormous number of alleged semantic pre-
suppositions in the literature (see piu-ticularly, for exampl e, Lakoff 
1972) . Thus , even many of the data which are claimed to indicate 
semantic pr esupposition are spurious . 
4.2 . Truth-valuelessness and Infelicitousness 
Let us turn to a somewhat more penetrating examination of the 
causes underlying belief i n se111antic presupposition, for, ve believe, 
this diagnosis will shed some light on remaining linguistic and 
philosophical issues . I n particular, we want to investigate the notion 
0£ "truth- valuelessness" more closely than has been done to date. We 
should like to express skepticism about it, skepticism which is the 
64  
more crucial in that "truth-valuelessness" is the central notion in 
any semantic theory of presupposition. 
It is not for a moment in question that there are truth- valueless 
sentences. Questions, imperatives, and (some say} explicit performa-
tives do not have truth-values- -obviously. We become skeptical only 
vhen this relatively clear insight is extended to cover declaratives 
of the familiar sort--sentences that look like fact-stating sentences. 
Even within this class , we recognize a subgroup of truth-valueless 
sentences: those vbich contain hidden parameters so far unspecified . 
Thus, 
(212) Rex is big. 
lacks a truth-value u.ntil we explicitly or implicitly specify a 
reference-class ("Big for a what?"). Similarly, we have argued (in 
press) that a sentence like 
(213) Perry knows who Clark Kent is. 
lacks a truth-value until some purpose or project has been specified. 
And Ethical Relativists contend, though rarely on syntactic or semantic 
grounds,18 that a moral Judgment such as 
(214) Murder is \lrong. 
bas a truth-value only relative to some person or group . 
This sort of truth- valuelessness is easily understood: it is simply 
that of the open sentence . The string 
(215) lie is sick. 
is truth-valueless in exactly the same way. But truth- valuelessness 
of this type is a purely syntactic and semantic matter , determined by 
our formation- rules and our model theory. It does not depend on any 
background information concerning facts in the world; and that is 
precisely what the alleged truth-valuelessness resulting from pre-
supposition failure does depend on. Presupposition theorists surely 
do not mean to suggest that "presupposition" failure somehow implants 
a hidden parameter in the allegedly presupposing sentence that is not 
there when the putative presuppositwn is true . So the truth-val ueless-
ness in terms of Yhich semantic presupposition is defined is of none 
of the foregoing familiar types . 
It is obvious on reflection that "truth-valuelessness" in the 
Strawsonian sense is no ordin..ry, commonsensical notion. It is quite 
a technical one. Although speakers of plain English may balk when 
queried, "Is s1 true or false?", finding themselves unable to respond 
either "It's true" or "It's false" without fUrther clarification, 
explanation, or qualification, this mulish behavior is hardly tantamow1t 
to responding, 11Neither--S1 lacks a truth-value" or the like. To take 
a native's inability to choose one of the two truth- values on the spot 
as indicating either that he believes S1 to lack a truth-value or that 
S1 in fact lacks a truth-value is to make a highly substantive explana-
tory claim, a claim which must be compared to alternatives . And in 
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every such case there are plausible alternatives in the offing. 
This point undermines the first of Strawson's two arguments against 
Russell (offered, incidentally, in the article (1950) that originally 
gave rise to talk of truth-valuelessness). Strawson, as before, asks 
us to suppose that someone has uttered (203) "with a perfectly serious 
air". Now: 
Would you say, 'That's untrue'? I think it is quite certain 
that you would not. But suppose he went on to ask you 
whethe r you thought that what be had just said was true, or 
was false ; whether you agreed or disagreed with what he had 
just said. I think you would be inclined, with some 
hesi tation, to say that you did not do either; that the 
quest ion of whether his statement was true or false simply 
did not arise, because there was no such person as the 
King of France. (p. 183) 
We have indicated our rejection of Strawson's contention that we have 
"pure intuitions" of truth- valuelessness. (If an informant did 
respond to our query "that the question •.. did not a.rise", the most 
likely possibility would be that he or she had read Strawson somewhere. ) 
Still , it is true that no normal speaker would respond simpJ.y, "That's 
false". (Note in passing that i'alsity is the operative notion in 
Strawson's argument, despite his mention of the sentence, "That's 
untrue"; the latter can only be a slip, since on Strawson's own theory 
the utterance of (203) is untrue.) 
So let us agree that-
(216) That's false. 
would be inappropriate at best if tokened in response to (213 ). 
Strawson concludes without further deliberation that (216) itself is 
1'alse. But, as we have been at pains to point out, falsity is only 
one of many, many different varieties of inappropriateness, infelici-
tousness, or unacceptability; and there may well be some more plausible 
account of the inappropriateness of (216). In fact, there is what we 
take to be a more plausible alternative: The trouble With responding 
to (203) by tokening (216) alone is that in so limiting one's answer 
one violates either Grice's Maxim of Strength or the Maxim of ReJ.evance 
(for this case is one of factive implication, Just like that or 
(155) in Section 3.7 above). One who believes that there is no King 
of France is in a position rather to assert the far stronger 
(217) That's false, since there is no King of France. 
(Notice particularly, in addition, that (217) is perrectly acceptable 
to a normal speaker in the circumstances envisioned. ) This explanation 
of the inappropriateness of (216) is not only compatible with but 
entails the truth of (216) and hence the falsity of (203). 
It is worth pointing out that what we have said here is entirely 
consistent with the contention, often attributed to Strawson, that 
when we utter a sentence whose "presupposition" has failed, we do not 
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succeed in thereby making a statement. Whether or not a speaker bas 
made a statement is a question of Ulocutiona.ry force and hence o f 
pragmatics; thus, it is (so far as has been shown) irrelevant to t he 
question of whether the sentence uttered is in fact true. (It is 
easily seen that anyone may utter a sentence which is in fact true 
without thereby making a statement--as when he or she utt ers it within 
quotation, on stage, to practice elocution, or to activate a phoneti-
caJJ.y coded door- opening device . ) Therefore, even if it could be 
established in particular cases tha.t a spealter had failed to make a 
statement in or by uttering some sentence, that still would not show 
that the sentence was truth-va.J.ueless. Tbe most we could say i s that 
the sentence's truth- value Just did not matter in the context in 
question (we shall amplify this point shortly). 
We have seen that ordinary speakers are not normally capable of 
ma.king intuitive judgments of truth-valuelessness (as distinct from 
refraining from making any judgment at all), and that the notion of 
"truth-valuelessness" is a theoretical artifact of l i nguistic a nd 
philosophical semanticists. It ought to be noted in addition that 
to take truth-valuelessness seri ously is to require some s i gnificant 
departure from the simple traditional format of standard logic . 
Logicians who are willing to take this step are forced to invent three-
valued logics (cf. Woodruff (1970)) and/or fancy semantice.l machinery 
such as van Fraassen' s (1966) method of supervaluations , in each case 
courting justified charges of arbitrariness in settling the numerous 
"don't-cares" that arise in the nevly amplified models . To say this 
is not to raise any direct objection t o hYJ>Othesizing truth- valueless-
ness; there a.re deviant logics of the sort we have mentioned which can 
be made as elegant and as mathematically satisfying as anyone could 
wish . The point is only that "truth-valuelessness" as a semantical 
notion needs considerable sophisticated formal spelling-out before it 
can soberly be understood. 
One would expect, from the foregoing points (that "truth- value-
lessness'' is not a concept possessed by laymen, and that its logic is 
neither simple nor (let us add) uncontroversia.J.), that it may be hard 
even for the semantic theorist to form an intuitive judgment, concerning 
a given sentence in a context , as to vbether that sentence in that 
context has a truth-value. And this expectation is richly borne out, 
in our experience anyway . Although there are intuitively clear cases 
of true sentences (in particular contexts) and clear cases of false 
sentences ( in particular contexts), '•e have yet to see a c l ear case , 
in aey context, of a truth-valueless sentence that is not an instance 
of' one o:f the familiar and rmexc1t1.Dg types mentioned above . Whatever 
t heoretical function the notion of truth-valuelessness may serve , that 
notion is no raw and intuitive one; by itself it yields no data. 
If this is right, then whatever utility the notion of "semantic 
presupposition" has is theoretical utility, as opposed to reportive 
utility. To repeat: a field linguist may report , as a datum, that a 
native refused to commit himself to a jud@ent of truth or to a 
judgment of falsity; but the linguist may not report, as a datum, that 
the nat i ve commited himself to a judgment of truth- valuelessness, unl ess 
(as is both unlikely and irrelevant) the native is himself a professional 
linguist or philosopher or has been force-fed on the spot by such a 
person. 
What, then, can "semantic presupposition" do for semantic theory? 
In the course of our case studies , we have found as yet no job for 
Strawsonian presupposition to do . If there is any such job, most 
likely the best way to get at it (as Garner (1971) has insisted) is 
systematically to investigate the consequences of "presupposition" 
failure . Are there any sentence pairs <81, 82> of which we would want 
(for any theoretical reason) to say that if 82 is false, S1 lacks a 
truth-value? 
In some cases of alleged semantic presupposition, we have seen, 
the penalty for the f ailure (falsity} of s2 is simply the falsity of 
S1 . In other cases , the penalty is the violation of Grice ' s first 
Maxim. (Notice that as a byproduct of this violation, the presumed 
truth- -far from the truth- valuelessness- -of S1 is assured . To violate 
the first Maxim in uttering S1 is to utter S1 when one is in a position 
to assert some stronger truth, i . e . one which entails S1 but is not 
entailed by it ; and onl y truths are entailed by truths . ) No doubt, 
in still other cases, the penalty will be that S1 is infelicitous; but 
infelicitousness entails nothing about truth or falsity, as we shall 
see . In still other cases, the penalty will be that whoever tokened 
S1 (or possibly someone else in the situation) has a false belief; but 
that result too is consistent with S1's being either true or false . 
In no case are we tempted to impose truth-valuelessness as a penalty, 
though we might be if someone were to show some powe r ful explanator y 
reason why we should thus eschew the Law of Bivalence. 
If our skepticism about truth- valuelessness is as well justified 
as we believe it is , then there ought to be some further diagnosis of 
the fervor with which philosophers and linguists have embraced the 
notion . We believe that the correct (causal) explanation is to be 
found io Austin ' s pellucid doctrine of infelicities (1962, Lectures 
XI and XII), though we shall expand slightly on Austin's remarks here . 
Austin was concerned to point out that, from the standpoint of 
speech-act theory taken in the large, a given speech act can be (and 
is, in particular cases) assessed or evaluated along a number of 
distinct and independent "dimensions of criticism" , or spectra of 
satisfactoriness and unsatisfactor iness. This is clearest in the case 
of "pure" (explicit) performatives; a performative speech act can go 
wrong in any one of a number of different ways , some more tragic than 
others depending on context. But the same is true of any other speech 
act. So far as we can see, there is in nature no such thing as a 
"pure constative" , though (on our view) a semantic representation 
or logical form is a picture of one, in the same sense in which we 
can draw a picture of a mass-point or a black box . 
The true/false dimension is just one avenue of criticism among 
others; there are many other ways of being happy or unhappy, satis-
factory or unsatisfactory, felicitous or infelicitous . And (here is 
the important point) the impor tance of the true/false dimension in 
fact varies widely from context to context with the passing purposes 
of speakers, bearers , and assessor s . Sometimes we care very much 
about truth and falsity . At other times we care much more about other 
sorts of virtues and faults . We think, in fact, that cases of the 
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latter sort predominate rather heavily. Philosophers' treatment 
(prior to Austin) of English sentences as if all that mattered about 
them were their truth-values is an occupational. disease, and has 
resulted 	in true's having come to be, in some philosophers' vocabu-
laries, the only honorific applicable to utterances. This is a 
crucial point to which we sha.11 return. 
Consider a case of Garner's, offered in conversation: A speaker 
suddenly utters a declarative sentence on a topic that he or she 
knows nothing about, say, 
(218) 	 At this moment there are exactly three customers 
sitting in the Cantonese restaurant downtown . 
in a context in which it is clear that the speaker cannot possibly 
have any positive evidence for the truth of (218). Something is badly 
wrong; the utterance is infelicitous in some way yet to be specified. 
But it certainly need not be denigrated along the true/false dimension; 
the sentence uttered, (218), may very veil be true. 
Similarly, take Moore's Paradox: 
(2:19) It's raining, but I don't believe that it is. 
In the absence of very special stage-setting, (219) is anomalous. 
Though much has been written about it, both by "ordinary language" 
philosophers and by epistemic logicians, no one has ever quite 
succeeded in showing exactly what is wrong with it .19 The important 
thing to see here is that, though an utterance of {219) is almost 
invariably as infelicitous as any utterance could be, (219) might 
perfectly well be true {of the speaker); this fact, indeed, is essential 
to setting up the Paradox. 
Finally, 	take a negated factive: 
(220) Herbert doesn't know that June is a go-go dancer. 
uttered in a situation in which its complement is false. There is no 
question that this utterance, given appropriate stress contour, is 
infelicitous (in our discussion of case 3 . 3 above we suggested that 
the infelicity is partly statistical and partly Gricean). But, as we 
have seen, that does not affect (220}'s truth-value in the situation 
envisioned, since (220) is straightforwardly true-for what that is 
worth! 
It is this last phrase that best expresses our view about "presup-
position" and truth-value . In each of the foregoing three cases, some-
thing has gone badly wrong with the speaker's utterance. But there is 
no reason at all vhy this should lead us to judge that the sentence 
uttered lacks a truth- value. 
Now we may proceed to explain philosophers' and linguists' 
enthusiasm ~or imputing truth-valuelessness to sentences whose only 
crime is that their "presuppositions" have failed. As ve remarked 
earlier, philosophers at least have always grotesquely overemphasized 
the true/false dimension in thinking about language, to the extent 
that true is regarded as a kind of diploma. Once we have decided 
that a sentence is true, we pat it on the head and pass on to the next 
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sentence we 'Want to evaluate. And, we believe, it is this habit 
which accounts at least for philosophers' occasional invocations of 
truth-valuelessness. Faced with a sentence which, though undeniably 
grammatical, sounds funny when its "presupposition" has failed, a 
philosopher is extremely reluctant to call it "true", for to do this 
is to give the sentence a passing grade, to honor it in what seems 
to the philosopher to be a conclusive way. And yet the philosopher 
does not want to call the sentence "false", either, for to do that 
is to fail the sentence, t o condemn it in an apparently conclusive 
way obviously unwarranted by the situation. The philosopher concludes 
that the sentence is not true, and that it is not false--hence, that 
it is neither true nor false, and so, truth-valueless . 
The mistake, of course, is the philosopher's taking true and 
false far too seriously in the first place. Why not Just admit that 
the sentence is true (or false, 'Whichever seems dictated by the assumed 
facts, what we know of its truth-conditions, and considerations of 
theoretical elegance), for what that is worth (very little), and get 
on to more important kinds of evaluation of the sentence and hypothe-
tical speech acts in which it occurs? That is, let us give up our 
excessively honorific use of true and recognize that, in the sorts 
of cases we are talking about-;-To admit that a sentence is true is 
no great concession, but is only a prefactory note to getting on with 
evaluation along dimensions perhaps more pertinent to everyday life. 
This same failure to appreciate Austin's vital insight that true 
and false comprise only one among many important pairs of terms used 
for the praise and blame of utterances has, we suspect, misled linguists 
as well. For example, Karttunen vrites, 
[John didn't manase to solve the problem, if John d id  
not even try to solve the problem], would have to be  
rejected as an infelicitous utterance to which no truth  
value could be assigned. {197lb:344)  
--the implication being that the infelicitousness of the utterance in 
the context envisioned is the reason why "no truth value can be assigned" 
to the sentence uttered; in that context {as we have heard some linguists 
put it), the sentence is "too infelicitous" to be true or false. But 
this attitude radically misconceives the status of truth and falsity 
as evaluative propert i es of utterances or sentences. The true/false 
dimension, it will be remembered, is only one avenue of evaluation 
among others; it is not a final touchstone which an assessor applies 
only after having run through all the "lesser" infelicities and found 
the sentence i'n ciuestion acceptable in all prelimi nary respects. A 
sentence or utterance can be infelicitous to an arbitrarily extreme 
degree in any number of respects and still be true (or false). To say 
of a sentence that it must lack a truth-value because it "is infelicitous" 
--or that it is "too infel.icitous to have a truth-value"--is like 
saying of a dog which is blind and which is bad at following scents 
that it is therefore neither loyal nor disloyal , or of a man that he is 
so bad at his job and so ~y and such a rotten poker player that he 
is neither kind to his mother nor unkind to her. 
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5. Relative Grammaticality 
Some linguists20 have alleged that certain syntactic phenomena 
require a notion of presupposition, in that one and the same sentence 
may be deviant or ill- formed relative to some ways the world might be , 
and yet perfectly acceptable relative to other ways the world might 
be . (We use "relative to" here as a gloss designed to bl ur the 
distinction between the fact of the way the world is, the speaker's or 
hearer's belief as to the way the world is, the speech community's 
shared backgroUlld information as to the way the world is, etc . remarked 
on in Section 2 above. We shall speak hereafter simply of "pre-
sumptions".) Now if a string S1 is •.tell-formed only _given the truth 
of a sentence s2 or in light of the fa<!t S2 describes, this provides 
considerable temptation to say that Si presumes or "presupposes" S2 
in some sense or other; and, in view of the intimate connection 
between syntactic deep structure and semantic representation or logical 
form, it suggests that the kind of presumption in question is semantical 
or at l east semanticaD.y relevant. In fact, a brief argument suffices 
to show that if well-formedness is relative in this way to factual 
presumptions about the world, then a strong form of Strawsonian 
semantic presupposition is viable after all: If the failure of some 
{logically contingent) factual preswnption S2 suffices to render an 
otherwise grammatical string S1 UI1grammatical or ill-formed, and if 
(as is uncontroversial) a string must at least be well-formed in order 
to be either true or false, then the failure of s2 a fortiori renders 
S1 truth-valueless; thus, if Lakoff {1969) is right about the relativity 
of grammaticality, s1 (by definition) semantically presupposes S2. 
Notice that the brand of truth-valuelessness appealed to here is 
far less mysterious (on its face ) than that denigrated in Section 3 
above. The latter is the reputed truth-valuelessness of an admittedly 
well- formed sentence in certain circumstances, requiring bizarre 
alterations in what we would ordinarily and naturally take to be the 
truth-conditions to be assigned to that sentence (recall the cases of 
nonrest rictive relative clauses and negated factives) and seemingly 
needless complications in our logic . The truth-valuelessness that 
allegedly arises from presumption-failure in a case of "relative 
grammaticality", however, i$ nothing so offensively arcane or baroque--
it is simply the unexciting "truth-valuelessness" of an ill-formed 
string. An ungrammatical sequence of words need not be assigned 
aoy unusual truth-conditions; straightforwardly, it is assigned no 
truth- conditions at all. 
5 .1. Factual Presumptions and Logical Form 
Unlike the alleged data underlying the claims we discussed in 
Section 3, some of the phenomena c ited as examples of "relative 
grammaticality'' are striking, evidently real, and hard to expl ain 
away. We shall take up only a few of the cases that we find the most 
interesting and troublesome for semantic purists of our stripe . 
1. Laurence Horn (1969) argues that certain sentences containing 
only and even a.re well-formed only in contexts in which certain 
contingent factual presumptions hold. (Lakoff (1972:58lff) gives a 
useful summary of Horn's data . ) For example, a sentence of the form 
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(221) Even A 0'd. 
is deviant, ungrammatical, or at least quite peculiar if it was not 
expected that A would not 0, or if there was no one besides A that 
0'd. (As always, we leave open the question of who it is that is 
doing the expecting.) The exact nature of the deviance or peculiarity 
here is as yet unspecified.21 
2. Lakoff (1969) argues convincingly that t he relative pronoun 
who can be used grammatically only when it is presumed that its subject 
is regarded for purposes of the discussion as denoting a person, as 
opposed to a mere thing or lower animal. {Lakoff (citing McCawley) 
finds it interesting that "semantics" is here invading what used to be 
thought of as "purely syntactic", viz. judgments of deviance or 
ungrammaticality; since syntax and semantics are no longer widely 
regarded as being separate and autonomous areas of inquiry, this invasion 
is not surprising. What is surprising is that our judgments of 
syntactic/semantic deviance should vary with our background beliefs 
or presumptions. To semantic purists of our persuasion, what informa-
tion about a sentence is encapsulated in that sentence's deep structure, 
logical form, or semantic representation should not depend on any 
contingent factual presumptions about the way the world is; it is a 
purely formal matter. We shall pursue this below.) 
3. Lakoff goes on to show (pp. 109-10) that intonation contour 
is sometimes dictated by background bel iefs . Contrast: 
(222) a. John called Mary a lexicalist and then she 
=== insulted him. 
b. 	 John called-Mary a lexicalist and then she 
insulted him. 
If we agree that intonation contour is at least sometimes a semantic 
matter--e.g. that intonation contour sometimes suffices literally 
to disambiguate an utterance which it characterizes--we can generate 
more cases in which background beliefs appear to affect syntactic and 
semantic well-formedness. 
4 . Either, too, and instead carry factual presumptions not 
unlike those carried by~ (cf. 1 above). Lakoff claims, citing 
(223} a. Jane is a sloppy housekeeper and she doesn't 
take baths either. 
b.?*Jane is a neat housekeeper and she doesn't 
take baths either. 
That "CtJbe construction, A and not B e ither, carries with it the 
presupposition that one might expect A to entail not B" (p. 110). Of 
course, this is a howler as it stands=--what speakers expect about 
entailment is irrelevant. Presumably -what Lakoff means it that one 
would not expect A and B, and in this he seems unmistakably right. 
Consider also the following contrasts.22 
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(224} a. Jane just succeeded in proving Fermat ' s Last 
Theore1n, and her husband is very brilliant ct oo }· 
a s well 
b . ?*Jane just added 2 and 2 and got 6 , and her 
husband is very brilli ant (too } · 
as well 
(225} a . Jane considered going to the dentist , but decided 
to enjoy her day off instead. 
b.?*Jane consi dered taking a pleasant ride through t he 
countryside, having a really good dinner, and 
seeing a movie, but decided to enjoy her day off 
instead. 
Lakoff concludes on the basis of such data23 that , while we may 
continue to use deviant , ill- formed, ungrammatical , etc . a s prefilcates 
of utterance{- t oken)s in context , they and their posit ive cognates mus t 
now be construed as designating relations between string(- type)s and 
sets of factual j udgments; a string is veil- or ill-f ormed only relative 
to such a set . Thus , we arrive at a ~tr ong notion of semant i c presup-
position by allowing factual presumptions to invade semantics via 
syntax. 
Two theoretical arguments seem to be implied here. One (let us 
call it the Argument from Meaningfulness) is a more explici tly semant ical 
version of that provided on the first page of the present section: 
Neglecting well-known cases of "semi- ", borderline or marginal grammati-
calness , a string must be well- formed or grammatical in order to be 
meaningful. Further , a string must be meaningfUl in order to have any 
semantic properties {save, trivially , that of meaninglessness) at all. 
Therefore , if the grammaticalness of a string depends on contingent 
factual presumptions, then so do that string's very meaningfulness and 
a fortiori its other semantic properties . 
The second theoretical argument (herearter, the Argument from 
Cenerative Semantics) is more remote from Lakoff' s text, but we suppose 
that it is one be would accept, since it captures a piece of motivation 
for the invocation of "presupposition" in semantic theory that is based 
squarely on the central claim or Generative Semantics : (i) The Lakovian 
presumptions affect syntactic well- f"ormedness. (ii) Semantic representa-
tions or logical. -forms are the input to syntactic derivations . There-
fore, {111} The Lakovian presumptions are in some vay part of sema.ntic 
content or logical form. The moral of each of the two ar gwnents is 
that factual presumptions ought in some way to be represented in our 
semantic accormts of the target sentences in question. And , J11ore 
generally, syntax and semantics ought hereafter to be conceived as being 
context-relative; they are not the austere, purely formal filsciplines 
they have been supposed to be ; one cannot pursue them successfully 
without taki ng into account particular utterers in particular situations . 
As we have implied throughout this essay, we want to resist these 
conclusions. It seems to us (though this is not the place to defend this 
less tha:i popular contention} that there is important theoretical 
utilit y to be gdned by splitting semiotic study into that which pertains 
to the formal properties of sentences considered apart from particular 
contexts , on the one hand, and relations that the same sentences bear 
to features of particular situations, on the other. In particular, we 
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want to hold to our perfect ly natural inclination to say that a 
sentence simply has a certain meaning or meanings in English, and that 
it simply has a certain range of possible uses, th~se being specifiable 
quite independently of contextual considerations. 24 And we certainly 
do not vant to court the counterintuitiveness and ugly theoretical 
complications of supposing that the very recursive rules which 
delineate well-formedness (rules which seem by their very nature to 
be purely formal) depend in any way on mention of specific possible 
states of affairs. Intuitively, a sentence is either a well-formed 
string of English or it is not (again barring borderline cases), 
regardless of what speakers, hearers, or theorists may happen to 
believe about nonlinguistic reality. 
If we are to resist Lakoff1 s skeptical conclusions, then, we must 
turn aside both of the theoretical arguments we have sketched, and 
find some alternative account of the phenomena; and this will not be 
entirely easy to do, since the arguments appear to be valid and the 
data are hard. Let us begin with the Argument-from Generative 
Semantics. (We shall return to the Argument from Meaningfulness 
considerably later.) 
Lakoff has not shown that premise (i) is true. In the respective 
contexts envisioned, it .1s plain that there is something wrong with 
tokening the strings in question--"wrong" at least in the general 
sense of "inappropriate", "nasty", or "unacceptable". What Lakoff has 
not demonstrated is that the awfulness is specifically syntactic ill-
formedness. It is quite possible in each of the cases we have listed 
that the penalty of "presupposition" failure is not syntactic defective-
ness at all, but infelic:itousness of an Austinian sort, Gricean conver-
sational unacceptability, or some other nonsyntactic: flaw. (In short, 
the relation between a string and its associated set of factual 
presumptions may well be praginatic, as its essential c:ontextualness 
naturally leads us to expect.) The problem for us here is that, as 
was not the case in our discussions in Section 3 above, no such 
pragmatic explanation comes readily to mind-the ugliness of (223b), 
(224b), (225b) and the like has no obvious pragmatic: source. 
Fortunately, we need not await the development of a detailed 
pragmatics in order to defuse the Argument from Generative Semantics. 
For we still have the option of denying premise (ii), despite its 
apparent centrality to the Generative Semanticists' program, The 
first thing to notice is that, if the argument is to be regarded as 
valid, premise (ii) must be interpreted exclusively, i.e. as: (ii') 
Semantic representations or logical forms are the sole input to 
syntactic derivations.-otherwise it would have to be regarded as 
possible for the La.kovian presumptions to be nonsemantic: input to 
the syntactic derivations. And in fact, this latter possibility is 
precisely what we want to hypothesize as fact. This requires, of 
course, that we deny (ii'); we hereby do so, for there is independent 
evidence of its falsity. 
For example, there are several convincing reasons to think that 
syntactic: transformations operate in part on underlying performative 
prefaces which refer to the utterer of a sentence, to the hearer 
addressed, and to the speech act which the speaker is thereby 
performing.25 Thus, e .g. a declarative sentence such as 
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(226} Fred is fat.  





I I I I 
state I you s 
~ 
Fred is rat 
Now it is plain (con~rary~ perhaps~ to sljps or malapropisms on the 
part of a few linguists) that this posited perrorrnative pre~ace is not 
pa.rt of logical form or semantic ~ontent in acceptably strict senses of 
those terms. A logical t'orm ass1.gneci. w a sentence~ on the usage 
orlginat ed. by Russell, determines a fully disambiguated l'eading of 
that sentence, along with a. set a:f truth-conditions for that reading~ 
and thereby (in the context of a containing logice.l theory) codifies 
aJ.J.. of the sentence ts enta.ilment-rela.tions--nothi:ng more. And it is 
clear that the performative preface dis layed in (227) p1ays no role in 
determining the conditions under which {226) is true, or what is or is 
oot entailed 1,y (226). (Thus La.k.off writes) correctly,26 
Note that in sentences it is the propositional ~ontent ~  
oot the entire sentence, that will be true or i'al.se •.•  
in sentence~ where there is an overt performative verb  
of' saying or stating or assert.ing1 the propositional  
content, which is true or false, is not given by the  
sentence as a.. ·W"hole I but rather by th~ object of that  
perrormative verb. (1972:560}  
The 11propositiona.l content 11 .referred to is precisely the scape or 
complement of the performa;t;hre opera.tor. The specification o:f overt 
per.formative verbs is inessential to the point.) Entail.ment=rele.tions .• 
a.nd truth-conditions generally~ are to be read out from: under the 
performa.t i ve p_.e.fa~ e, a.nd so, consequently~ is logka.l form. Contrary 
to what Lakoft' goes on nealogistically to say, logical form does not 
properly contain propositional content-it is propositional content. 
The semantic content of a sentence is one thing, the illocutionary force 
or that sentence~ or the (::pragmatic) use to which it is put on some 
occasion 1 is citlite anotherJ though both notions are important to the 
understanding of 11meaningu ta.k.en diffu_sely in the large. 
The relevance or the Perrormative Analysis to our discussion of 
'1 relat i ve. g:rammat icaH.ty1• is that it provides a c:crW1terexmnple to 
premise (ii 1 ) of' the reYised Argument from Generative Semantics. Logical 
f"orm, properly construed, is not the sole input to tne transformational 
component I for tra.nsi'ormatiom; operate"'ii !,,,!ell on perf'ormative material~ 
and perror:ma.tive material. is not part or logical rorm. (Thus, if~ 
take 11 deep structure" to l:Je, "by defi.nition, whatever it is that syntactic 
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transformations take as input, we cannot accept the suggestion that 
deep structure may simply be identified with logical form. Deep 
structure has logical form as a proper part . ) Now, what we want 
to suggest is that there is at least a second sort of input to the 
transformational component: factual presumptions. That is, we shall 
concede that contingent factual presumptions do indeed affect 
syntactic processes, but deny the alleged implication that these 
presumptions have semantical repercussions. In this way we may 
concede their existence and their syntactic relevance without courting 
the troublesome and counterintuitive claim that a sentence's semantic 
properties (as codified in the logical form(s) assigned to the sentence ) 
vary with contingent fact . 
No one who takes seriously the contention that syntactic processes 
have "psychological reality" need find this proposal startling. It 
is not surprising that performative prefaces affect syntactic deriva-
tions, since what one wants and intends to do with one's words, no 
less than the thought (so to speak) passing""'Ehrougb one's mind, may 
certainly be expected to affect the causal processes issuing in one ' s 
actual speech. Likewise, we would expect the background beliefs 
stored in one ' s belief- stockpile to affect these processes too. So 
it is quite natural to suggest that sets of beliefs (on someone's 
part) should serve as input to syntactic transformations just as 
performative prefaces do, or at least that some transformations should 
be sensitive to them. 
5 . 2 . Alternative Analyses 
We hypothesize that the transformations that are sensitive to 
contingent factual beliefs are relatively superficial. Consider case 
3 above, that of presumptive intonation contours. Our inclination is 
to suppose that the relevant stress is functioning only conversa-
tionally in such cases; but, rather than put forward a Gricean theory 
applicable to stress phenomena, let us suppose for the sake of argument 
that stress contour cuts deeper than this, to the extent that a 
sentence uttered with inappropriate intonation relative to the 
contextually presumed beliefs is syntactically and not just conversa-
tionally unacceptable. If so , we suggest, the bel iefs affect the 
syntactic process somewhere in the relatively superficial subprocess 
of lexicalization (if intonation is taken to be a lexical matter), or 
even in the phonological component (if we are careful to distinguish 
a theoretical level of "surface structure" from what is ultimately 
produced in the form of patterns of noises or marks). It seems clear 
that the truth-conditions of (222a) and (222b) are precisely the 
same--thougb of course this would be denied by someone who held that 
(222a) is ill- formed, and hence has no truth-conditions at all, in 
contexts in which it is presumed that it ' s good to be a lexicalist. 
Why not adopt the far more natural alternative of saying, not that 
in such a context (222a) has been produced from no logical form at 
all, but that it has been produced from a conjunctive logical form 
(the same one which underlies (222b)) by a syntactic process culminating 
in a regrettably defective lexicalization? 
It is much more obvious that Lakoff's data concerning who (case 
2 above) are lexical in nature. When a syntactic process requires the 
insertion of a relative pronoun, the syntactic component waits until 
almost all its operations have been completed before deciding whether 
to lexicalize that pronoun as who or as which . The choice , to be 
sure , is dictated by a nonsemantic factor; but it is quite a super-
ficial choice. 
The i nsertion of~. too, and e ither (cf. cases land 4) is , 
we should think, nearly as superficial, triggered rather late in the 
transformational process by items from whatever set of factual pre-
swnptions is in play. Since we want so far as possible to avoid 
resting our main contentions on substantive and probably controversial 
syntactic claims (not being in a position to defend such claims in any 
detail) , we shall not try to flesh out an articulated theory of the 
sources of the Lakovian particles. But if a grammar is to be sensitive 
enough to factual presumptions to mark the Lakovian target sentences 
as being ungrammatical relative to the rel evant presumptions , then 
that grammar must have some way of recording that relativity. We 
suggest that the most natural and appropriate procedure is simply to 
flag some transformations in such a way as to limit their operation 
to occasions of favorable conditions in a speaker ' s (or whoever ' s) 
belief- s t ore.27 
We are a littl e more troubl ed by example (225) above. The 
presumption of (225a) is evidently that going to the dentist is not 
enjoy~ble (that going to the dentist and enjoying oneself tend to 
precl ude one another); and the (true) presumption relative to which 
(225b) is deviant is that taking a pleasant ride through the country-
side, etc. are enjoyable (do not tend to preclude enjoying oneself) . 
We are not sure exactly what is going on here, but we shall hazard 
some cautious preliminary syntactic remarks designed simply to 
illustrate the pattern of explanation that we find attractive . 
It seems clear enough that instead, at least in sentences like 
{225a-b), contains a hidden reference back to a previously occurring 
item; instead cannot occur in the absence of any assumed antecedent : 
(228) *The whale is a mammal instead. 
(229) ~Two and two is four instead. 
Probably there is a deleted redunda.ncy- - viz. instead in (225) very 
likely comes from -instead of NP where "NP" is replaced by a repetiti on 
of the original noun or nominal phrase .-Thus, (225a) \i'Ould come from 
(230) 	 Jane considered going to the dentist, but decided 
to enjoy her day off instead of goi ng to the 
dentist. 
28the "instead of" cJ.ause being inside the scope of decided . 
It is less plausible here to say that instead is inserted super-
ficially in response to the presence of a factual belief, if instead 
is indeed not a mere!y inserted item like~ or too. If instead 
derives from an entire underlying clause, then it is less easy to 
fall back on our practice of saying that it is just kicked in l exically 
at the eleventh hour by a piece of background information . 
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What may possibly be happening here is that instead of in inter-
mediate structure comes from a sentential connective, and is inserted 
when the connected sentences are nominalized (if the nominalizations 
do come from underlying sentences, as they may or may not). The 
connective in question may well be and not. If so, then it is 
plausible to suggest that instead of as a particular lexicalization 
of & - has a contrastive connotation (wilike other lexicalizations 
such as and not), just as but is a lexicalization of & which is 
distinguished from other possible lexicalizations in that it ca:r·ries 
the suggestion of contrast. And this brings us to a brief discussion 
of the nature of "contrastive connotation" itself. 
A naive theorist might demand that sentences whose ma.in surface 
connective is and and those whose main connective is but be assigned 
different logical forms. E. g. since 
(23.l.) George believes in semantic presupposition but 
he's smart. 
suggests in whatever sense that we don't expect believers in semantic 
presupposition to be smart, while 
(232) 	 George believes in semantic presupposition and 
be's Slllll,rt. 
carries no such suggestion, it might be said that (231) and (232) have 
different underlying semantic structures. This, we believe, would be 
seriously mistaken. For, considered from the austere standpoint of 
truth- conditions alone, (231) and (232) would seem to be equivalent. 
Since (232) is true if George believes in semantic presupposition and 
George is smart, this commits us to saying that (231) is true in that 
circumstance as well. 
Perhaps the contention that (23.l.) and (232) have the same truth-
conditions will be seen as simply question-begging. After all, if 
(231) is ill-formed in a context in which it is not presumed that 
belief in semantic presupposition tends to preclude being smart, 
then (231) and (232) cannot have the same truth-conditions, there 
being at least one possible state of affairs in which (232) is true 
but ( 231) is untrue (because ungrammatical). We shall argue against 
this last claim by considering that possible state of affairs a 
little more closely. Suppose we are in a seminar room full of 
semantic presupposition enthusiasts, and tha\ these worthies have 
convinced us that the notion of semantic presupposition is not only 
viable but a sharp and indispensable tool for linguistic semantics 
in this century. No one in the room doubts this for a moment; any 
one of us, faced with a philosopher who failed to recognize the 
prevalence of truth-valuelessness, would conclude either that the 
philosopher's intuitions and a priori assumptions were badly soured 
or clouded by years of teaching introductory first-order logic, or 
that the philosopher was a jackass. Now suppose that someone in the 
company asserts (231), referring by his use of George to someone who 
is not present. It seems clear that, although the speaker's utterance 
is deviant in the context, nevertheless what he says has significant 
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implications. For example, be could justifiably be held to have 
asserted that George believes in semantic presupposition, and likewise 
to be held linguistically responsible for the truth of the claim that 
George is smart (the speaker did, after all, say that George is smart) . 
If George turns out to be stupid despite his oeTief in semantic 
presupposition, then, it seems to u.s, the speaker has (inter alia) 
said something false . Now if even in a context elaborately safe-
guarded against the presumption that believing in semantic presup-
position tends to preclude being smart, the speaker's utterance is 
held to have implications (it entails its conjuncts at least) and to 
be (even "in part") false, then it has semantic properties and hence 
is not meaningless or semantically ill- formed in the context. 
The case is even clearer if ve imagine that the speaker, rather 
than being one of our own number, has Just entered from the outside . 
He may utter (231), believing that Boer and Lycan wer e right in 
"The Myth of Semantic Presupposition" and that they never should have 
been persuaded to recant . What are we (the occupants of the seminar 
room) to say about this utterance of (231}? Should we say that it is 
ungrammatical and hence meani ngless, though the speaker remains gaUy 
unaware of this? That the speaker ' s own apparent belief in (23l) ' s 
presumption suffices by itself to render his utterance meaningful? 
That (such matters being relative) the utterance is meaningful "for 
him" but not meaningful "for us" , whatever that might mean? Whatever 
choice we make here, one thing that seems indisputabl e is that, as 
before, the utterance has implications and admits at least of the 
possibility of being i'a.lse; and if so, then it is meaningful and 
hence grammatical in the context, period . 
But isn't there something wrong with uttering (231) in a context 
in which no one believes or pretends to believe that believing in 
semantic presupposition tends to preclude being smart? Certainly 
there is, but not necessarily falsity, truth- valuelessness, or any 
other semantic defect . An utterance of (231) would be inappropriate . 
Why? 
5 . 3 . The Awfulness of (Relative) Deviance 
It vould be hard to explain the inappropriateness in Gricean terms, 
since there is nothing wrong with the literal l.ocutionary content of 
(231)--it does not appear to violate any conversational maxim, and 
hence does not give rise to a Gricean argument on the part of the 
hearer. Nor, though the utterance of (231) in a hostile situation 
would certainly be infelicitous in some sense, would the infelicity 
be of any characteristic Austinian sort , for nothing would go wrong 
in any standard way with the speech act performed (qua speech act)--
there is no temptation to accuse the utterer of having failed to make 
a statement, or of having stated defectively (except in a tautolo-
gously broad sense or "defective" that simply co-extends with the 
wholly general "inappropriate"). 
The problem seems intuitively to reside in the choice of the word 
but, and thus to be a lexical problem. This brings us back to the--
pattern of explanation employed in connection with vho, ~. too, 
and either . The lexiealizing transformation that produces English 
reflections of & is sensitive to ractual presumptions: if it is 
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presumed (by whomever} that the truth of s1 tends to preclude that 
of S2, then the occurrence of i in rs1 i S21will be lexicalized as 
but; otherwise not. And what is wrong wi tfi (231) in a context in 
which no one has the relevant belief is that But-Lexicalization has 
operated on its own, without the appropriate trigger . A parallel 
account may explain the behavior of instead: We have suggested that 
instead reflects a shallowly underlying instead of, and the latter 
appears to be a specialized lexicalization of & - (waiving questions 
of how and where in the derivation lexical insertion occurs), properly 
triggered only when the speaker's store of presumptions includes the 
belief that one of the relevant alternatives excludes the other. The 
string 
(233} "Jane thought of going swimming, but decided 
to go swimming instead. 
is completely unacceptable because the presumption that going swimming 
tends to precl ude going swimming is self- contradictory. 
A similar if slightly extended strategy may suffice to account for 
the presumptive behavior of counterfactuals. Our account of counter-
factuals in Section 3.8 above, unl i ke our other explanations of 
"presupposition" phenomena, rested on a highly substantive piece of 
theory (David Lewis') and so was introduced only as an attractive 
possibility; what we shall point out here is another . 
Our feelings about counterfactuals with true antecedents are 
very strong, and (to report our own case) they bear interesting intro-
spective Similarities to our feelings about~. but, instead, etc. 
It is possible that the deviance of a counterfactual with a true antece-
dent is, like theirs, lexical . Nottce that the problem arises only in 
connection with the superficial subjun~tive mood. Even when a conditional 
expresses a speculative hypothesis., its antecedent may acceptably be 
true if it is couched in the overtly iod,icative mood, as 
(234) If it turns out that Raj comes to the party, 
there'll be a volleyball game . 
which is perfectly acceptable even when it does turn out that Haj 
attends. Now it is interesting that the subjunctive mood (excluding 
the hortatory subjunctive) is in a way not on a par with the other 
moods of a traditional English gral!llllar: indicative, interrogative, 
imperative. Each of the latter corre.sponds to a general type of speech 
act (stating, asking, ordering, etc.), and is produced at the surface 
presumably by transformations which are triggered by the corresponding 
performative prefaces in syntactic deep structure. The subjunctive 
mood, by contrast, corresponds to no fami,lia.r general type of speech 
act and is presumably not so produced. Our suggestion (only that) is 
that the superficial subjunctive mood is a lexical item, introduced by 
a lexicalizing transformation, and that this lexicalizing rule is a 
factually restricted one, like But-Lexicalization. One further small 
piece of evidence for this is t~fact that, while the transformations 
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which produce surface interrogatives and imperatives reorder 
structural elements of underlying forms, whatever produces surface 
subjunctives changes only individual words. To make a subjunctive, 
one need only change does to should, was to~. will to would, 
etc. If all this is right, then the deviance of a counterfactual with 
a true antecedent is of just the same sort as that of (231) tokened in 
a hostile context; a sentence of the form (175) above presumes (we might 
say, lexically presumes) the falsity of S1. 
5.4. Narrow Grammaticality and Broad Grammaticality 
A serious objection to our program comes to mind. We have conceded 
that the failure of a Lakovian or lexical presumption has syntactic 
repercussions, insofar as lexicalization is a syntactic matter, and we 
have suggested that the resulting odd utterance is the product of 
illicit lexicalization. Now to say that the lexicalization of but in 
a hostile context is "illicit" is presumably to say that the appearance 
of but at the surface is not the result of a correct application of 
But-Lexicalization. But (so the objection goes) there is no such thing 
as an incorrect application of But- Lexicalization--a syntactic rule 
either applies or does not appl;:- Consequently, the surfacing of but 
is not the result of an application of But-Lexicalization at all . And 
it certainly is not the result of an application of any other syntactic 
rule; so it is not generated by the set of syntactic rules taken as a 
whole, i.e . not generated by the grammar. But a grammar is (among other 
things) a recursive device that delineates the notion of grammaticality. 
So our string whose factual presumption has failed is ungrammatical 
(in the context in which the failure occurs). Moreover, since it is 
not the output of any syntactic rule(s), and since our syntactic rules 
(run in reverse) are what assign semantic representations to surface 
structures, it seems we are forced to the conclusion that our defective 
string has no semantic interpretation, and hence expresses no logical 
form, and hence is assigned no truth-conditions, and hence cannot be 
either true or false! In short, in offering our account of but and 
other particles, have we not almost explicitly conceded Lakoff's claim 
in its strongest form, and opened the door to semantic presupposition 
after all? 
This argument is impressive, and, though we believe that it 
fails due to several crucial oversimplifications, we shall be able 
here to offer only a rough sketch of a reply. But we can begin with 
a datum that is tolerably clear and points toward complexities 
unrecognized by the argument: 
There is a substantial intuitive difference between the sense in 
which (231) is "ungrammatical" relative to the fact that believing in 
semantic presupposition does not tend to preclude being smart--at 
best a somewhat attenuated sense, ve believe--and that in which (236) 
or even (237) is ungrammatical. 
(236) *Good of believe Off table the the the why. 
(237) wBertrand believes who Gottlob is. 
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Wbat we want to maintain is that (231) is "grammatical" enough 
to have trutb-conditions, and indeed to be true even when lexically 
inappropriate. The utterer of (231) (in th~stile circumstances) 
has violated a rule of grammar, but it is not a rule whose violation 
produces semantic anomaly. We propose the hypothesis that, even though 
the rule in this case has not been properly triggered, it can still be 
run backwards as a semantic-interpretation mapping in such a way that 
(231), even in our hostile context, will be assigned a (truth- conditional) 
semantic interpretation and hence can be understood in a rather narrow 
sense (for what that is worth). Thus, to address the formidable 
objection raised a few paragraphs above, the factual restriction on our 
But- Lexicalication rule does not serve as an impenetrable filter. That 
is, it is not an absolute restriction which, if violated, prevents the 
rule from operating at all; rather, it functions (if you like) as a 
strainer- the product succeeds in coming through, but not in a very 
appetizing form. It is, we shall argue, grammatical in a broad but 
useful sense, though deviant in a considerably narrower sense. 
If there are (as we contend, contrary at least to the letter of 
Generative Semantics) several disparate sources of input to the trans-
formational component, at least two of which must function jointly to 
produce a particular string that is grammatical in the context in which 
it occurs, then it is (though perhaps unfamiliar) not at all surprising 
that there should be more than one sort of syntactic or quasi-syntactic 
"deviance", corresponding to failures of various sorts of triggers. 
The deviance of (231) in our hostile context is due, not to any mal-
function or misuse of the rules which rearrange elements of logical form 
to produce surface form , but to the unlicensed application (nevertheless, 
an application) of a preswnption- $ensitive lexica.lizing rule which has 
nothing to do with structuring. The form is the same, and it is this 
form for which truth-conditions are def'ined. Thus, a sentence uttered 
in a context may be lexically deviant without being semantically 
deviant or uninterpretable. In this quaint sense, the sentence may 
(somewhat paradoxically) be both "ungrammatical" in its context and 
true, unlike (236) or (237), which simply have no semantic interpretation. 
~ a fortiori, the sentence can be both "ungrammatical" in this wey 
and meaningful . This suffices to turn aside the Argument from Meaningful-
ness, since that argument baldly assumed, equivocating on grammatical , 
that ungrammaticality entails meaninglessness. 
What is to become, then, of Lakoff's claim that "a sentence will be 
well-formed only with respect to certain presuppositions about the 
nature of the world"? We have distinguished tvo notions of "grammati-
calness" vhich might paraphrase well-formed here, a broad notion and 
a narrow notion. A sentence is "grammatical" in the broad sense if it 
is assigned a semantic interpretation, whether or not it has been 
appropriately lexicalized (alternatively, if it is the product of some 
application of the relevant syntactic rules, even if one or more of the 
rules has been applied in violation of a "strainer"-style restriction). 
A sentence is "grammatical" in the narro'< sense, however, only if it is 
not only semantically interpretable but correctly lexicalized given 
the factual presumptions that in fact obtain in the context in which it 
is uttered. Thus, a sentence in vacuo is "grammatical" in the broad 
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sense, or else it is not; it is "grammatical" (or "ungramma.tica.l") 
in the narrow sense only relative to a set of contingent bel.iefs. 
To be semantically interpretable is to have a specific logical 
form or forms. In -view of this, 1,e prefer to reserve the term well-
formed as a synonym for "grammatical" in the broad sense. (Thus, some 
well-formed sentences are lexically improper.) ~e may relate well-
formedness in this sense to "grammaticalness" in the narrow sense in 
the way suggested by Lakoff himself (1.969:ll5): A string S :i,s well-
formed (- "gra.nnnatical" in the broad sense) if_f there is at least one 
set of factual presumptions relative to which s is "gra.mma.tical II in 
the narrow sense. The well-formecmess of S, on this usage, does not 
vary with contextually specified sets of beliefs. 
Lakoff w-rites, 
However, if a speaker is called upon to make a judgment as 
to ..tiether or not Sis 'deviant', then his extra-linguistic 
knowledge enters the picture. 
On our usage, deviant here is to be read as "not 'grammatical.' in the 
narrow sense"; a sentence ' s being "deviant" in this sense is (contrary 
to Lakoff's usage) compatible with that sentence's being well-fanned 
(semantically interpretable). 
The contrast between the broad and narrow senses -0f "grammatical" 
has so far been highlighted only by the behavior of words of a certain 
class {even, too, either, instead, but, •. . ), which (so to speak) 
themselves carry connotations of various kinds. If we are right in 
supposing all this, then poss.ibly other syntactic phenomena will be seen 
to point toward the distinction as well. And it should be added that 
tbere are probably l-0ts of different senses (or kinds, or grades) of 
grammaticality besides these two; grammatical., deviant, OK, and other 
evaluative predicates appli·ed by linguists to strings mask many 
different kinds of linguistic (and sometimes nonlinguistic) goodness 
and badness, and someday these must all be straightened out. 
Lakoff anticipates and disparages our suggestion of defining 
"grarnmatica.lity'' in the broad sense in terms of "grar.ur.aticalit:(" in 
the nar::row sense and reserving "well- formed.Dess" as a synonym for the 
former: 
Such a definition would define a field of presupposition-
free syntax. One might ask then what "ould be the content 
of this field, what phenomena would it deal with, would it 
be interesting? Sqch a field of presupposition-free syntax 
would deviate from the traditional study of syntax in that 
it would no longer involve the study oi' the distribution of 
all grammatical morphemes. As we have seen, the distribution 
of grammatical morphemes like who versus which cannot be 
stated in terms of presupposition-f'ree syntax. •. It is not 
even clear that principled gr-0unds could be found for 
motivating the notion of grammatical transformation within 
the bounds of such a field ... In fact, it JIJI.J.Y well turn out 
that such a field would be li:mited to the study of the well-
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formednesa conditions on possible surface structures of a 
language . Such a field might well be no more interesting 
than traditional phrase structure gra:mmar. At present, there 
is no reason to believe that it would be . (pp . 115- 6) 
Lakoff seems to concede here that our distinction between well- formedness 
and "grammaticality" in the narrow sense is tenable; what he doubts is 
that, as a matter of empirical fact, a "presupposition-free syntax" or 
recursive characterization of (what we call) well- formedness would be 
able to explain many of what are traditionally taken to be syQtactic 
phenomena--or so we read the quoted remarks . 
He points out that "presupposition-free" syntax would fail to 
account for the distribution of all grammatical morphemes, e.g. for 
that of who and which. This is correct; on our account, a recursive 
grammar of(mere) vell- formedness would not predict whether who or 
which was correct in a given context--obviously, since it would not be 
context-relative at all . But this consequence is entirely congenial to 
us. Whether one uses who or which in a given context is not a matter 
of form or structure, and, so far as we can see, has nothing to do with 
truth- conditions in the semanticists' sense of the term. It is a matter 
of the &PPropriateness of a single word. Possibly appropriateness-
conditions should be built into an adequate semantics in the form of 
nonlogical axioms or "meaning postulates", for those linguists and 
philosophers who countenance such things (and it seems clear that our 
syntax will have to countenance them, though philosophers may go on to 
argue over their logical or epistemic status) . But axioms, for those 
who appeal to them, serve strictly to account for (or "account for") 
those semantic phenomena that are nonstructural, that turn on particular 
information about particular morphemes or semantic primes. Thus, it 
seems to us that a recursive theory of well-formedness should fail to 
predict the behavior of all morphemes. 
A more serious question is that of whether a "presupposition-:free" 
syntax would be interesting or important. Lakoff contents himself with 
giving a few examples of allegedly interesting phenomena that would 
fail to be treated by such a syntax. That in itself is unexcitin,g. 
What makes Lakoff1 s examples more interesting is that the phenomena in 
question are'ones which have been thought of by linguists specifically 
as syntactic phenomena. And data of this sort drive home our earlier 
contention that syntactic rules operate on something in addition to 
semantic representations or logical forms. 
However (assuming that Lakoff's points concerning selectional 
restrictions, coreference and identity, etc. can be dealt with inde-
pendently}, we have f-0und only one class of syntactic phenomena that 
require us to posit input from the belief-store, and the hypothesized 
syntactic effect of such beliefs is (so far as has been shown) quite 
superficial. There seems to be a group of morphemes whose distribution, 
rather late in the transformational process , is indeed governed by 
background beliefs . But that in itself hardly warrants Lakoff' s grandly 
skeptical predictions quoted above . He would have to find much more 
evidence, and many more different kinds of plainly syntactic but 
equally plainly context-bound data, in order to make a case for 
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doubting the importance or interest o:f "presupposition-free" syntax.
Two final replies: 
1. La.koff says, "It is not even clear that principled grounds 
could be found for motivating the notion of Bramma.tical transforma-
tion within the bounds of such a field." His reason for this (de1-eted 
from the foregoing quotation} is that 
since selectional restrictions in general involve pre-
suppositions, any such restrictions could not be used 
to motivate transformations . If such grounds for moti-
vating transformations vere taken away, it is not clear 
that very many, if any, of the traditionally assumed 
transformations could be motivated vithin a presupposition-
free syntax. (p. 116) 
Two dubious claims are involved here: that "selectional restrictions 
in general involve presuppositions", and that most of the "traditionally 
assumed" transformations are assumed large]._y on the basis of arguments 
from selectional restrictions. The first of these claims i s entirely 
unclear as it stands, though it is likely to yiel d a truth upon 
cl.arification, since "selectional restrictions" rather obviously 
depend on the bel.iefs of speakers and hearers and consequently may 
be expected to vary considerabl.y with those beliefs (this is one reason 
for supposing that "selectional restrictions", contrary to the inten-
tions of Gilbert Ryle, should play only a minor role in syntax}. The 
second claim is much more striking. Doubtless Lakoff knovs far more 
of tbe history of syntax than ve . But (i) we have never noticed that 
appeals to selectional restr ictions loomed particular]._y large in 
syntactic argumentation that we have come across, and (ii) we should 
regard such appeals as argumentatively suspect, since (intuitively 
speaking} they bear not on formal structure, but on vhat we say about 
the meanings of words. Only much further work can settle these 
issues. 
The matter of selectional restrictions aside, it is easy enough 
to provide "principl.ed grounds" for motivating the notion of a 
grammatical transformation within the bounds of presupposition-free 
syntax. The job of a presupposition-free syntax as limned above is, 
given semantic representations or logical forms vritten in a logicians' 
canonical idiom, to map these forms onto well-formed (i . e. in Lakoff ' s 
phrase, possible) English surface structures. A syntax of well-
formedness is needed (whether or not it is as "important" as some 
other branches and sub-branches of semiotics); and it is hard to see 
bow such a mapping would be able to function in the absence of 
grammatical transformations--it seems, indeed, to require them by 
definition . 
2. LaJ<.off says, "[Presupposition-free syntax) might well be no 
more interesting than traditional phrase structure grammar. At 
present, there is no reason to believe that it would be." If what 
Lakoff is looking for is an a priori reason to believe that 
presupposition-free syntax would be interesting, in addition to the 
rather obvious fact that both logic and grammar require some notion 
of abstract structure (hovever unimportant that structure might turn 
out to be in comparison to other features of a natural language), he 
can find that reason in his mm remark about "well-formedness 
conditions on possible surface structures". For we have the notion, 
marked vividly in intuition, of a possible sentence, a string which 
has a possible use in English, though of course not every possible 
sentence is appropriate in every (or even any) context. There is a 
firm distinction between strings which are possible sentences of 
English and strings vhich simpl y have no semantic interpretation . 
(We would be the last to rule out the possibility that this distinction 
masks further and more refined distinctions as well . ) It is precisely 
the job of "presupposition-free" syntax, as Lakoff sees, to mark this 
distinction and t.hereby to delineate the class of strings that are 
candidates for lexically correct, felicitous and conversationally 
acceptable utterance. And that is interesting enough for us. 
Footnotes 
1Keenan (1972) provides a good example of the theoretical 
complications attending the acceptance of presuppositions . 
2Wilson (1975) makes a valuable step tovards discrediting pre-
suppositions, albeit from a somewhat different standpoint from the one 
adopted here. Boer and Lycan (1974) attack presuppositions in the form 
of "invited inrerences" (Geis and Zvicky 1971). 
3Langendoen and Savin (1971); Karttunen (1973) . 
4Karttunen's more recent vritings display increasing sophistication 
in these matters (1973; Karttunen and Peters 1975). 
5Tbis formulation is our r econstruction (Boer and Lycan 1974) of 
Geis and Zwicky1 s text. 
6Tbe following point has been made independently and somevhat 
differently by Katz (1973). 
7Tbus, Lakoff (1972) cannot (contrary to his explicit statement 
in footnote 2 to Section V) have been speaking of sellltlntic presup~osition 
when he wrote, " ... in certain cases tsicJ the presupposition relation 
is transitive ...CButJ transitivity of the presupposition relation fails 
in Cother] cases" {575, 576). 
8This is not to say that stress does not sometimes have semantic 
significance as well. 
9Tbe treatment of it as a "surface marker" for a bound variable 
in deep structure figures prominently in the version of Montague Grammar 
formulated by Cresswell (1973 :178-9), obviating the need for a rule of 
clefting. 
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1°Reis (1973) pursues thi s l i ne in a rejoinder to Wil son (1972) . 
11Notice that this is slightly paradoxical in itself: (74b) , when 
uttered (as is more COllll!lon) with rising stress on know, suggests or 
implies that Sam is a Martian , even though (74b} itself is entailed by 
the claim that he is not ! 
12rn a system of Montague Grammar, t he d istinction between 
i nternally and externally negated factive constructions can be made 
explicit at the level of deep structure, in terms or variations in the 
scope of negation relative to the scope of the nominalized sentential 
complement (regarded as a functor which forms sentences from monadic 
predicates) . Given an appropriate semantical rule for a factive 
complementizer that, factive constructions and their i nternal negations 
can both be shown to entail their sent ential compl ement s (Cr esswe l l 
1973:165- 9). If negated fact i ves are t hus syntactically ambi guous , 
there i s yet another expl anation of the temptation to invoke semantic 
presuppositions here, viz. failure to distinguish the genuine entailment 
which attached to internal negations in deep structure from the merely 
pragmatic implication attaching to external negations . This explanation 
would in turn neatly account for the fact that the factive suggestion 
carried by a negated epi stemic sentence is obliterated when that is 
r eplaced by whether . 
13compare also As soon as Smedley arrived at the narty, he managed 
to slip and fall on his face , though some hearers might insist on under-
standing this as irony. 
14The actual semantics and syntax of (103a) are mysterious to us. 
If (103a) is equivalent to some conjunction, as we suppose, is it 
itself derived from some conjunction i n semantic structure? Is there 
any syntactic evi~ence to indicate that manage undergoes lexical 
decomposition? These are matters we shall have i:o leave. But our data 
concerning (119)-(121) sui'fice to make the preliminary point that (103a) 
is simply stronger than (103c), and this point yields a natural explana-
tion of Karttunen' s phenomena, obviating any need to invoke semantic 
presupposition. 
15For some speakers, actually, our technician ' s opening- and-
shutting action verifies (147b} as veil as (147a.) . For these speakers, 
the following account is unnecessary. The oddity of (142a) vhen (142b) 
is false is due simply to the statistical rarity of actions relevantly 
like John's. 
l6of course, i:his kind of situation almost never actually occurs . 
When vacuous names occur in ordin,u,y English, they do so attributively . 
See Boer (to appear) . 
17The distinction between referential and attributive uses of 
singular terms, originally introduced by Donnellan (1966) as a pragmatic 
matter, has subsequently been given both a selllSntic dimension (Boer, to 
appear; Boer and Lycan, in press; Devitt 1974) and a syntactic dimension 
(Stampe 1974; Bell 1973). 
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18However, see Harman (1975), 
19For vhat we take to be the reason for this lack of success, 
however, see Lycan (1970). 
2°Chiefly Lakoff (1969 and 1972). See also Fillmore (1971) and 
Langendoen (1971), 
21Horn argues for related conclusions concerning~; these, 
we believe, are easier to explain away in terms of quantificational 
structure. 
22nata of this sort were called to our attention by Jon Schonsheck 
in an unpublished note. 
23He also offers examples concerning selectional restrictions, and 
some which depend on claims about core:ference and identity; but ve find 
these far less convincing than those we have listed. 
24of course, this is not to say that sentences could have meanings 
at all in the absence of speakers who use them in certain ways in 
certain situations. 
25see McCawley (1968); Ross (1970); Lakoff (1972); Sadock (1975). 
26The point, hovever, is not entirely uncontroversial; an opposing 
view is taken by Lewis (1972) and by Cresswell (1973). 
27cresswell (1973:235-6) seems to endorse a similar proposal :for 
Montague Grammar, for he remarks on the "elegance" of incorporating 
"use-dependent acceptability principles" and notes that Such principles 
can be generalized to include beliefs as well. 
28Actually, there is a relatively useless alternative reading of 
(225) and (230) according to which what Jane did instead of going to the 
dentist was to make a decision, one which may or may not have been 
carried out. 
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